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JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
RHETORICAL GENRES IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
On the morning of November 12, 1975, Associate United 
States Supreme Court Justice William Orville Douglas handed 
an envelope containing his letter of resignation to Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, asked him to deliver it to President 
Gerald Ford, and "stepped into h i s t o r y . H i s  tenure, the 
longest in the history of the Court, spanned almost thirty- 
seven years and was served under five Chief Justices and 
seven Presidents. His opinions, found in volumes 306 
through 423 of United States Reports, number almost twelve 
hundred and occupy more than a fourth of the bound records 
of the Supreme Court. On the occasion of justice Douglas' 
thirty-fifth anniversary on the Court, his close friend
^Newsweek, Noveiriber 24, 1975, p. 45.
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and former Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that,
If it is true, as said by de Tocqueville almost a 
century and a half ago, that in a period of time 
every public problem in American life eventually 
reaches the Supreme Court, certainly Justice Douglas 
has served through such a period, and he has written 
on every one of those problems without reservation 
or equivocation.2
When Douglas took his place on the Court on April 17, 
1939, filling the seat vacated by the resignation of Justice 
Louis D . Brandeis, he came there as one of the country's 
most widely recognized experts in finance law and business 
regulation. When the University of Chicago's new president 
Robert M. Hutchins tried unsuccessfully to recruit Douglas 
away from the Yale law faculty he called him "the most out­
standing law professorin the United States. In addition 
to expertise in corporate finance, and his brilliant ser­
vice on the Securities and Exchange Commission during the 
Roosevelt administration, and in addition to his association 
with a noted Wall Street law firm and his appointments to 
the law faculties of Columbia and Yale, William 0. Douglas 
was about to enter upon a new and distinguished career in
2
Earl Warren, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia Law 
Review 74 (April 1974), p. 342.
^Quoted in William 0. Douglas, Go East Young Man,
(New York: Random House, 1974), p. 164.
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American jurisprudence. Between 1942 and 1975 he authored 
two hundred and seven opinions touching upon first amend­
ment freedoms, opinions which would cause him to be 
regarded as the foremost advocate of individual liberty in 
the history of the United States Supreme Court. Professor 
Thomas I. Emerson of Yale wrote in 1974 that Douglas ;
. . .  sees the first amendment as much more than a 
weapon to prevent the government from interfering 
with freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition 
in narrow terms. He views it not only in Mill ' s 
sense as performing a social function in maintaining 
a marketplace of ideas, or in Meiklejohn's sense as 
essential to the working of the democratic process, 
but also as supplying the constitutional grounds for 
protecting each person in seeking to realize his or 
her potential as a man or woman. . . .  He is utili­
zing the first amendment as a counter to all the 
pressures of modem life toward conformity, bureau­
cracy and purely plastic existence, in this respect. 
Justice Douglas has given a totally new dimension to 
the first amendment.^
If only for existential reasons then, a figure of 
Douglas' historical significance, personal flamboyance, 
literary productivity and penchant for political controversy 
deserves scholarly attention. But William O. Douglas' path 
in American history has been marked most significantly not
^Thomas I. Emerson, "Justice Douglas' Contribution 
to the Law: The First Amendment, " Columbia Law Review
74 (April 1974), p. 3 56.
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by his early and unceasing involvement in the ecology and 
conservation movements, nor even by his contributions to 
the Roosevelt administration and his subsequent flirtations 
with Vice Presidential nominations, but by his candid and 
forceful arguments defending freedom of expression. Thus, 
this study focuses upon those arguments in order to better 
understand the philosophical and rhetorical supports for 
Douglas' beliefs.
Purpose of the Study
Although William O. Douglas' liberal interpretation 
of the first amendment is well-documented, the rhetorical 
bases of his position are not. Further, although the 
intrinsic rhetorical nature of judicial opinions is often 
asserted, their generic constituents remain undemonstrated. 
Therefore, the first question posited in this study asks: 
Can judicial opinions be generically classified according 
to the jurisprudential bases of their argument? This study 
hypothesizes that they can be so classified because of a 
characteristic nexus between argumentative substance and 
jurisprudential warrant; i.e., substantive rhetorical con­
tent depends for warrants on legal philosophy. The broad
-5-
theoretical categories of natural law, legal positivism, and 
legal realism thus can serve as the categories of an analy­
tic system for classifying substantive arguments within 
particular opinions.
The second question of this study is: Presuming the
general categories of natural law, legal positivism, and 
legal realism, are there generic clusters in Douglas' first 
amendment opinions, and if so, what are they and how can 
they be characterized? To answer that question, operational 
definitions of three potential rhetorical genres correspond­
ing to the general judicial orientations are adopted as 
content analytic categories. Each first amendment opinion 
of Douglas is then examined to determine which hypothetical 
genre best characterizes it. This analysis results in a 
grouping of his opinions into the three categories of 
natural law, legal positivism, and legal realism. If actual 
rhetorical practice flows from these jurisprudential orien­
tations, we may argue that legal philosophy and institutional 
constraints inherent in the United States Supreme Court 
merge to form rhetorical genres in judicial opinions.
The final question raised in this study asks : Does
William O. Douglas argue from different jurisprudential/
—6 —
rhetorical bases in majority and non-majority opinions?
Legal scholarship claims that substantial differences 
characterize these two opinion types. To determine whether 
Douglas' opinions typify this pattern, his majority and non­
majority opinions are compared to determine whether he 
adopts divergent rhetorical strategies when writing with 
the majority than he does when entering a dissent. For 
analytic purposes, the two classes are each sub-divided. 
Majority opinions Douglas authored are grouped as (1) 
Douglas for the majority (those cases in which he wrote the 
Court's ruling), and (2) Douglas concurring with the major­
ity (those cases in which he voted with the majority but 
authored a separate opinion). Non-majority opinions are 
classified as either Q1 ) Douglas dissenting from a sub­
stantive ruling of the Court (cases which the Court heard 
and issued decisions for from which he dissented), and (2) 
Douglas dissenting from procedural rulings (those cases in 
which he published an opinion dissenting from the Court's 
decision to deny certiorari, remands from re-trial at a 
lower court level, stays or denials of stays, and various 
other jural proceedings). These groups are then conpared 
to determine whether significant differences in the form 
or argument exist between them.
-7-
Such an inquiry into the rhetorical and jurisprudential 
bases of judicial opinions is justified for the communication 
scholar, the legal philosopher, and the legal practitioner 
alike. The communication scholar gains insight into the 
uses of rhetoric in one of its more crucial forums— the 
United States Supreme Court. The legal philosopher gains 
insight into the implementation of abstract philosophical 
principles in the day-to-day exigencies of legal reasoning. 
And the legal practitioner, representing either the bench 
or bar, gains insight into the argumentative bases of 
Supreme Court opinions.
Overview of the Study
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter I 
provides an introduction to the study, states the purpose 
of the study in terms of three research questions to be 
pursued, presents an overview of the project, and reviews 
three areas of relevant literature.
Chapter II explores the nature of judicial writing 
with special emphasis upon rhetorical differences between 
majority and non-majority opinions. This chapter draws 
upon the work of legal philosophers, jurists, and communi­
cation scholars to determine whether a constellation of
—8 —
constraints operates upon the rhetorical options of the 
judge-rhetor that produces a characteristic nexus between 
philosophic warrant and rhetorical strategy. Three hypo­
thetical argument forms drawn from natural law philosophy, 
legal positivism, and legal realism are operationalized 
respectively as Argument from Ideal, Argument from Rule and 
Argument from Context and subsequently serve as content 
analytic categories by which to examine Douglas' first 
amendment opinions. The constraints created by systemic 
and substantive limitations inhering in the Supreme Court 
as an institution are next examined to estimate their impact 
upon the rhetorical options of the judge. The chapter con­
cludes by examining critical comment on Douglas' opinions so 
that the present analysis may be placed in proper scholarly 
context regarding his judicial philosophy and rhetorical 
behavior.
Chapter III elaborates the assumptions underlying the 
research methods employed in this study and explains the 
LEXIS system of computerized legal data retrieval used to 
determine which of Douglas' career opinions touched upon 
the first amendment. The chapter concludes by detailing 
the practical procedures employed in coding each of the
-9-
opinions according to the categories established in Chapter
II.
Chapter IV presents the results of the study. The 
chapter's organization is derived from the order of 
questions pursued in the study: Section one discusses
critical observations regarding the existence of rhetorical 
genres in judicial opinion. The second section offers both 
critical and quantitative data pertaining to the generic 
clusters which characterize Douglas' first amendment opin­
ions. The final section presents data regarding differ­
ences between the rhetoric of majority and dissent.
Chapter V offers the conclusions drawn by this study 
regarding the existence of rhetorical genres in judicial 
writing and the generic variations found between majority 
and non-majority opinions. Finally, suggestions for further 
research into judicial rhetoric in general and William 0. 
Douglas in particular are offered in the fifth chapter.
Five appendices follow the study. Appendices A, B, 
and C respectively present Tables of Cases providing cita­
tions for cases coded as Natural Law (The Argument from 
Ideal), Legal Positivism (The Argument from Rule), and Legal 
Realism (The Argument from Context). Appendix D lists those
-10 —
cases retrieved by LEXIS, but judged not relevant to the 
present study. Appendix E provides an example of the 
coding form used to analyze the opinions. A bibliography 
of sources consulted completes the study.
Review of Literature 
Overview
Three general areas of scholarship impact upon the 
present study. The first is that literature pertaining to 
William O. Douglas' judicial career. These sources are 
reviewed to determine how previous analysts have evaluated 
Douglas and to establish his place and significance in 
American jurisprudence. Douglas' own non-judicial literary 
and scholarly works are introduced but not reviewed. The 
second body of literature surveyed is that produced by com­
munication scholars working in the area of freedom of 
expression. This review functions to provide the discipli­
nary backdrop into which the present study fits. A third 
area, philosophy of law and legal communication, is briefly 
surveyed here and then probed in depth in Chapter II.
-11-
Douqlas' Works. Even in retirement William O, Douglas 
continues to be one of the more prolific writers of all 
United States Supreme Court justices and his output during 
his career both on and off the bench was mammoth. He 
personally authored over twelve hundred opinions during his 
service on the Court, a tenure which on October 29, 1973, 
surpassed that of Justice Stephen J. Field, thus making 
Douglas' career the longest in the Court's history. In 
addition to this vast body of legal opinion, Douglas' extra­
judicial writings are as numerous as they are varied. On 
topics ranging from casebooks on the law of business finance 
and corporate reorganization, to his well-known works on 
conservation and ecology (written long before such issues 
were fashionable), from his polemic and controversial tract. 
Points of Rebellion, to his autobiography, Douglas has 
authored thirty-five book-length works. ^ In addition to 
these, he has produced scores of both scholarly and popular 
articles appearing in periodicals as diverse as the Harvard 
Law Review, Playboy, and the American Library Association's 
Intellectual Freedom Newsletter. Indeed, the complete extent 
of Douglas' literary output is not known. In an interview
^See Bibliography for these titles.
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with this researcher, Mr. Monty Podva, Douglas' present law 
clerk, reported that an entire year was allotted for the 
compilation of an accurate bibliography of the Justice's 
works. Obviously some restriction of this body of litera­
ture is necessary for present purposes. Since Douglas is 
best-known for his first amendment position, and since 
history must ultimately evaluate a Supreme Court justice 
principally on the basis of his judicial record, only those 
opinions dealing with the broad concept of freedom of 
expression will be analyzed in this study. Of the more 
than twelve hundred opinions Douglas authored, three 
hundred and one contain references to the first amendment, 
either substantial or tangential, and two hundred and seven
g
of those were deemed relevant to this study.
Limitations. Even though a Supreme Court justice has 
channels of communication open to him other than the opinion 
itself (an assertion clearly borne out in the case of 
Douglas himself), this study views the legal opinion as the 
channel which is likely to reveal recurrent patterns of 
relevant communication behavior. This study, therefore, for
^See Chapter III for the criteria adopted to determine 
relevance or irrelevance of opinions.
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practical as veil as theoretical reasons, will neither 
review now nor analyze later the extra-judicial writings 
of Justice Douglas.
During his long career William O, Douglas has contin­
ually attracted the attention of scholars and popular 
writers alike, and commentary on him has been characterized 
by glowing encomia as well as vitriolic invective. Within 
this body of literature, a considerable portion has focused 
upon his position regarding first amendment freedoms.
Because of the focus of the present inquiry, only those 
studies dealing with this aspect of Douglas ' career will be 
examined. Commentary on Douglas in popular periodicals is 
far too profuse to review here, nor does the purpose of this 
study require it.
The Legal Perspective. Since Douglas came to the 
Supreme Court in April of 1939, his judicial behavior has 
received extensive comment, but it was 1951 before such 
comment focused upon his first amendment opinions. This 
delay of over a decade was, no doubt, caused by the scarcity 
of opinions in the area of free speech produced by Douglas 
during the period. Two scholars have suggested explanations 
for why Douglas produced relatively few opinions on freedom
-14-
of expression during his first ten years on the bench.
Gerhard Casper argued that it was only after World War II 
that Douglas underwent "a shift of interest from concern 
with the problems of economic equality to those of political
7
freedom. " A more insightful explanation than merely "a 
shift of interest" was offered by Sidney Davis who wrote 
that although many students believe that the Justice's 
early tastes ran toward cases involving business regulation 
and finance law, a better explanation is "that Chief Justice 
Stone, his former dean at Columbia, tended to assign to 
him— more than to any other justice— the writing of cases 
that generally fell within that area."®
Despite Douglas' being something of a captive of his 
own expertise in the area of finance law, in 1951, Leo 
Epstein examined the Justice's record in the field of civil 
liberties generally, noting that "the first ten years of 
his judicial tenure . . . coincided with an unprecedented 
volume of cases revolving about the application of 
7
Gerhard Casper, "The Liberal Faith: Some Observations
on the Legal Philosophy of Mr. Justice William O. Douglas," 
Federal Bar Journal 22 (1962), p. 189.
®Sidney Davis, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia Law 
Review 74 (April 1974), p. 350.
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g
safeguards to personal liberties." Epstein investigated 
the Justice's record in such areas of civil liberties as 
free speech, procedural due process, involuntary confessions, 
right to counsel, trial by jury, and search and seizure. 
Although Justice Jackson had termed Douglas' position re­
garding the citing of reporters for contempt of court "a 
dogma of absolute freedom,Epstein disagreed, pointing 
out that even though "his opinions may seem, on occasion, 
to be dogmatic, they are not the approach of an absolutist. 
Epstein supported this conclusion by citing Douglas' opinion 
in United Public Workers v. Mitchell in which he argued 
"that Congress had the power to prohibit some employees 
from engaging in political activity. Specifically Douglas
distinguished between administrative employees and indus-
13trial employees."
Epstein next turned to the civil liberties cases 
arising specifically out of World War II, most notably
9
Leon Epstein, "Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties," 
Wisconsin Law Review 125 (1951), p. 125.
^°Criac V .  Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), at 384.
Epstein, p. 133.
^^330 U.S. 75 (1947).
^^Epstein, p. 133.
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those dealing with the military relocations imposed upon
14Japanese-Americans. In each of these cases Douglas voted 
to sanction the activities of the military, agreeing with 
Black in Hirabayshi v. United States, for example, that 
"where the peril is great and the time is short, temporary 
treatment on a group basis may be the only practical 
expedient.  ^ Epstein seemed most interested in refuting 
Justice Jackson's charge of absolutism on the part of 
Douglas and, accordingly, offered these wartime cases as 
evidence to the contrary. He seemed to rule out the possi­
bility of philosophical consistency on Douglas' part and 
concluded that although a charge of "war hysteria" against 
Douglas would be inaccurate, the exigencies of 1941 and 
1942 were such that the Justice "deviated from his usual 
position.
Epstein had noted that Douglas largely adherred to a 
clear and present danger test in opinions such as the several 
cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses, but he failed to
^^Hirabayshi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu
V .  U.S. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 
(1944).
^^320 U.S. 81 at 107, [Opinion by Black, Douglas 
concurring.]
^^Epstein, p. 156.
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see Douglas ' behavior in the wartime cases as the philosoph­
ical inverse of such a position. Although Vern Countryman
called the curfew cases "a grave error of constitutional
17interpretation," it seems clear that Douglas was being
consistent with a rigorous clear and present danger tests
he argued that the exigencies raised by the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor and throughout the Pacific had created
conditions sufficient to tip the scales in the government's
favor. The fact that in virtually simultaneous cases
involving the Jehovah's Witnesses he routinely voted to
protect their activities as posing no potential harms which
government might curtail supports this assertion.
Scholarly attention to Douglas' legal philosophy arose
ten years following Epstein's article when Gerhard Casper
examined "a rather arbitrary sample of [Justice Douglas']
utterances chosen in order to make a point which is received
1 Rby general and broad reading." Despite this cavalier 
sampling procedure, Casper's essay provided valuable insights
17Vern Countryman, The Douglas Opinions (New York: 
Random House, 1977), p. 37.
Casper, p. 180.
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into the judicial philosophy upon which Douglas seemed to be 
operating up to that time. Casper found elements of both 
legal realism and natural law at work in Douglas' opinions 
and concluded that "the most characteristic trait of 
Justice Douglas and his judicial philosophy [is] the
19persistent and consistent pursuance of the liberal faith."
Casper turned to John Dewey to define what he meant by "the
liberal faith:"
. . . belief in the conclusions of intelligence as 
the finally directive force in life; in freedom of 
thought and expression as a condition in order to 
realize this power of direction by thought, and in 
the experimental character of life and thought.
In 1964 the Yale Law Journal published a series of 
essays celebrating Mr. Justice Douglas' twenty-fifth anni­
versary on the bench. Hugo Black suggested in one of them 
that Bill Douglas "must have come into the world with a 
rush and that his first cry must have been a protest 
against something he saw at a glance was wrong or unjust.
^^Ibid,, p. 194.
2®John Dewey, "Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind," 
in Felix Frankfurter, ed., Mr. Justice Holmes (New York: 
1931), p. 3.
^^Hugo Black, "William Orville Douglas," Yale Law 
Journal 73 (1964), p. 915.
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Douglas' former student, Abe Portas, observed in another
essay in the Yale tributes that "to himself, to friend and
foe alike, Mr. Justice Douglas is a harsh critic who lies
in wait for the slothful, the untidy, the drooling, the
soft and sappy. The unerring leap to the jugular, the
fantastic speed and cleanliness of the kill— these are the
22marks of Douglas' mind."
Five years later, to mark Douglas' thirtieth year 
on the bench, the U.C.L.A. Law Review published a similar 
series of essays in which Douglas' long-time friend and 
companion, Fred Rodell of the Yale law faculty, made a like 
comment when he suggested that while on the bench Douglas 
"fidgets and doodles as brethren and lawyers alike wend 
their wordy way toward the point that his precise and tight- 
wound watch of a mind has ticked off long since." Rodell 
went on to supply an example of such behavior on Douglas ' 
part drawn from an occasion when Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a 
frequent Douglas antagonist, had been continually interrupting
^^Abe Portas, "Mr, Justice Douglas," Yale Law Journal 
73 (1964), p. 718.
^^Fred Rodell, "As Justice Bill Douglas Completes His 
First Thirty Years on the Court: Herewith a Random Anni­
versary Sample, Complete with Casual Commentary, of Divers 
Scraps, Shreds, and Shards Gleaned from a Forty-Year Friend­
ship," U.C.L.A. Law Review 16 (1969), p. 705.
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counsel with questions while hearing argument before the 
Court. His patience and judicial decorum having worn thin, 
Douglas turned to Justice Reed and muttered, "Why can't 
the little bastard keep his big mouth shut and let us get 
on with it?"^^
In the same series of essays. Professor Kenneth L.
Karst of the U.C.L.A. law school compared the thirty year 
career philosophies of Douglas and Black regarding the 
application of the due process mandates of the Constitution. 
His conclusion was that Black's philosophy was "to resist 
doctrines that permit judges to impose their own values on 
a reluctant society," while "Douglas has consistently 
adopted the position of an egalitarian activist, willing to 
use whatever judicial tools may be at hand— or may be 
created— to promote the ends of equality of opportunity."^^ 
Karst's essay traced Black's critique of the modern formu­
lation of the due process doctrine, a critique which leveled 
the charge of a return to natural law on the part of Douglas 
and others. However, Karst closed his essay with a passage
^^Ibid., p. 706.
^Kenneth L. Karst, "Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural-Law-Due-Process 
Formula," U.C.L.A. Law Review 16 (1969), p. 717.
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which underscored the problem with such accusations. Quot­
ing Paul Freund's 1949 lectures. On Understanding the 
Supreme Court, Karst reminded us that "one man's natural 
law may turn out to be simply another's fighting verities
Though not breaking any particularly new ground, John 
P. Frank's essay on Douglas in The Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court 1789-1969; Their Lives and Major 
Opinions, made several important points concisely. Of 
great importance in understanding Douglas is an idea men­
tioned frequently regarding the jurisprudential heritage to 
which he was heir. Frank wrote that,
Douglas did more than take the Brandeis seat. He 
continued, so nearly as it was relevant in chang­
ing times, the Brandeis point of view. As he 
developed his own legal doctrine, he drew first 
and most often on Brandeis, particularly in rate- 
making, antitrust, and freedom of speech cases.
By following and then extending the Brandeis tradition,
Douglas was, Frank suggested, "a bridge from an old
26Quoted in Karst, p. 750.
^^John P. Frank, "William O. Douglas," in Leon 
Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., The Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court 1780-1969; Their Lives and 
Major Opinions, with an Introduction by Louis H. Poliak, 
(New York and London: Chelsea House Publishers in Assoc­
iation with R. R. Bowker Company, 1969), p. 2455.
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liberalism to a new, spanning almost a third of a century
28with a consistent freshness of outlook."
Although Gerhard Casper's observation that Douglas 
did not author many free speech opinions during his first 
decade is correct, the next ten years were a marked con­
trast. In 1971, Professor H. Frank Way examined Douglas' 
opinions during the period from 1953-1962, noting the 
Justice's consistent voting record in the fields of taxa­
tion, civil rights, personal injury, criminal cases, sub­
version, and a number of others and described the "overarching 
quality" of Douglas' opinions to be "fear of alienation." 
Professor Way explained this quality in Douglas' juris­
prudential orientation by pointing out that "through a 
number of connecting attitudes. Justice Douglas expressed 
a fear of the loneliness of the individual as he confronts 
the state." According to Way's interpretation, various 
components of a citizen's relationship to government com­
bined to form in Douglas' judicial philosophy "an almost 
classical 19th Century liberal view of the state and power.
2®ibid., p. 2460.
Frank Way, Jr., "The Study of Judicial Attitudes: 
The Case of Mr. Justice Douglas," Western Political 
Quarterly 24 (March 1971), pp. 19-20.
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In 1974 William O. Douglas celebrated his thirty-
fifth anniversary on the Court, the only such anniversary
in the history of that institution. To mark the occasion,
the Columbia Law Review published not only a number of
tributes, including two by Chief Justices with whom Douglas
had served,but also several important studies of his
long career. Michael I. Severn, Dean of the Columbia Law
School described both Douglas' philosophy and his impact
upon American constitutional law, calling him "the supreme
expositor from the bench of the philosophy of legal 
31realism." Sidney Davis found legal realism to be the
central influence on Douglas' jurisprudence, but also found
elements of positivism and natural law, but concluded that
"if he can be said to represent a legal tradition, it is
the functionalism and realism that flowered at Yale in the 
32
late 1920’s." Although Davis pointed to strong influences
^^Warren E. Burger, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia 
Law Review 74 (April 1974), p. 344.
^^Michael I. Sovern, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia 
Law Review 74 (April 1974), p. 345.
32sidney Davis, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia Law 
Review 74 (April 1974), pp. 350-352. See also Jerome Frank, 
Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Bretano's, 1930), pp.
74-80 for a discussion of fact-skepticism.
-24-
of rule and fact skepticism In Douglas' opinions, he also
noted exceptions to the Justice's antipathy to absolute
truths, and those exceptions were In the area of freedom
of expression.
The work of Yale's Thomas I. Emerson In the field of
33
first amendment law Is well known. It was thus appro­
priate for Columbia to call upon him to comment upon 
Douglas' contribution to American jurisprudence In that 
area. Emerson pointed to two aspects of Justice Douglas' 
position on the first amendment which have received less 
attention than his liberalism or alleged absolutism. The 
first of these. In Emerson's view, was Douglas' "remarkable 
ability to grasp the realities of the system of freedom of
expression and to formulate legal doctrine which takes those
34
realities Into account." He wrote that,
. . , the great capacity of the Warren Court to 
function on this level was one of Its principal 
glories. These efforts have been frequently
33Thomas I, Emerson's works Include: Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Random House,
1966); with David Haber and Norman Dorsen. Political and 
Civil Rights In the United States (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 3rd ed., 1967); The System of Freedom of Expression 
(NY: Vintage Books, 1970).
^^Emerson, "Justice Douglas' Contribution to the Law: 
The First Amendment," p. 354.
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denoxmced as 'activism' but, in fact, they are 
essential to transform constitutional principles 
into effective working rules for everyday life
Among Emerson's chief concerns in his own writing is that a 
legal system must not only evolve general theoretic prin­
ciples of law, but that it must construct a body of positive 
law and governmental machinery to insure that a system of 
freedom of expression works. Not surprising, then, is 
Emerson's reference to Douglas' teleological bent in first 
amendment law, a trait typical of legal realism. Emerson 
pointed out that "Justice Douglas has not only grasped the 
theory of the first amendment? he has also understood the 
apparatus of repression and sought to attack it at every 
point
But beyond the influence of sociological jurispru­
dence, Emerson saw in Douglas a second characteristic which 
has not received extensive comment? that characteristic
being "his emphasis upon the amendment's personal fulfill- 
37ment aspect." Professor Emerson wrote that Douglas, 
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid,, pp. 354-355. 
37ibid., pp. 355-356.
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. . . has understood the deeper significance of the 
civil rights movement, the black revolution, the 
organizers for peace, and above all, the youth 
culture. He sees these social phenomena as legiti­
mate strivings toward a more open, more fraternal, 
more rational, and more self-fulfilled society.
And he has sought to transform the basic principles 
of constitutional law in order to protect and foster 
these new values against society's effort to suppress 
them.
The social engineering of Douglas thus appears to have been 
motivated by a belief that the fundamental law of a system 
must ultimately connect with a system of morality; a 
fundamental tenet of natural law theory was thus welded to 
legal realism.
The most valuable essay to appear in the 35th anniver­
sary series published in the Columbia Law Review was that 
by L. A. Powe, Jr., Assistant Professor of law at the 
University of Texas and former law clerk to Mr. Justice 
Douglas. To date, it is the most definitive statement of 
Douglas' first amendment philosophy. Powe began by exam­
ining the period of 1939-1945, and noted that Douglas 
"displayed a cautious liberalism in extending the amend­
ment 's protections," and summarized the period by suggesting 
that Douglas "engaged in a balancing process to determine
®®Ibid., p. 3 56.
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whether federal government interests should prevail over 
individuals' assertions of first amendment rights.
The intermediate decade of 1946-1956, in Powe's view, 
saw Douglas' position on the first amendment undergo signi­
ficant changes. He noted that during this period "Douglas
began to make the first amendment the cornerstone of his
40judicial philosophy." The justice engaged in less 
balancing than in previous years and began to demonstrate 
an "increasing reliance on [Holmes' and Brandeis'] under­
standing of the first amendment. But by the end of this 
period, Douglas had abandoned even the clear and present 
danger test and was "no longer willing to balance competing 
interests; instead his reading of the unequivocal language 
of the first amendment compels him to give unqualified pro­
tection to expression. The only exception to this shift 
noted by Powe was Douglas ' position regarding the exercise 
of religion clause of the first amendment. In Cleveland v .
A. Powe, Jr., "Evolution to Absolutism: Justice
Douglas and the First Amendment," Columbia Law Review 74 
(April 1974), p. 380.
^°Ibid., p. 384.
^^Ibid., p. 384.
42"^‘ibid., pp. 390-391.
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United States^  ^Douglas wrote an opinion for the Court
sustaining the convictions under the Mann Act of several
Mormons who practiced polygamy. This case, along with 
44several others, led Powe to conclude that during this
period, "Douglas' approach to the religion clauses . . .
45was one of cautious balancing."
In the period from 1957 to the date of Powe's essay 
in 1974 Douglas arrived at his "absolutist" stance in both 
expression and religion cases. Powe wrote that "under the 
new standard, whenever pure expression is at issue, any­
thing less than absolute protection is automatically inad­
equate."^® His inclination toward balancing in the area of 
religious freedoms was now gone, and Powe suggested that it
"was replaced by an analysis demanding as complete a
47separation of church and state as possible."
^^329 U.S. 14 (1947).
44e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) which held that the separation of church and state 
did not prevent reimbursement of parents' expenses for their 
children's transportation to religious schools.
^®Powe, p. 393.
4®Ibid., p. 396.
^^Ibid., p. 398.
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Professor Powe offered as his explanation of Douglas' 
"Evolution to Absolutism" an argument implying the influ­
ence upon him of legal realism. Powe suggested that 
Douglas had "one eye on the world around him and the other
4P
on the law," and that the "key to understanding Douglas'
treatment of the free exercise clause lies in a full
appreciation of his global o u t l o o k . H e  concluded that,
Douglas' changes in the expression, free exercise, 
and establishment areas can be laid in large part 
to an increasing maturity and understanding of 
societies at home and abroad. . . . as his own 
thinking on these issues progressed, the evolution 
of his ideas became intertwined with two other 
significant developments: his exceptionally 
strong sense of globalism and his growing skepti­
cism about government's ability to solve problems 
without creating new ones. . . . Douglas' views 
evolved towards absolutism by demanding that the 
tainting hands of government stay away from the 
precious liberties protected by the first amend­
ment . 50
The Academic Perspective 
Several doctoral dissertations have dealt wholly or 
in part with William O. Douglas, although none have focused 
specifically upon the rhetorical/jurisprudential bases of 
his first amendment opinions. John W. Hopkirk's study, 
"William O. Douglas— Individualist? A Study in the
^®Ibid., p. 398. ^^Ibid., p. 409. ^°Ibid., p. 410.
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Development and Application of a Judge's Attitudes," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, 1958), inquired into
the ways in which Douglas ' "opinions have been shaped by
the Justice's background, both during his youth and in the
course of his professional training and apprenticeship for
the position of Associate Justice of the United States."
This early work concluded that Douglas' boyhood poverty,
physical handicaps, and environment contributed to a "spirit
of Western Populism," and that,
A definite shift is noticeable since he joined 
the Court. While he still employs the techniques 
of 'functional' analysis of legal problems, his 
concern seems to be less focused on methods of 
efficient law enforcement, more on the need to 
protect the individual from abuse of organized 
power, either public or private.^
A third study, R. L. Meek's "Justices Douglas and 
Black: Political Liberalism and Judicial Activism," (Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Oregon, 1964), compared the 
value systems (defined as "the hierarchical ordering of 
values representing patterns of choice followed in concrete 
cases") of Justices Douglas and Black for the period of 1939- 
1961. As is widely agreed, the study concluded that "the
^ D^issertation Abstracts 20 (1960), p. 4428.
^^Ibid., p. 4429.
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two Justices share a basically similar orientation," but 
noted that "Justice Douglas more consistently supports the 
claims of individual freedom and political rights— a liberal 
response— than does Justice Black." Meek also concluded that 
while Justice Black opted for the "'paternalistic' liberalism 
of the twentieth century . . . the pattern of choice of 
Justice Douglas is somewhat closer to the more pluralistic 
and individualistic liberalism of the nineteenth century.
Dorothy Bructon James' study, "Judicial Philosophy 
and Accession to the Court: The Cases of Justices Jackson
and Douglas," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1966), employed the paradigm of role theory to analyze all 
of the two justices' "published and unpublished speeches 
prior to and following accession to the Court, their books, 
and their published opinions during the period they served 
together on the bench (1941-1954)." James found that while 
Jackson and Douglas both accepted the "pivotal attribute" 
of the role of the Court in the American political system, 
they demonstrated differences which "stemmed from Douglas'
^^Dissertation Abstracts 25 (1964), p. 3086.
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devotion to 'libertarian activism' and Jackson's devotion 
to 'libertarian restraint.
A study critical of Justice Douglas was that done by 
Paul King Pollock, "Judicial Libertarianism and Judicial 
Responsibilities; The Case of Justice William 0. Douglas," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1968). Pollock 
ambitiously set out not only to discover "the judicial 
philosophy of Justice William O. Douglas," but also "to 
explore the very nature of constitutional adjudication 
itself and to draw some . . . conclusions as to the pre­
conditions for responsible adjudication." Although Douglas 
had been on the bench for twenty-five years at the time of 
Pollock's study, only one hundred opinions were examined, 
along with Douglas' extra-judicial writings. Pollock con­
cluded that Douglas' brand of liberalism was, in fact, a 
return to "mechanical jurisprudence," that it failed "to 
meet the requisites of responsible adjudication," and that 
his "basic approach to adjudication was neither viable or 
persuasive because it did not represent a true understanding
^^Dissertation Abstracts 27 (1966), p. 1878-A.
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of what a judge was actually faced with when called upon to 
decide a constitutional law case.
The study with greatest implications for the present 
inquiry was that of Solomon Resnik, "Black and Douglas; 
Variations in Dissent," (Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for 
Social Research, 1970). Resnik examined the free speech 
opinions of both justices for the period of 1937-1964 with 
particular attention paid to the differences between major­
ity and non-majority opinions. He found that both justices 
frequently resorted to "absolute philosophies and immutable 
c a n o n s " i n  dissents, but not in majority opinions. Resnik,
a political scientist, did not address the communication
implications of such a finding. In addition to a communi­
cation focus, the present study differs from Resnik's in 
three ways : first, it covers the full span of Douglas' 
career; second, it focuses exclusively on Douglas; and 
third, it attempts to relate rhetorical behavior in majority 
and non-majority opinions to traditional categories of legal 
philosophy.
^^Dissertation Abstracts 29 (1969), p. 4073-A.
^^Dissertation Abstracts 31 (1971), p. 6130-A.
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Major Works
A number of book-length works on Douglas have been 
published over the years, several of which were edited 
by Professor Vern Countryman of the Harvard Law School. 
Countryman, one of Douglas' early law clerks, has compiled 
three volumes of representative excerpts from the Justice's 
opinions, and in some instances reproduced them in full, 
thus making them available to wide audiences. Unfortunately, 
Countryman's works make no attempt to analyze, interpret, 
or critique the opinions, only to anthologize them.
One of the most thorough and valuable works to date 
on Douglas is a critical analysis of his opinions in the 
field of tax law. In 1973, Wolfman, Silver, and Silver 
published Dissent Without Opinion; The Behavior of justice 
William O. Douglas in Federal Tax C a s e s . T h e  authors 
traced a substantial shift in Douglas' attitudes reflected
^^Countryman's works are: Douglas of the Supreme
Court: A Selection of His Opinions (New York: Doubleday,
1959); The Judicial Record of Justice William O. Douglas 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); and The Douglas
Opinions (New York: Random House, 1977).
®®Bemard Wolfinan, Jonathan L. F. Silver, and Marjorie 
A. Silver, Dissent Without Opinion (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1975).
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in two hundred seventy-eight federal tax cases between
1939 and 1973. At the beginning he authored the Court's
opinion in Helvering v. C l i f f o r d , "one of the strongest
finpro-government tax cases in the books." But by 1973,
as Wolfman pointed out, Douglas had shifted to a "pattern
fixof solitary pro-taxpayer stances." The bibliography
provided by the authors is the most complete in print and
was most valuable to the present study.
One final work should be mentioned. In 1971, H. E.
McBride published a disjointed harangue entitled Impeach
Justice Douglas. Mr. McBride offered several innuendos
regarding Douglas' travels to the Soviet Union, railed at
his liberalism, and accused him of being "almost totally
committed to support . . . pornographers and other immoral 
62elements." Despite the fact that McBride's book was 
published as "Volume I," no companion volume evidently went 
to the presses.
^®309 U.S. 331 (1940).
^*^Erwin N. Griswold, "Foreword," in Wolfman, Silver, 
and Silver, p. x.
®^Bemard Wolfman, "Preface," in Wolfman, Silver, and 
Silver, p. xv.
62H. E. McBride, Impeach Justice Douglas (New York: 
Exposition Press, 1971), p. 110.
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C1early the commentary Douglas has inspired since
coming to the Court has not always been favorable, but it
has typically been intense. Henry Steele Commager observed
that because "the Supreme Court is the greatest and most
effective of our educational institutions, the judge should
63
be a great teacher." If that is correct, perhaps the most 
insightful comment about Mr. Justice Douglas was that made 
by Sidney Davis that "he has, in a sense, been the great 
teacher of our times, and the lessons he teaches will stay 
with us far longer than the false bromides of those who 
flaunt their patriotism in their lapels and temper their 
beliefs to fit the season.
The Communication Perspective
The second general area of scholarship relevant to 
this study is that dealing with the study of freedom of ex­
pression by communication scholars. Since 1970 researchers 
in communication have produced a considerable body of liter­
ature in freedom of speech, much of which was published in 
the Free Speech Yearbook. Two topical subdivisions of this
63
Henry Steele Commager. "Choosing Supreme Court 
Judges," The New Republic, May 2, 1970, p. 16.
6 4Davis, p. 3 52.
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scholarship impact upon the present study. The first deals 
with the justification for freedom of speech inquiry and 
teaching by communication specialists, a body of literature 
which forms the disciplinary context into which this study 
fits. Second, a representative sampling of substantive 
research is reviewed in order to note the kinds of questions 
typical of the research produced in freedom of speech by 
communication scholars.
Notwithstanding Earnest Wrage's assertion that schol­
arship should be judged on "its merits, not by the writer's 
union card,academic territoriality is a fact of life 
and the arguments offered in support of free speech studies 
by communication scholars deserve attention.
Professor Donald C. Bryant, then president of the
Speech Communication Association, wrote to Professor Thomas
L. Tedford, editor of the association's new publication.
Free Speech Yearbook in September of 1970, saying that the
work presented in the debut of that journal was,
. . . appropriate to the profession of Speech 
Communication, whose particular province includes 
research into the problems and history of free
®^Earnest Wrage, "Public Address; A Study of Social 
and Intellectual History," Quarterly Journal of Speech 33 
(1947), p. 454.
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speech, education of youth in school and college 
in those problems and that history, and active, 
vigilant investigation and exposure of hazards 
to freedom of speech and its correlatives in 
the context of the times.®®
Since that first issue in 1970, the Free Speech Year­
book has come to be recognized as the primary outlet for 
communication scholars interested in problems of freedom 
of expression. Franklyn S. Haiman, one of the chief
instigators of the study of free speech in departments of
communication, offered three reasons justifying such 
research as is reported in the present study. He argued 
that.
The first and most basic point is that the 
viability of our very profession rests on the 
assumption that freedom of speech, as a political 
principle, is sufficiently understood and accepted 
in the society in which we work so that what we do 
has substance and meaning. . . . The vitality 
of the teaching of speech, from classical to 
modern times, has ebbed and flowed with the rela­
tive absence or presence of freedom of speech in 
the surrounding society.®^
Haiman suggested next that, just as students of jour­
nalism must be well grounded in the law of their discipline,
^^Donald C. Bryant, letter to Thomas L. Tedford, Free
Speech Yearbook (1970), p. v.
67Franklyn S. Haiman, "Why Teach Freedom of Speech," 
Free Speech Yearbook (1970), p. 2.
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. . . the oral communicator, vÆiether his medium 
be the public speech or rally, radio or television, 
stage or screen, needs equally to know his rights 
and responsibilities— especially in an era when so 
much controversy surrounds the exercise of those 
rights and the relevant laws and court decisions 
are as complex as they are.®®
Perhaps of greatest impact for the present study, Hai­
man argued third that,
. . . there is a unique research and writing 
contribution that scholars in speech communication 
can make to the development of the law of freedom 
of speech which lawyers, or political scientists, 
because of the particular perspectives from v^ich 
they view the world, are not likely to offer.
[Haiman's argument on this point had already been 
twice demonstrated by the fact that his own essay,
"The Rhetoric of the Streets : Some Legal and
Ethical Considerations," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 53 (April 1967), pp. 99-114, was cited in 
litigants' briefs before the United States Supreme 
Court in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 
(1969), a case involving the picketing of Mayor 
Richard Daley's home, and in Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969), the highly significant flag- 
burning case. Additionally, his article, "Speech 
V .  Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to?"
appeared in the Northwestern University Law Review 
(May-June, 1972), pp. 153-199.] It is the semanti- 
cist who can most effectively analyze the weaknesses 
of the Supreme Court's 'fighting wards' doctrine 
. . .  or its obscenity test . . . .  It is the 
communications experimentalist who is most likely 
to produce evidence which casts doubt on the law's 
unquestioned assumption that a speaker can just­
ifiably be held to account for 'inciting' illegal 
conduct in his listeners. It is the historical 
critic of free speech controversies who may sharpen
®®Ibid.
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our perceptions regarding the political and 
social causes of repression, and the empirical 
field researcher who may help us better under­
stand the fears and anxieties which make the 
public's acceptance of the First Amendment's 
mandates so difficult
Due largely to the impetus given by Haiman, Tedford, 
and others, the Speech Communication Association authorized 
the formation of the association-wide Committee on Freedom 
of Speech and subsequently the first Free Speech Yearbook 
in 1970 carried syllabi for free speech courses being 
taught by professors of communication at Northwestern Uni­
versity,^® Indiana University,Simmons College,and 
Bradley University
In 1976, the Southern Speech Communication Associa­
tion became the first regional professional association of
go
Ibid., pp. 2-3. [Haiman's N.U.L.R. article was 
cited in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975).]
^^Franklyn S. Haiman, "Outline for Contemporary Prob­
lems in Freedom of Speech," Free Speech Yearbook (1970), pp. 
5-6.
71Richard L. Johannesen, "Syllabus for the Social 
Influences of Speech," Free Speech Yearbook (1970), pp. 7-10.
^^Kenneth F. Kister, "Syllabus for Intellectual Free­
dom and Censorship," Free Speech Yearbook (1970), pp. 11-27.
^^David M. Hunsaker, "Syllabus for Freedom and Respon­
sibilities of Speech, Free Speech Yearbook (1970), pp. 28-43.
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communication scholars to grant full division status to 
free speech studies. It vas appropriate that Franklyn 
Haiman was chosen to keynote that occasion. In San Antonio, 
on April 9, 1976, he no longer dwelt upon justification for 
teaching and research in freedom of speech by communication 
scholars, but instead forthrightly suggested that the 
agenda for such studies should take the form of historical- 
critical research, case or field studies, empirical and 
experimental studies on communication effects, attitude 
research, and critical analyses and theory development.
Haiman explained that within the last area was the important 
task of testing "the evidence and reasoning upon which the 
conventional wisdom of pubic and courts is based, using what­
ever skills we may possess because of our presumed expertise 
in understanding the communication process.
In addition to the numerous essays published in the 
Free Speech Yearbook, several excellent book-length works 
and anthologies have been produced by communication resear­
chers writing in freedom of speech. Once again, Franklyn 
Haiman emerges as one of the leaders in the field. To date
^^aiman, "Freedom of Speech as em Academic Discipline," 
Speech Delivered at the Southern Speech Communication Assoc­
iation Convention, San Antonio, Texas, April 9, 1976 and 
published in the Free Speech Yearbook (19/6), pp. 1-6.
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he has published three works, the first of which was pub­
lished under the auspices of the American Civil Liberties 
Union. It was a summary of key first amendment concepts
including such headings as The Public Forum, Schools and
7 5Colleges, State Security, and The Mass Media. In 1965 
Haiman published Freedom of Speech; Issues and Cases, 
which anthologized significant court cases as well as 
relevant extra-judicial works under the headings of provo­
cation to anger and the problem of preserving the peace, 
political heresy and the problem of national survival, and 
artistic expression and the problem of public morality. In 
1977 Haiman presented his most comprehensive effort, a six 
volume edition of works covering the entire spectrum of
civil liberties. He served as general editor for the series
77and authored the volume on freedom of speech.
Other well known works by professors of communication 
include Robert M. O'Neil's Free Speech; Responsible
75Franklyn S. Haiman, The First Freedoms: Speech,
Press, and Assembly (New York: The American Civil Liberties
Union),
76Franklyn S. Haiman, Freedom of Speech: Issues and
Cases (New York: Random House, 1965).
7?Franklyn S. Haiman, ed.. To Protect These Rights 
(Skokie, 111: National Textbook Co., 1977).
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Communication Under Law published in 1972. O'Neil, then
the debate coach at Tufts University, covered subjects such
as the overall concept of freedom of speech, limits on the
right of free speech, the speaker's right to a forum, the
state's role in regulating the time, place, and manner of
expression, and protection of the speaker's legal liabili- 
7 8ties. Haig A. Bosmajian has been active in free speech
research among communication scholars for many years and
has produced two significant major works in addition to
many articles. His first came in 1971 under the title The
Principles and Practice of Freedom of Speech.Bosmajian's
anthology included selections from major court cases, the
Areopaqitica of Milton, the works of John Stuart Mill, and
the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn, Zechariah Chafee, and
Herbert Marcuse. Bosmajian's magnum opus came in 1976 in
80the form of Obscenity and Freedom of Expression. in a 
review of the work which also noted the value of Professor
^®Robert M. O'Neil, ed.. Free Speech; Responsible 
Communication Under Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Col,
1972).
79Haig A. Bosmajian, The Principles and Practice of 
Freedom of Speech (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1971).
80Haig A. Bosmajian, Obscenity and Freedom of Expres­
sion (New York: Burt Franklin and Co., 1976).
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Bosmajian's career contributions to the field, Franklyn 
Haiman wrote that,
If there were any doubt, prior to the 
publication of this book, that Haig Bosmajian 
had earned the title of chief encyclopedist 
for the freedom of speech sub-discipline, he 
has now established an undisputed claim to that 
position. Obscenity and Freedom of Expression 
is the most comprehensive source book of court 
opinions dealing with the obscenity issue that 
has ever been published.81
Over the years, a number of essays treating freedom 
of speech have been published in communication journals and 
anthologies other than the Free Speech Yearbook. In 197 5 
Gillmor and Dennis urged that legal research offered unique 
opportunities that "the versatile communication researcher 
may want to include in his methodological armamentarium."8% 
Noting that most communication law researchers had simply 
adopted traditional methods used in the field, Gillmor and 
Dennis argued that "if communication law scholarship has one 
great need, it is probably a greater infusion of creativity
81Franklyn S. Haiman, review of Obscenity and Freedom 
of Expression by Haig A. Bosmajian, in Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 63 (October 1977), p. 332.
®^Donald M. Gillmor and Everette E. Dennis, "Legal 
Research and Judicial communication," in Steven H. Chaffee, 
ed., Political Communication : Issues and Strategies for Re­
search (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 197 5), 
p. 284.
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into the process of research itself."®^ They argued in 
conclusion that communication law researchers must be 
familiar with both the traditional and behavioral approaches 
to legal data, but if they adhere blindly to "legal re­
search as practiced by jurisprudents and behaviorists [they] 
will probably always be frustrated. It should be remembered
that neither group is particularly interested in communi-
84cation problems." Gillmor and Dennis suggested that.
Communication researchers study the law in the 
context of freedom of expression or for the 
purpose of identifying communication patterns 
within judicial structures . And for this they 
need a new model, one which has a communication 
research perspective.85
As if to answer this challenge. Professor Don R.
Le Duc, a communication researcher as well as member of the 
United States Supreme Court bar, wrote in 1976 in the 
Quarterly Journal of Speech that the judicial process 
"would seem most susceptible to an analysis that recognized 
its intrinsic nature as an extremely specialized and speci­
fic form of communication."®® Le Duc argued in particular
B^ibid., p. 292. ®^Ibid., p. 299. ®^Ibid., p. 299.
8®Don R. Le Duc, "'Free Speech' Decisions and the 
Legal Process: The Judicial Opinion in Context," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 62 (October 1976), p. 279.
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that the judicial opinion's two major aspects, the ratio 
decidendi, or rationale for decision, and the obiter dicta, 
or those "statements in opinions wherein courts indulged 
in generalities that had no bearing upon the issues in­
volved,"®^ are employed differently by judges "to address 
arguments to fellow jurists, members of the bar, govern­
mental officials, and even the public at large."®® Pro­
fessor Le Due's essay has singular importance to the present 
study and it will be discussed at greater length in a 
subsequent chapter ; it is sufficient to note at this point 
his closing observation that we should study judicial
. . . material with the skills of a communication 
scholar. Understanding these basic rules of legal 
communication should allow the scholar to place 
judicial opinions in their proper context, and 
perhaps even more importantly, through this process 
to gain a better perspective for viewing the over­
all influence of the legal process upon the 
communication process.
This type of perspective is crucial if the 
scholar is to play some role in the development 
of freedom of expression doctrine in law. . . .
[We should] use a synthesis of legal methodology 
and communication research techniques in perceptive 
fashion to develop a philosophy for the area of
®^Black's Law Dictionary, 4th rev. ed., (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1968), p. 1222.
®®Le Due, p. 280.
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greatest concern to communication scholarship, that 
law defining rights in the vital process of commun­
ication .G9
The Jurisprudential Perspective 
The final area of scholarship which impacts upon this 
study is that work done primarily by jurisprudents investi­
gating the nature of judicial writing, particularly that 
dealing with the role of precedent in legal reasoning.
Ratio decidendi, and its less respectable counterpart, 
obiter dicta, have received comment by numerous legal 
philosophers who have examined these parts of the judicial 
opinion as bases for legal arguments. Chapter Two of the 
present study examines the nature of judicial writing and 
draws upon the work of legal philosophers such as A. W. B.
Simpson's, "The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine
90of Binding Precedent," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
the work of jurists such as Justice Benjamin Cardoso's Law 
and Literature, and the recent work of communication 
scholars such as Don R. Le Duc, reviewed above. The chapter
®®Ibid., p. 287.
W. B. Simpson, "The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and 
the Doctrine of Binding Precedent," in A. G. Guest, ed., 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), pp. 148-175.
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further examines the mechanics of opinion writing through 
such works as former Justice Tom Clark's essay, "Inside 
the Court, and Professor Henry J, Abraham's well known 
text, The Judicial Process; An Introductory Analysis of 
the Courts of the United States, England, and France.
Because of the treatment of these sources and similar others 
in Chapter Two, a detailed review of them at this point will 
be omitted.
91Tom C. Clark, "Inside the Court," in Scott and 
Earle, eds.. Politics, USA; Cases on the American Demo­
cratic Process (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965),
pp. 440-444.
92Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Intro­
ductory Analysis of the Courts of the United states, England, 
and France, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press,
197 5) .
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL COMMUNICATION:
SEEKING THE INTERNAL DYNAMIC
Introduction
Is there a characteristic nexus in judicial communi­
cation between philosophic warrant and rhetorical strategy? 
Are certain situational and functional constraints identifi­
able in the rhetoric of the Supreme Court opinion? This 
chapter explores these questions by first noting the phil­
osophic bases of natural law, legal positivism, and legal 
realism and then by establishing their relationship to 
rhetorical type. In other words, do the assumptions of 
each school of thought also assume typical forms of argu­
ment?
The influence of institutionally based constraints 
upon the opinions of United States Supreme Court justices 
is the first area of concern. These constraints fall into 
two classes. The first are systemic limitations imposed by
-49-
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the mechanics of how opinions come to be written, including 
such factors as the judicial conference, the assignment of 
opinions by the Chief Justice, and so on. The second are 
substantive constraints: expectations of the bench, bar,
and law school regarding standards for judicial opinion 
writing, or the limitations imposed upon the judge-rhetor 
by the doctrine of stare decisis. Here we examine existing 
scholarship regarding supposed differences between majority 
and non-majority opinions in order to get a basis for later 
evaluations of such differences in the Douglas opinions. 
Third and finally, critical commentary on Douglas' opinions 
is examined to note where contemporary scholars have placed 
him philosophically. The present analysis of his opinions 
can then either confirm or dispute existing evaluations.
This chapter thus serves to elaborate the hypotheses posited 
in Chapter I that a correspondence between jurisprudence and 
rhetoric typifies judicial opinion and that different opin­
ion types are likely to be marked by divergent rhetorical 
strategies. Only after fully explicating these hypotheses 
may we progress to methodological issues such as those 
treated in Chapter III.
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Jurisprudence and Rhetoric; The Generic Potential 
This section hypothesizes three potential genres of 
judicial rhetoric drawn from legal philosophy and taking 
the form of (1) Argument from Ideal; The Natural Law 
Warrant; (2) Argument from Rule: The Positive Law Warrant;
and (3) Argument from Context: The Legal Realist Warrant.
While no attempt is made to fully explicate these three 
schools of jurisprudential thought,^ this section outlines 
the fundamental tenets of each, identifies its significant 
proponents, synthesizes operational definitions of the 
arguments based therein, and establishes the relationship 
of each to rhetorical theory.
Argument from Ideal: The Natural Law Warrant
Martin P. Golding summarized natural law philosophy
when he wrote that thinkers in the tradition
. . . maintain that lawmaking is a purposive activity 
that must satisfy certain moral requirements in order
^Legal philosophers generally agree that the three 
traditions of natural law, legal positivism, and legal 
realism, while receiving different treatment by different 
theorists, for practical purposes represent all fundamental 
approaches to jurisprudence. See, e.g., M. P. Golding, ed.. 
The Nature of Law (New York: Random House, 1966): M. P. 
Golding, Philosophy of Law (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1975); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London; 
Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1977).
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for it to have laws as its outcome. Secondly, 
they tend to maintain that the question of the 
existence of laws cannot be completely separated 
from the question of their moral obligatoriness 
or moral quality. Thus, natural law theorists 
adopt, or come close to adopting, a moral- 
deontic position.%
These two basic tenets of natural law thought, despite
d'Entreves' warning to the contrary,^ can be found in its
defenders ' writings for at least the last seven hundred
years. Although roots of the tradition reside in the
works of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, the first, and still
most influential, specific elucidation of the philosophy
is the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas written in
the thirteenth century. The essence of the Thomist position
argued, in his words :
As Augustine says, that which is not just seems 
to be no law at all. Hence the force of a law 
depends upon the extent of its justice. . . .
Every human law has just so much of the nature 
of law as it is derived from the law of nature.
But if at any point it departs from the law of
2
Golding, Philosophy of Law, p. 2 5.
O
A. P. d'Entreves is an Italian subscriber to the 
natural law tradition who argues that "except for the name, 
the medieval and the modern notions of natural law have 
little in common. " Natural Law; An introduction to Legal 
Philosophy, 2nd ed., (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1970),
p. 15.
-53-
nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion 
of law.4
It is important to note how these ideas connect: the
validity of a law depends upon its adherence to a moral 
order, and the obligatoriness of a law depends upon its 
validity. The Thomist position achieved this nexus by 
reference to Eternal law, or the "rational guidance of 
created things on the part of God," and thus reached the 
postulate that "the Natural law is nothing else than the 
participation of the Eternal law in rational creatures."^ 
Perhaps the most characteristic feature of natural law 
philosophy was its reliance upon self-evident propositions.
A. P. d'Entreves, Professor of political Theory in 
the University of Turin, argued that the intersection of 
the moral content of laws and the attendant obligatoriness 
of laws was the thread flowing through the natural law 
tradition:
This point where values and norms coincide, 
which is the ultimate origin of law and at the
4
Summa Theologica, in Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic 
Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House,
1954), p. 784.
®St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, quoted in 
d 'Entraves, p. 43.
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same time the beginning of moral life proper, 
is I believe, what men for over two thousand 
years have indicated by the name of natural 
law.®
How this view of the nature of law might work in a 
judge's reasoning about cases was indicated by Columbia's 
Harry W. Jones who wrote that "in Natural Law theory any 
asserted statutory or case-law rule that fails to conform 
to the ought to be of the Natural Law is not law at all.
Such an enactment, such a case-law principle, is as the
7
Natural Lawyers say, 'law only in appearance.'" Thus, 
when a judge exercises discretion in hard cases, he may in 
fact be applying natural law philosophy to fill the so-called 
"gaps" in the positive law. Discovering whatever personal 
beliefs are guiding the judge at such times has been the
Q
business of the judicial sociologists; the important idea 
to grasp, though, and one that Jones made clear is that
d'Entreves, p. 116,
^Harry W. Jones, "Legal Realism and Natural Law," in 
Golding, The Nature of Law, p. 265.
^Notable among these efforts is the work of such 
scholars as: Herman C. Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A
Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1948: Theodore L.
Becker, Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence;
A Working Theory and Study in Judicial Decision-Making, 1964; 
and the several works of Glendon Schubert, most notably.
The Judicial Mind, 1965.
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"far closer affinities [exist] between the approach of 
legal realism and that of Natural Law than exist between 
conventional analytical jurisprudence [i.e., legal 
positivism] and the Natural Law tradition."^
From these Thomist and modern statements can now be 
synthesized an operational definition of a potential 
rhetorical genre bound together by the fundamental tenets 
of natural law; Arguments drawing warrants from natural 
law philosophy rely prédominantely or exclusively upon such 
self-evident moral-deontic principles as justice, unalien­
able rights, fairness, and the dictates of reason. Such 
arguments do not rely ultimately upon statute, precedent, 
or extra-judicial evidentiary materials.
In addition to having origins in the literature of 
jurisprudence, the Argument from Ideal has a corresponding 
analog in rhetorical theory which Richard Weaver termed the 
Argument from Genus :
What the argument from genus then says is that 
'generic' classes have a nature vAiich can be 
predicated of their species. Thus man has a 
nature including mortality, which quality can 
therefore be predicated of the man Socrates 
and the man John Smith. The underlying 
postualte here, that things have a nature,
®Jones, p. 263.
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is of course a disputable view of the world, 
for it involves the acceptance of a realm of 
essence. Yet anyone who uses such a source 
of argument is committed to this wider 
assumption. Now it follows that those who 
habitually argue from genus are in their 
personal philosophy idealists.10
Argument from Ideal thus involves certain epistemological 
and juriprudential presuppositions. By holding these pre­
suppositions central, an analysis of actual opinions may 
reveal a rhetorical genre whose "internal dynamic" is 
predicated upon them.
Argument from Rule; The positive Law Warrant 
Among our more influential contemporary legal philo­
sophers is Oxford's H. L. A. Hart. His simple definition 
of the tradition to which he subscribes provides a clear 
starting point for understanding the Argument from Rule : 
"Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple 
contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that 
laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, 
though in fact they have often done s o . A l t h o u g h  a 
positivist himself. Hart does not entirely reject the
^®Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: 
Henry Regenery Company, 1970), p. 56.
l^H. L. A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals," Harvard Law Review 71 (February 1958), p. 181.
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viability of natural law theory, but his definition under­
scores where the two philosophies diverge: tne proponents
of legal positivism refuse to require an inherent link 
between man-made laws and morality, a law's existence 
establishes its obligatoriness— the law is the law.
A fragment from Justinian's Digest provided an early 
intimation of the essential feature of legal positivism: 
"What pleases the Prince has the force of law. This 
cynical conception of positivism faces upon examining the 
version of it that emerged in nineteenth-century British 
Utilitarianism. The central jurisprudential work in that 
tradition was John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined, first published in 1832. Flatly repudiating
1 ^the core of natural law doctrine, Austin articulated the 
so-called "command" theory of law which expanded the 
Justinian notion of sovereign to mean "a determinate human 
superior not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, 
[and receiving] habitual obedience from the bulk of a given
12Quoted in Golding, Philosophy of Law, p. 2 5.
^^E.g., Austin wrote: "Now, to say that human laws
which conflict with the Divine law are not binding . . .  is 
to talk stark nonsense."
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society. This definition allowed for "sovereign" to
take shape as a sovereign monarch, a sovereign legislature 
(in Austin's term, a "determinate body"), or a court of 
last resort. Golding put the Austinian view in modern 
terms, saying that "whatever is enacted by the lawmaking 
agency is the law in the society.^
The contribution to modern positivist thought of Hans
Kelsen, "probably the most influential legal philosopher in
the twentieth century"^® was expressed in his "Pure Theory
of L a w . T h e  theory provides insight into the bases of
judges' arguments in opinions. For Kelsen the validity of
laws, and hence their obligatoriness, always depends upon
the existence of super-ordinate laws. to determine the
validity of a legal rule (statutory or case-law), one need
only determine its "pedigree." Kelsen thus stipulated:
The validity of a legal norm][i.e., rule] cannot be 
questioned on the ground that its contents are
l^Quoted in Golding, ed.. The Nature of Law, p. 94.
^^Golding, Philosophy of Law, p. 25.
l^Golding, ed.. The Nature of Law, p. 108.
^^Kelsen holds his theory to be "pure" for two reasons: 
(1) it is free from deontic or ideological content, and (2) 
it is free from the study of political, historical, economic, 
or sociological influences upon the development of law.
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incompatible with some moral or political value.
A norm is a valid legal norm by viture of the fact 
that it has been created according to a definite 
rule and by virtue thereof o n l y . 18
This passage could serve as the first precept of the 
doctrine of stare decisis and its corollary, judicial re­
straint. A judge basing an opinion in this philosophy needs 
only to "find" the appropriate statutory or case-law rule
and he can, ipso jure, determine what is valid for the case 
1 Qbefore him.
A conception of positive law evolved from Justinian, 
Austin, Hart, and Kelsen, can now be synthesized in a 
second operational definition of a potential rhetorical 
genre referred to as Argument from Rule: Arguments drawing
l®Hans Kensen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. 
A. Wedberg, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), quoted
in Golding, The Nature of Law, pp. 12 5-126.
^^Although the present study eschews detailed expli­
cation of the critiques of these various legal philosophies, 
it should be noted that strict adherence to either an 
Austinian or a Kelsonian version of legal positivism results 
in what has been criticized as "mechanical jurisprudence," 
or "the slot-machine theory of judicial decision." (Jones, 
p. 264) The legal realists in particular refused to accept 
a syllogistic model of judicial decision-making in which 
statutes and common-law rules serve as major premises, the 
fact pattern or the instant case as minor premises, and the 
judges decision as the forced conclusion. In Courts On 
Trial: Myth and Reality in American justice (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1949), Judge Jerome Frank criti­
cized this view of judicial process, representing it as 
reducible to the formula; R(rules) X F(facts) = D(decision),
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warrants from legal positivism rely predominantly or exclu­
sively upon statutory or case-law rules. Such arguments 
tend to be deductive and/or analogical--the legal rule pro­
viding either the major premise for a deduction or the model 
for an analogy, the facts of the instant case the minor pre­
mise or analog, and the decision the necessary conclusion.
As with the Argument from Ideal, the Argument from
Rule has a corresponding rhetorical analog. Weaver explained
the Argument from Similitude as the process of invoking,
. . . essential (though not exhaustive) correspondences 
. . . .  Thinkers of the analogical sort use this 
argument chiefly. If required to characterize the 
outlook it implies, we would say that it expresses 
belief in a oneness of the world, which causes all 
correspondence to have a probative value.20
The inherent reference to antecedent statutes and/or anal- 
agous controlling cases typical of the positive law warrant 
rests upon such a belief in the probative force of correspon­
dence. An analysis of opinions focusing upon this aspect 
of positive law philosophy may reveal a second rhetorical 
genre bound together by an internal dynamic predicated upon 
such essential correspondences.
20weaver, pp. 56-57.
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Argument from Context: The Legal Realist Warrant
Addressing the New York State Bar Association in 1932, 
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo claimed that "the most distinc­
tive product of the last decade in the field of juris­
prudence is the rise of a group of scholars styling themselves 
21realists." The realists to whom Cardozo referred were in
22fact both scholars and jurists. The scholars providing 
seminal philosophical impetus for the movement were William 
James and John Dewey, the fathers of pragmatism; the central 
jurist was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose chief interpreter. 
Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, was primarily
21"Jurisprudence," in Margaret E. Hall, ed.. Selected 
Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (New York: Pal on
Publications, 1947), p. 10.
^^The term draws in a variety of writers. Harry Jones 
explains that he "shall be using the tent term 'legal 
realist' in a sense broad enough to accomodate the behavioral 
focus of Karl Llewellyn, the fact-skepticism of Jerome Frank, 
the institutional empiricism of Underhill Moore and the 
logical pragmatism of Edwin Patterson." (Jones, p. 263)
Ronald Dworkin refers to "the powerful intellectual movement 
called 'legal realism,'" and associates with it the names 
of John Chipman Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Jerome 
Frank, Karl Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, and Morris and Felix 
Cohen (Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 3-4). Neither writer 
would claim comprehensiveness for his list; perhaps the work 
of Wilfried E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism: Skepti­
cism, Reform, and the Judicial Process (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1969) does the best job of identifying both 
the representative contributors and significant iueas of the 
realist tradition.
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responsible for initiating the corollary to legal realism, 
"sociological jurisprudence." Wilfred E. Rumble's valuable 
book, American Legal Realism thus argued that the realist 
movement was "best understood as an outgrowth of pragmatism, 
sociological jurisprudence, and the ideas of Mr. Justice
Holmes."23
Although the term "sociological jurisprudence" is 
sometimes subsumed by the term "legal realism" and sometimes 
used synonomously, a clearer understanding of them reveals 
that the former refers to the study of legal institutions 
from a certain perspective, while the latter refers to a 
certain view of their operation. Ronald Dworkin explained 
the first:
The emphasis on facts developed into what Roscoe 
Pound of Harvard called sociological jurispru­
dence; he meant the careful study of legail 
institutions as social processes, which treats 
a judge, for example, not as an oracle of doctrine, 
but as a man responding to various sorts of social 
and personal stimuli.2^
A radical shift of focus was implied in this view, one 
which no longer viewed jurisprudence as a closed logical 
system but rather as functional institutions with social
23Rumble, p. 46.
^^Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 4.
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causes and effects to be reckoned with. Thus in an essay
entitled "The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence," Dean
Pound called for "scientific apprehension of the relations
of law to society and of the needs and interests and opinions
25of society today."
The extension of this view made by the realists focused
upon the operation of legal institutions and jural agents
and was similarly radical in departing from traditional
views of the judicial decision-making process. The impact
of William James' psychology was most significant here.
Harry Jones suggested that the realist concept of legal
thinking was best characterized as,
. . .  a shared legacy from Holmes--that judges, 
prosecutors, and practicing lawyers do not really 
think in syllogims, that substantive doctrine is 
not the essence of law, and that one who would 
know the ways of legal action must dig beneath 
the doctrines formally announced in judicial 
opinions down into the substrata of personal 
preference, empirical fact, and conflicting 
social interests.26
This view of the decision-making process received its 
most sophisticated development in the work of Jerome Frank, 
known both as "rule-skepticism" and "fact-skepticism." The
p. 9.
26(3reen Bag XIX (1907), pp. 610-600, quoted in Rumble,
26Jones, p. 263.
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arguments judges use in announcing their decisions are
better understood when viewed as Judge Frank viewed them;
Rules, whether stated by judges or others, whether 
in statutes, opinions, or text-books by learned 
authors, are not the Law, but are only some among 
many of the sources to which judges go in making 
the law of the cases tried before them. . , . The 
law, therefore, consists of decisions, not of rules.
If so, then, whenever a judge decides a case he is 
making law.27
Frank's explanation is clearly the progeny of Holmes' famous 
definition of law itself: "The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
2P
what I mean by the law."
The important conclusion to be drawn from this dis­
cussion of judges as the centerpiece of legal realism is 
that their decisions provide the realist with criteria for 
determining the validity of laws. Whereas the proponents 
of natural law seek adherence to a moral order as the sine 
qua non of validity and the positivists insist upon a law's 
inclusion in a valid legal system, the realists' ultimate 
criterion is social utility. A legal rule, either in the
2 7 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 137-138.
28Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review 
10 (1897), pp. 457-468, quoted in Golding, The Nature of 
Law, p. 179.
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form of a judge's decision or a statute, would be required 
to meet two standards: (1) Does the rule aspire to desir­
able social goals? and, (2) Does the rule provide a rational 
basis for achieving those goals through the argument it 
presents or implies? Of course no realist would argue that 
pedigree is unnecessary for a law, but such legitimation by 
virtue of harmony with the rules for rule-making would be 
seen as ancillary to its capacity for social engineering.
From these perspectives on legal realism can now be 
extracted the operational definition of a third potential 
rhetorical genre of judicial opinion herein called Argu­
ment from Context: Arguments drawing warrants from legal
realism, while possibly referring to statutory or case-law 
rules, in fact rely upon reference to social goals for
support and typically stress the exigencies of the instant
29case or extra-judicial evidentiary materials.
29in an important article in The Journal of Philosophy 
Ronald Dworkin detailed exactly what forces are at work when 
a judge bases his decision upon factors other than statute 
or precedent. Pointing out that the belief that judges al­
ways "find law" is a tenet of the outmoded school of thought 
called "formalism" or "mechanical jurusprudence," Dworkin 
explained that "the position presently in vogue insists rather 
that there are two sources of judicial decision: rule and
discretion," Dworkin, \*xo insisted that the exercise of dis­
cretion is not "an occasional misfiring but a characteristic 
feature of the legal process," suggested that there are
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The analog to Argument from Context found in rhetori­
cal theory was explained by Richard Weaver as "Argument
basically three types of standards available to the judge as 
legitimate inventional options when arguing from sources 
other than statute or precedent:
First, there are standards, like 'No man shall profit 
by his own wrong' and “Infants are the wards of the 
law,' which are like textbook rules in that they have 
already been used in a variety of cases as good rea­
sons for decision, and a judge will determine the 
weight and scope of such standards by awareness of 
these cases.
Second, certain institutions of any community are 
competent to declare standards on its behalf. For us, 
today, such institutions include legislatures, execu­
tive officers, and administrative agencies, and the 
judiciary itself, in the sense that a 'new' standard 
may be shown to represent a proper summary of the 
resolution of other standards achieved in other 
cases.
[Third], judgments of the community at large or 
some identifiable segment thereof. The court refers 
to such judgments when it rejects a particular re­
sult or rule as unjust, as well as when it more 
explicitly invokes the ideals of the society. . . .
This discussion treads on the famous controversy. , . 
about the relation of law and morals. On some 
occasions, in some kinds of cases, moral principles 
accepted as standards within the community will 
figure as good reasons for a legal decision, just 
as, on other occasions, in other kinds of cases, will 
standards otherwise established.
(Ronald Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion," The Journal of Philo­
sophy 60 (1963), pp. 624-638.
In Dworkin's argument lies the key to understanding 
Jones' suggestion quoted on p. 4 above tnat close affinities 
exist between natural law and legal realism. The point at 
which they intersect is the point at which they depart from 
the Argument from Rule in order to make discretionary deci­
sions and thereby fill the so-called "gaps" in the positive 
law. The realist adopts a more empirical orientation, the
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from Circumstance," which he characterized as "the nearest
of all arguments to purest expediency. This argument merely
reads the circumstances. . .and accepts them as coercive, or
allows them to dictate the decision." Weaver went on to
suggest that such "argument savors of urgency rather than
of perspicacity; and it seems to be preferred by those who
30
are easily impressed oy existing tangibles."
natural lawyer tends to the idealistic. Arthur Goodhart 
explained the empirical basis of such a realist orientation: 
It is by his choice of material facts that the judge 
creates law. A congeries of facts is presented to him; 
he chooses those which he considers material ones. . . .  
His conclusion is based on the material facts as he 
sees that, and we cannot add or subtract from them by 
proving that other facts existed in the case.
(Arthur Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a 
Case," Yale Law Journal XL (December 1930), p. 169.)
Abraham L. Davis provided numerous examples of such 
fact selection in his important work. The United States 
Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data (New York: 
MSS Information Corporation, 1973). A notable case was the 
apparent influence upon Chief Justice Earl Warren's Brown 
opinion of extensive social psychological evidence relating 
the harms of racial segregation.
^®Some legal theorists of a positivistic bent would 
agree with Weaver's suggestion that those adopting this form 
of argument are less than perspicacious, particularly as 
regards analysis of statutory and/or case-law constraints. 
However, that misses the point of American legal realism; 
it was astute social perspicacity that sired the urgency of 
their arguments in favor of making precedents rather than 
following them.
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The underlying teleological nature of legal realism 
(which it inherited from sociological jurisprudence), when 
viewed in tandem with Weaver's explanation of Argument from 
Circumstance, may provide clues with which to seek an 
internal dynamic in judicial opinions in order to determine 
whether such elements form a rhetorical genre. But philo­
sophy alone is insufficient to explain a particular rhetorical 
transaction, for there are other constraints as well. We 
now turn to an accounting of institutionally based influences 
upon the rhetorical choices of United States Supreme Court 
justices.
The Living Hand of Tradition; institutional 
Rhetoric in the Supreme Court
Rhetors speaking for institutions, Kathleen Jamieson
argued in 1973 in Philosophy and Rhetoric,
. . .are more constrained by genre than others 
because of their sense of the presentness of the 
past. An institutional spokesman who draws his 
perceptions of his role from the traditions of 
the institution itself tends, for example, to 
feel generic constraints more acutely than does 
the rhetor not tied to a tradition-bound institution.
31Kathleen Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the 
Rhetorical Situation." Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (Summer 
1973), p. 165.
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But the rhetors thus constrained, Jamieson further suggested, 
contribute to a reciprocal relationship between themselves 
and the institution they represent, for "establishment and 
maintenance of definable forms of rhetoric serve to define 
the institution itself." Thus a rhetorical tradition begins 
to form, "creating expectations which any future institu­
tional spokesman feel obliged to fulfill rather than
frustrate. A long-lived institution tends to calcify its 
32genres." Perhaps no American institution better fits 
this description than the Supreme Court. Steeped in almost 
two centuries of tradition, the Supreme Court opinion must 
answer to the expectations of history, the bench, the bar, 
the law school critics, other branches of government, and 
the public at large. But this highly specialized form of 
communication is first the product of more or less rigid 
mechanical constraints as well. We turn first to those, 
then to the more substantive influences upon the content 
of opinions.
Before an opinion can be written, it must be assigned. 
If the Chief Justice has voted with the majority, he assigns 
the opinion writer, if not, the senior Associate Justice
S^ibid.
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voting with the majority has the task of assigning an 
33
author. But the bases upon which such a decision are 
made are also constrained by the institution. Professor 
Henry Abraham suggested one consideration guiding the 
assignment of opinions to particular justices, using Brown 
V .  Board of Education of Topeka^^ as his example, Abraham 
claimed that frequently the "so-called 'great,' or 'big,' 
or 'important constitutional' cases--although these are 
somewhat subjective concepts— should be authored by the
'Chief himself."35
A second consideration influencing choice of opinion 
writer, and one dictated largely by the need of the legal 
community for precision and accuracy, may at times supersede 
the first. Abraham noted in this light that "no matter 
what the importance of a case, the selection of a Justice 
to write the opinion must take into account the possible
33Tom C. Clark, "Inside the Court," in Andrew M, Scott 
and Earle Wallace, eds.. Politics U.S.A.; Cases on the 
American Democratic Process, 2nd ed., (New York: The
Macmillan Company), p. 443.
3*347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5%enry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An intro­
ductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, 
and France, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press,
1975), pp. 205-206.
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36importance of the decision as a precedent." Consequently,
the Justice with greatest expertise in the relevant field
of law will likely get the assignment. An example was
pointed out in Chapter I in Sidney Davis' suggestion that
Chief Justice Stone tended to assign to the young Douglas
most cases involving issues of business reorganization and
finance in order to take advantage of his expertise gained
37as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Still another audience of Supreme Court opinions 
provides a third consideration affecting choice of who shall 
be author. Although all these considerations are intrinsi­
cally rhetorical, this one is particularly so, for Professor 
Abraham argued that,
. . . there is considerable evidence that the 'Chief' 
is conscious of an element of 'public relations' in 
designating his opinion writer. This is particularly 
true in cases that are undoubtedly going to be
S^Ibid., p. 206.
37See, e.g., Sidney Davis, "Mr. Justice Douglas," 
Columbia Law Review 74 (April 1974), p. 350, and see also, 
John R. Frank, "William O. Douglas," in Leon Friedman and 
Fred L . Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court 1780-1969; Their Lives and Major Opinions, 
with an Introduction by Louis H. Poliak, (New York and 
London : Chelsea House Publishers in Association with 
R. R. Bowker Company, 1969), p. 2486.
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unpopular to a sizeable segment of the population.
In other words, he is not unmindful of the 
importance of making a decision acceptable to the 
public, or, when possible, of coating the bitter 
pill that must be swallowed.
David M. Hunsaker, a communication scholar and communi­
cations lawyer, cited an example of such rhetorical con­
siderations influencing both choice of author and the 
opinion itself. Hunsaker reported that Chief justice Earl 
Warren, discussing his recently published majority opinion 
in Brown v. Board of Education with law students at the 
University of Virginia, said that he "wanted an opinion 
short enough and simple enough to appear on the front page 
of every major newspaper in the country the day after it 
was handed down."^^ Thus, if the theorists are correct, 
Warren's decision to author the opinion himself was influ­
enced both by the signal importance of Brown and by its 
supposed unpopularity with some elements of the population.
The Brown example notwithstanding, Abraham suggested 
another aspect of this public relations phenomenon in
38Abraham, p. 207.
S^David M. Hunsaker, "The Rhetoric of Brown v . Board 
of Education; Paradigm for Contemporary Social Protest," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal 43 (Winter 1978), 
pp. 91-109.
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claiming that to facilitate such bitter pills going
it is not unusual for the Chief Justice to "assign so-
called 'liberal' opinions of the Court to 'conservative'
Justices and so-called 'conservative' opinions to 'liberal'
Justices--again in the hope of making them more palatable.
Obviously the Brown opinion illustrated that this practice
is not always followed, but other cases suggest that it
sometimes apparently is. Justice Black with Justice Douglas
concurring, for example, authored the surprisingly harsh
and singularly unpalatable Korematsu^  ^opinion sustaining
the military relocation of thousands of Japanese American
citizens during World War II. Another example of this
tactic possibly affecting choice of opinion writer is the
case of "conservative" Texas Democrat Justice Tom Clark
getting the assignment to author the widely unpopular
condemnation of required Bible-reading in public schools
handed down in School District of Abington Township v.
42Schempp.
Both before assignment of writer, and sometimes for 
months after, the rhetorical direction of a single opinion
^°Abraham, p. 208. “^^323 U.S. 214, (1944).
^^374 U.S. 203, (1963).
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is shaped and reshaped in one of the most confidential 
rituals in American society, the judicial conference of the 
Supreme Court. Not until 1979 when A.B.C. News obtained 
advance information on the Harris v. Lando case had signifi­
cant material leaked from this inner sanctum. But des­
criptions of its operation and anecdotes of its struggles 
have been recorded by those who were there, justice Tom 
Clark, in a short and valuable essay called "inside the 
Court," provided one such insight. He told of one judicial 
conference when Justice Harlan was presenting his view of 
a case and Justice Holmes, breaking the usual protocols of 
the occasion, blurted out, "That won't wash I That won't 
wash 1" But, as Justice Clark continued,
Fortunately, the Chief Justice at the time was 
Melville Fuller. He had already discussed the 
case and his position was similar to that of 
Harlan. When the diminutive but courageous, 
silver-haired, handlebar-mustached Chief Justice 
realized that all was not well between his brothers 
he quickly answered Holmes' 'That won't wash,' 
with a cheery 'Well, I'm scrubbing away, anyhow^'
A tense situation passed over during the ensuing
laughter.43
An idea of the importance and value of such interaction 
was expressed in a letter to William 0. Douglas signed by
43ciark, p. 442.
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all his brethren on the Court on the occasion of his re­
tirement. The letter, dated December 19, 197 5, appeared 
in Volume 423 of United States Reports. They said,
. . .  as colleagues we valued highly your unparal- 
led knowledge of the multitude of decisions of the 
Court covering more than one-third of this century.
It was a unique resource for the Court and one that 
may never again be present at our Conference table.
We shall always remember your occasional verbal 
'footnotes' telling us intimate details as to how 
some opinion e v o l v e d . 44
In all liklihood the Justices were being diplomatic
in that account of the conferences. As Justice Clark
pointed out, once the opinion is assigned and an original
draft composed, the author's arguments are printed in the
print shop in the basement of the building and circulated
to the other Justices and
. . .then the fur begins to fly. Returns come in, 
some favorable and many otherwise. . . . The cases 
are often discussed by the majority both before and 
after circulation. The final form of the opinion is 
agreed upon at the Friday conferences. Of course, 
any Justice may dissent or write his own views on a 
case. These are likewise circulated long before the 
opinion of the majority is announced.
The Supreme Court opinion, then, though one man receives 
credit, blame, and historical judgment for it, is truly the 
product of nine men, as well as all their institutional
44423 U.S. VIII. ^^Clark, pp. 443-444.
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predecessors . Nevertheless, we may be confident that the 
opinion contains nothing the authoring Justice cannot live 
with, despite Abrahams' comment that "studies based on the 
Justices' [unpublished] papers make abundantly clear that 
Justices of all ideological persuasions ponder, bargain, 
and argue in the course of reaching their decisions— even 
at the risk of compromising their ideologies."^® But 
despite this process, the option of the seriatim opinion, 
either concurring or dissenting, makes the published opus 
of his decisions a valid index of the Supreme Court Justice's 
judicial philosophy, and certainly a valid record of the 
rhetorical bases for that philosophy. But constraints enter 
in that are perhaps much more influential than those imposed 
by the mechanical operation of the Court itself. These con­
straints are imbedded in the system of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, and particularly in the doctrine of stare 
decisis. They comprise an important star in the constellation 
of constraints shaping American judicial rhetoric, and must 
also be considered.
^®Abraham, p. 215.
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Precedent/ Dicta, and Style; Functional 
Constraints on Supreme Court Rhetoric 
Cicero noted the communicative nature of law, and 
particularly the interplay between laws and judges, observ­
ing that "it can be truly said the magistrate is a speaking
47law, and the law is a silent magistrate." Our reverence
for precedent, institutionalized as the doctrine of stare
decisis, binds us inherently, though not inescapably, to
the words of generations of such "silent magistrates" known
still as the common law. This doctrine produces perhaps
the single most powerful constraint operating upon the
rhetorical options of the judge. His opinion must function
as a central element in the total legal system of which it
is a part. Awareness of the functional importance of his
words, coupled with traditional stylistic expectations for
opinions, form a paradigm case of what Jamieson described
as "doctrine and form becom[ing] fused as style and content
4 8are ultimately fused." But the United States Supreme 
Court justice retains substantial options by virtue of the
4?Cicero, De Republica, De Legibus, trans. Clinton 
Walker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 461,
Jamieson, p. 165.
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availability of the seriatim, or separate, opinion. He may
write the majority opinion itself, write a concurring opinion,
49or post a dissent. Much legal scholarship holds that the 
rhetoric of Supreme Court opinions differs widely depending 
upon whether it represents a majority or non-majority 
position. Because of the diverse functions served by major­
ity and non-majority opinions, and because they are often 
aimed at different audiences, students of the Court have 
held that the judge's rhetorical responses are governed by 
the diverse sets of constraints at work in these two 
situations. One of the primary questions of the present 
study asks whether William 0. Douglas typifies this claim, 
and further, whether legal philosophy as manifested in 
argument also correlates with majority/non-majority status 
of the opinion? So that this question can be answered, we 
must first examine the alleged differences.
Three basic opinion types are present in Supreme Court 
rhetoric: the majority opinion, the concurring opinion, and
49Justices may dissent in several ways. They may dis­
sent from an actual substantive decision of the court, they 
may dissent from the denial of a writ of certiorari, from an 
order to remand, from a stay or the removal of a stay of some 
kind, etc. For purposes of analysis, dissents of a substan­
tive type and a procedural type are treated separately in 
this study. See Ch. IV.
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the dissenting opinion. Each has certain functions, certain 
audiences, and certain relationships to legal philosophy.
In the Anglo-American system of common law the majority 
opinion has one overriding function : to state legal rules
which support the present decision and which should guide 
lawyers, litigants, and judges in future similar cases.
For this reason we may expect, hypothetically at least, that 
the rules orientation of legal positivism would most fre­
quently typify majority opinion writing, and that hypothesis 
has been implied by legal philosophers from John Austin to 
the present. The early thinkers in that tradition in fact 
insisted that the decision acieved its authority by the 
statement of a legal rule. Austin wrote that "the general 
reasons or principles of a judicial decision. . .are com­
monly styled, by writers on jurisprudence, the ratio 
d e c i d e n d i . T h i s  rationale for decision becomes the 
precedent of the case and thus the desire to achieve the 
rule of law in fact results in the law of rules. Accord­
ingly, Professor Carleton Allen indicated the close nexus 
between ratio decidendi and the concept of stare decisis
^®John Austin, Jurisprudence, 5th ed., (1885), p. 627, 
quoted in Goodhart, p. 161.
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when he pointed out that "any judgment of any Court is
authoritative only as to that part of it, called the ratio
decidendi, which is considered to have been necessary to
the decision of the actual issue between the litigants
Writing in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, A. W. B. Simpson
admitted that "there may indeed be as many ways of finding
the ratio of a case as there are ways of finding a lost cat,"
but went on to offer a contemporary affirmation of the
Austinian view of the concept;
For purely legal purposes we may take it for granted 
that we should look in cases for a rule or rules of 
some kind or other. Furthermore, the term ratio 
decidendi is normally used to refer to some kind of 
binding rule . . . which is to be found in decided 
cases— some rule which a later court . . . cannot 
generally question.52
An important, but implicit, aspect of Simpson’s argument, 
is that, at least as far as the American supreme Court is 
concerned, one must look for ratio decidendi only in major­
ity opinions. Neither concurring nor dissenting opinions
^^Sir Carleton Allen, Law in the Making, 2nd ed., 
(1930), p. 155, quoted in Goodhart, p. 162.
52^. w. B. Simpson, "The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and 
the Doctrine of Binding Precedent," in A. G. Guest, ed,, 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), pp. 155, 160.
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may serve as sources of law for the instant case, though 
either may eventually attain that status.
A rhetorical practice often necessary in any common
law system is that of "distinguishing" cases. Simpson
pointed out that this strategy was often taken to be "some
sort of intellectual sharp practice," or as "a suspicious
or spurious 'way round' the doctrine of precedent." That
charge, however, misunderstands both "distinguishing" and
the doctrine of precedent itself, for;
Distinguishing cases, which consists in giving 
reasons why a rule in a case ought not to be 
followed or applied in a later case, is often 
conceived to be an indication that courts are not 
'really' bound; in truth, earlier cases are dis­
tinguished, and have to be distinguished, just 
because they are binding, so that they ought to be 
followed unless a reason can be given for not 
following them; in much the same way courts have 
to interpret statutes just because statutes are 
binding
The conclusion relevant to the present study is that 
the practice of distinguishing cases, despite its apparent 
departure from the Argument from Rule, is very much a 
characteristic of Legal Positivism— the binding rule is not 
being denied its importance, only its present relevance.
^^Ibid., pp. 174, 158-159.
^^Lawyers, legal scholars, and rhetoricians alike agree 
that the process of applying precedent is fundamentally that
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Thus properly understood, "following and distinguishing 
cases [may] turn out to be the very ways in which the
of analogical reasoning. Lawrence c. Becker wrote that 
'Standard accounts of analogy in legal reasoning focus on 
the question of the similarities and dissimilarities to be 
found between the things (people, events, acts, circum­
stances, verbal expressions) said to be analogous." But 
noting that if one adopts a quantitative standard for 
validity in analogical reasoning, the result is complete 
identity and thus no analog at all, Becker pointed out that 
"the Morning Star and the Evening Star are not analogs, but 
the same thing." Thus he suggested that, "a purely 
quantitative approach to the question of validity will not 
do: it is not just the sheer number of similarities between
analogs which counts, but somehow the significance of their 
similarities. . . .  It is relevant similarities which are 
at stake." Becker concluded that a good analogy is judicial 
matters is no different from one in other social sciences 
and suggested that "what one looks for in a good dynamic 
analogy. . . is simply an object which has a property which 
can be 'yoked' to a property in its analog for the purposes 
at hand. Relevance, or validity (i.e., whether A and B are 
appropriately thought of as analogs for a given purpose) 
is decided here in just the same way one decides the worth 
of a theoretical model: in terms of its consequences for
predictive, explanatory, heuristic, or other tasks."
(Lawrence C. Becker, "Analogy in Legal Reasoning," Ethics 
83 (April 1973), pp. 248-249, 252.) In other words, does 
the controlling case (the precedent) help to explain or pre­
dict the correct results in the instant case in terms of 
relevant similarities? If so, a fundeunental threshold of 
fairness is presumed to have been met, and the parties to 
the litigation should achieve a sense of aesthetic closure 
as a result. The Belgian rhetorician and jurisprudent Chaim 
Perelman called such a result the "Rule of Justice," and he 
defined it as "a principle of action in accordance with which 
beings of one and the same essential category must be treated 
in the same way." (Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and 
the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie, (New York: The
Free Press, 1963), p. 16.) Thus, the concept of relevant 
similarity intersects with the concept of ratio decidendi
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creation of law by judges usually takes place in the common 
law system."55
Because the majority opinion must function well in 
future courtrooms, a judge's stylistic options are under­
standably constrained when composing one. Most theorists 
have agreed with Justice Cardozo in this light that "there 
can be little doubt that in matters of literary style the 
soveriegn virture for the judge is clearness."Making
in a crucial way: to decide what is a relevant similarity
and what is not is also to decide what is ratio decidendi 
and what is obiter dicta. Sir Carleton Allen illustrated 
the significance of this point in terms of the individual 
judge's reasoning in cases when he argued that the judge 
"places the fetters on his own hands. He has to declare 
whether the case cited to him is truly apposite to the 
circumstances in question and whether it accurately embodies 
the principle which he is seeking. The humblest judicial 
officer has to decide for himself whether he is or is not 
bound." (Quoted in Simpson, p. 149.)
Edward H. Levi, who was to become President of the 
University of Chicago and subsequently Attorney General of 
the United States, made the same point in his classic work.
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1949) when he wrote that "the determination 
of similarity or difference is the function of each judge." 
(p. 2) With characteristic directness. Justice Douglas 
also confirmed that the "re-examination of precedent in 
constitutional law is a personal matter for each judge 
who comes along," (We The Judges, p. 429)
55gimpson, p. 155.
5®Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Law and Literature," in Law 
and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses (New York:
Harcourt. Brace and Company, 1931), p. 7.
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more explicit the notion of how audiences use the opinion,
Percival Jackson elaborated upon the rhetorical necessity
for clarity in majority opinions:
The judge who writes for the Court must not roam the 
fields; on the contrary, he must weigh his words 
within an ambit of discretion so that he may secure 
agreement from his fellows. He must avoid confusion 
and uncertainty not only to obtain unanimity but also 
to command respect from the bar and the public for the 
decision of the Court. 7^
Indeed, the functional significance of clarity in majority
opinions exists at all levels, for as Don R. Le Duc pointed
out,
lack of clarity will invite an appeal at the trial 
court level and with it the potential embarrassment 
of a reversal. Lack of clarity at the appellate 
level will stimulate litigation throughout the 
court's jurisdiction to resolve all questions left 
unsettled by the opinion.
At least in terms of the ideal then, theorists agree 
that the rhetoric of majority opinions (when they announce 
the judgment of the court) is constrained by the doctrine 
of stare decisis, by the functional applications of the
57Percival E. Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court:
A Chronology (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969),
p. 15.
58Don R. Le Duc, "'Free Speech' Decisions emd the Legal 
Process: The Judicial Opinion in Context," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 62 (October 1976), p. 283.
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opinion/ and by the expectations of various critical audi­
ences. There is, however, another species of majority 
opinion, which may be less constrained, the concurrence.
A judge may feel any of several motivations for
issuing a concurring opinion. He may only wish to add a
rhetorical, "Me, too1" to the Court's judgment; he may wish
to say that he concurs only with the result and that he
disagrees with the route by which it was achieved; he may
wish to argue that the Court's decision has not gone far
enough. Douglas, for example, often used concurring opinions
in the First Amendment area for this reason, agreeing with
the judgment when the Court upheld some aspect of free
speech, but insisting that any law restrictive of such
liberties should be invalidated, it was to these and other
purposes that Abraham had reference when he wrote that
there are many legal scholars who are convinced that, 
whereas dissenting opinions are both eminently justi­
fiable and necessary, concurring opinions are 
neither— that they are frequently nothing more than 
ego-manifestations and/or 'quibbling,' which would 
more profitably be confined to footnotes in the body 
of the majority opinion. Yet there is no doubt that 
the concurring opinion is a significant tool in the 
judicial process.
^^Abraham, p. 205.
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Because the concurring opinion is less constrained 
by the systemic needs of the legal community, two generali­
zations may be made about it. First, it is not the place 
to look for ratio decidendi. By definition, a case may set 
only one precedent at a time, not several. Although the 
judge may issue "rule-like" statements in concurrences, 
they possess no legal force for the instant case. Second, 
and following from the first, concurring opinions are less 
likely to be predictive of judicial philosophy. A judge 
may urge upon his brethren the relevance of alternative 
rules to guide the present decision, thus suggesting a 
positivistic bent; he may stress the exigencies of the case 
itself as persuasive, thus tending toward legal realism; or 
he may argue that the outcome should be dictated by trans­
cendent values existing independent of the positive law, 
thus invoking natural law. But if the concurring opinion 
is of less value or interest to the legal community, it 
still retains importance for the academic. Although con­
curring opinions may not predict judicial behavior as well 
as majority opinions, they certainly reflect it as well. 
Douglas' First Amendment opinions, for example, were almost 
thirty percent concurrences, and in terms of legal
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philosophy as manifested in argument, turned out to be
quite similar to both his majority and dissenting opinions.
In terms of uses by the legal community and as the
object of study for scholars, a third opinion type, the
dissent, may surpass both the majority and the concurring
opinions for its rhetorical ramifications. If the primary
function of the majority opinion is to announce legal
doctrine, then, as Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone pointed
out, the function of "a considered and well-stated dissent
[is to sound] a warning note that legal doctrine must not
61
be pressed too far." Stone saw the public pronouncements
of the Court as vital to the healthy functioning of the
democracy and stressed the role of dissent, saying that such
decisions must "be supported by written opinions, freely
criticized by the members of the Court vho do not agree with 
62them." Since unanimity in the Supreme Court's delibera­
tions has become more and more rare, the functional importance 
of the critiques couched in dissents has become more important,
G°see Chapter IV.
Quoted in Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1956), p. 591.
G^ibid., p. 575.
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That dissents frequently find their way into majority 
opinions is a commonplace stated with uncommon incisiveness 
in a frequently quoted passage by Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes:
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to 
the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence 
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly 
correct the error into which the dissenting judge 
believes the court to have been betrayed. ^
But does the non-majority opinion represent a different 
rhetorical type? Commentary from both the bench and the 
academic community seems to so indicate, and the explanation, 
as with concurring opinions, is the relative absence of con­
straints, Authors of non-majority opinions are not arti­
culating case law, at least for the instant case. In this 
regard Justice Cardozo, one of our more rhetorically gifted 
judges, asserted that "comparatively speaking at least, the 
dissenter is irresponsible," and that therefore,
we need not be surprised . . .  to find in dissent 
a certain looseness of texture and depth of color 
rarely found in the per curiam. Sometimes, as I 
have said, there is just a suspicion of acerbity, 
but this after all, is rare. More truly character­
istic of dissent is a dignity, an elevation of mood 
and thought and phrase. Deep conviction and warm
^^Charles Evan Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United 
States (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc.,
1928), p. 68.
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feeling are saying their last say with knowledge 
that the cause is lost.
. . . The dissenter speaks to the future, and 
his voice is pitched to a key that will carry 
through the y e a r s . @4
Contemporary social scientists affirm the rhetorical 
divergence of dissents. Le Duc noted recently that "the 
dissenting judge is free to range beyond generalizations 
to abstract philosophical arguments, " and that "thus as a 
general rule it might be said that the more vigorous or 
eloquent the judicial passage being quoted, the less likely 
it is to be an expression of existing l a w . S o l o m o n  
Resnik went even further in his analysis of the stylistic 
variables in judicial communication, suggesting that the 
literary excesses so often attributed to dissents are 
"really a function of the non-majority opinion and are thus 
stated in exaggerated form in order to present ideals to 
be emulated rather than specific precedents for the here 
and now," and therefore such "statements have a strategic 
rather than a literal purpose."®®
®^Cardozo, pp. 33-37. ®®Le Due, p. 284.
®®Solomon Resnik, "Black and Douglas: Variations in
Dissent," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for 
Social Research, 1970, quoted in Dissertation Abstracts 31
(1971), p. 6130-A.
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The relative absence of functional constraints ope­
rating upon the non-majority opinion gives rise to two 
generalizations. First, dissents are not likely to be the 
home of obiter dicta, defined by Abraham as "more or less 
extraneous point[s], presumably unnecessary to the decision, 
made by the author of an o p i n i o n , a n d  more colorfully 
described by Justice William Brennan as "the gas on the
stomach of the Justice at the time he was writing the 
68decision." And second, as with concurring opinions, 
dissents are less likely to predict legal philosophy as 
manifested in argument. This is not to dispute Le Due's 
argument above that non-majority opinions are less likely 
to express existing law, for by definition they do not.
But Le Due's argument should not be extended to suggest 
that a dissent is unlikely to adopt Argument from Rule. 
Douglas, for example, adopted this argument type more fre­
quently in dissents than Argument from Ideal and Argument
69from Context combined. An example of why such a rhetorical 
strategy makes sense is found in Douglas' DeFunis^^ dissent.
®^Abraham, pp. 221-222. Quoted in Abraham, p. 222. 
G^see Chapter IV.
^^DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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The Court, per curiam, remanded for mootness a case alleging
reverse discrimination in the University of Washington law
school minority admissions program. Justice Douglas filed
a lengthy and highly technical dissent from this remand which
ultimately had significant impact upon Thurgood Marshall's
71majority opinion in the Bakke case. Such a possibility 
of future implementation of arguments by the Court makes 
desirable, from time to time, a highly positivistic dissent­
ing opinion. Also instructive to recall in this light is 
that the "clear and present danger" test, one of the most 
widely invoked common law rules in American jurisprudence,
was bo m  in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s dissent in Schenck
72
V. United States. Again as with concurrances, dissents 
serve well as repositories of and indexes to a justice's 
judicial philosophy and rhetorical behavior; they simply are 
not as likely to predict them as well as the more constrained 
majority opinion.
Several conclusions emerge from this examination of 
supposed differences between majority and non-majority
^^Regents of university of Calif, v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
912 (1978).
72249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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opinions. First, majority status for an opinion is more 
likely to predict a dependence upon positivistic juris­
prudence, the Argument from Rule. Both mechanical and 
substantive institutional constraints combine to support 
this generalization. Rules often form the basis of a 
universal vocabulary for judges, a way of justifying a 
decision that is least likely to give rise to dispute. Al­
though on some occasions a judge may decide that reliance 
upon precedent is insufficient justification, he would never 
regard its use as inappropriate, nor would any critic of 
judicial decision-making. Furthermore, although we may 
expect the majority opinion to be characteristically pre- 
cedent-laden, even dissents often rely predominantly or 
exclusively upon rule-based arguements. Thus, despite a 
judge's personal philosophical orientation, we may expect 
his rhetorical indulgence of that orientation to be signifi­
cantly constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis. Second, 
concurring opinions, although a type of majority opinion, are 
less likely to predict jurisprudential/rhetorical substance 
because of their comparatively less constrained nature. And 
third, the non-majority opinion is also a less reliable 
predictor of rhetorical genre for it, too, feels fewer con­
straints than the majority opinion. What must be remembered,
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though, is that both the concurring and dissenting opinion 
may very well adopt the Argument from Rule as frequently as 
the majority opinion, but not as a functional necessity.
If rule-like arguments are present in non-majority opinions 
they are not there to function as the imprimatur of case 
law, they serve rather the function of critiquing the major­
ity opinion and recording for future parties the bases of 
potential evolution in the law.
The most important conclusion flowing from these 
explanations of judicial rhetoric, though, is that to 
suggest that a jurist is exclusively a "positivist," or a 
"realist," or a "natural lawyer" is to misunderstand the 
nature of legal reasoning, the operation of the American 
Supreme Court, and the nature of rhetoric itself. A proper 
understanding of legal philosophy sees it not as a denomi­
national choice made by the judge for life, but as a 
rhetorical choice made in any given case as the "available 
means of persuasion" appropriate to that situration.
Natural Law, therefore, is neither the vestigial remains of
a medieval tradition nor the exclusive province of Catholic 
73jurisprudents; it is simply a source of argument and a
^^Natural Law Forum, a leading jurisprudential publica­
tion, for example, is published by the Notre Dame Law School,
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type of reasoning which relies ultimately upon values pre­
sumed to transcend the positive laws of the society governed 
by them. Likewise, Legal Realism is not best understood as 
a rationale for implementing the social policy prerogatives 
of activist judges; it is rather an approach to legal argu­
ment which recognizes that law is meaningful only if viewed 
in a social context, and which believes that sometimes 
societies outrun their rules and when they do, judges can 
help the rules catch up. And finally, the judge practicing 
Legal Postivism should not, ipso facto, be accused of
74
"mechanical jurisprudence" or "slot machine" decision-making;
74Jones, p. 264. Others have likewise disparaged such 
knee-jerk jurisprudence. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote 
that judges often seem "to fortify principle with precedent," 
(The Common Law, p. 209) and Cardozo suggested that "the 
power of precedent . . .  is the power of the beaten track."
(The Growth of the Law, p. 62). Justice Jackson elaborated 
the point by revealing the often present judicial timidity 
at work: "The judge who can take refuge in a precedent
does not need to justify his decision to the reason. He may 
'reluctantly feel himself bound' by a doctrine, supported 
by a respected historical name, that he would not be able 
to justify to contemporary opinion or under modem conditions." 
(Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1941), p. 295). Cardozo suggested
that lawyers as well as judges sometimes abused the doctrine 
of stare decisis observing that in some of their arguments 
"anything bound might be cited, though wrought through no 
process more intellectual than paste pot and scissors."
(The Growth of the Law, pp. 13-14). The abusive or unthinking 
deference to precedent by his fellows on the bench was des- 
scribed by Cardozo as "march[ing] at times to pitiless
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rather a decision of relevant similarity is allowed to
govern the instant case and such a decision is, in Chaim
75Perelman's view, essentially rhetorical. To these inven-
tional choices, Cardozo admonished, we should turn if we
wish to study judicial rhetoric, for they are,
. . . more important than the mere felicities of 
turn or phrase. [They] are what we may term the 
architectonics of opinions. The groupings of fact 
and argument and illustration so as to produce a 
cumulative and mass effect; these, after all, are 
the things that count above all others.
Oxford's Ronald Dworkin suggested the payoff for such inquiry
when he argued that "attention to the explanations judges
give may reveal patterns of judicial behavior, self-adopted
conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic which is 
supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the 
sacrificial rite. They perform it, none the less, with 
averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they 
obey the bidding of their office. The victim is offered up 
to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar of regularity." 
(Ibid., p. 66). Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior 
under Franklin Roosevelt, suggested what may actually be at 
work when judges behave in such a way. William O. Douglas 
quoted him as characterizing Justice Felix Frankfurter as 
"a real conservative who embraced old precedents under the 
guise of bowing to 'the law' but who actually chose the old 
precedents because he liked them better." (Go East Young 
Man, p. 327.)
75His notion of the Rule of Justice (see note 54 above) 
is fundamentally an epistemological process of assigning 
individual cases to appropriate categories and supporting 
such decisions by argument.
^®Cardozo, "Law and Literature," pp. 32-33.
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guides which will aid a careful observer in predicting
decision, in making them more 'reckonable' or perhaps less
77' u n r e c k o n a b l e T h e  patterns may turn out to be genres.
But before turning to the issue of genre theory, one 
final task remains for the present chapter, and that is to 
examine the critical commentary upon William o. Douglas' 
judicial rhetoric. Only by so doing can the forthcoming 
analysis of his opinions be placed in meaningful context.
The Douglas Opinions; Style and Philosophy
Any Justice of the United States Supreme who composes
the line that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is "to keep
78government off the backs of the people, " may expect a 
considerable body of criticism to accumulate around his 
decisions, and such a literature has grown up around Douglas', 
Professor Vern Countryman of the Harvard Law School was one 
of Douglas' first law clerks and between 1959 and 1977 edited 
three collections of Douglas' opinions. Countryman observed 
that such comments drew the ire of "some of the more fasti­
dious students of the Court who do not like Douglas' judicial
^^Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion," p. 628.
78Laird, Secretary of Defense v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 28
(1972), Justice Douglas, dissenting.
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style." Over the long run, though. Countryman suggested
that such criticism mellowed. He wrote that.
At an earlier time, some of these critics were 
inclined to the view that Justice Douglas' approach 
led him frequently into error. Today, many of 
them would complain only that he has reached the
right conclusion by the wrong route.
So that the forthcoming analysis of Douglas' opinions may
be placed in scholarly context, we must examine both the
stylistic route he took and the philosophical conclusions
his critics have drawn therefrom. What will become apparent
is that there exists a strong connection between judicial
style and philosophical inferences based on it. It is those
inferences we mean to test.
A recurrent criticism levelled at Douglas' opinions
was that they were "unjudicial." H. Frank Way made this
charge, adding that, on occasion, "Justice Douglas' rhetoric
[stood] outside the mainstream of legal prose, a prose which
80may out of some inner necessity be colorless and lifeless."
79Vern Countryman, The Judicial Record of Justice 
William O. Douglas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1974), pp. 380-381.
®®H. Frank Way, Jr., "The Study of judicial Attitudes: 
The Case of Mr. Justice Douglas," western Political Quarterly 
24 (March 1971), p. 22.
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The law professors have been among Douglas' most severe
critics. William Cohen of the U.C.L.A. Law School, and one
of the Justice's former clerks, wrote that Douglas was,
. . . not a law professor's judge. His opinions 
draw more professional ire than praise because 
they are terse--even brusque— marching to their 
conclusions without the elegantia ’juris which 
marks the academic ideal.81
Professor Kenneth L. Karst, also of the U.C.L.A. law faculty,
indicated the profession's technical tendencies when he
wrote that Douglas ' opinions were "long on conclusory
statements and short on the kind of painstaking analysis
that one might expect from a lawyer of Justice Douglas'
intellectural attainments. . . .  I still yearn for a little
82more explanation."
Percival Jackson saw Douglas and Black as two of a
type and described their opinions as "monuments of disregard
for precedent," and bemoaned "their disrespect for past 
83wisdom." Jackson disapproved particularly of Douglas'
81william Cohen, Introduction to "Mr. Justice Douglas; 
Three Decades of Service," U.C.L.A. Law Review 16 (1969), p. 
701.
82Kenneth L. Karst, "Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural-Law-Due-Process For­
mula, " U.C.L.A. Law Review 16 (1969), p. 749 (final ellipsis 
in original).
83Percival Jackson, p. 13.
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dissents, calling them examples of "intransigency. The
charge of being unjudicial became more specific in Jackson's
critique when he noted with dismay that "Justice Douglas
quotes liberally from extrajudicial sources, even in one
case, a recent antitrust suit, he reproduced a column
84written by Art Buchwalk." But Gerhard Casper represented 
another typical response to the same practice by Douglas of 
turning to widely diverse extra-judicial sources for his
8 5arguments. In Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago
Casper noted that Douglas' seven page dissent,
. . .  quoted (aside from court opinions and legal 
treatises): Plato, Republic ; Hobbes, Leviathian;
Milton, Areopagitica; John Galsworthy and George 
Bernard Shaw in addition to two sociological works, 
Pfeffer's Creeds in Competition, Father Murray's 
recent book about Thomism and the Founding Fathers 
(We Hold These Truths) and the New York Times.®
But if opinions are consistently "unjudicial," are
certain jurisprudential inferences more likely to follow
than others? in Douglas' case the answer is yes, and the
inferences have uniformly pegged him as a legal realist.
G^ibid., pp. 14, 9. ®^365 U.S. 43 (1961).
pg
Gerhard Casper, "The Liberal Faith: Some Observa­
tions on the Legal Philosophy of Mr. justice William O. 
Douglas," Federal Bar Journal 22 (1962), p. 193.
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Two factors in addition to the manifest content of his 
opinions, however, may have exaggerated the accuracy of this 
classification. The first is that Douglas was trained by 
legal realists during the inception of the movement at 
Columbia and Yale. Second, cirtics may have taken Douglas 
himself too literally when he claimed in his extra-judicial 
writings to be a legal realist. His autobiography recalled 
his early years on the Columbia faculty:
At Columbia, revolt against the traditional 
approach to law was now under way. Underhill 
Moore, Herman Oliphant, Hellel Yntema, Karl 
Llewellyn, and Walter Wheeler Cook were the 
renegades. I joined their ranks. . . .  We 
wanted to discover whether the law in books 
served a desirable social end or should be 
changed. We were dubbed the leaders of 
'sociological jurisprudence.'®^
This orientation followed him to the Yale faculty where he
came to know Robert Hutchins. There, he said, "some of us
. . . were trying to do what we had been unable to do at
g o
Columbia— make the law more relevant to life." Douglas' 
high regard for Hutchins was lifelong,and the nexus
87 88Go East Young Man, pp. 159-160. Ibid., p. 166.
®®Douglas listed "six seminal forces in the law who 
shaped my life." He wrote that "they were followed by many 
others; but the first six were Robert M. Hutchins, FDR, Ben 
Cohen, Jerome Frank, Louis Brandeis, and Hugo L. Black."
Go East Young Man, p. 182.
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between law and society central to legal realism was an
article of faith they shared. Douglas quoted Hutchins'
explanation of the doctrine in his autobiography: "The law
is the application of thought to what is perhaps the most
important of all matters, the regulation and direction of
the common life, , . . Since law is architechtonic, which
means that it shapes the conduct of society, everything in
90the society is relevant to it."
Gerhard Casper's study of Douglas' opinions led him 
to conclude that "the legal philosophy and method applied 
in the decision-making of these years was basically that of 
legal realism. That is : an attempt was made to ascertain
the social and economic facts of the day before passing
judgment on what was considered to be in the public inter-
91est." Pointing to United States v. Columbia Steel Com- .
92pany, Casper asserted that the opinion was "an excellent
example of how a 'legal realist' can write a court opinion
which at the same time is an essay on economics, an essay of
rare clarity relating economic and political facts to
93community policies," Casper was perceptive to note the
®®Ibid., p. 170. ^^Casper, p. 189.
92334 U.S. 495 (1948). 93casper, p. 186.
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epistemological nearness of legal realism to natural law, 
citing Douglas' statement that "we believe with Jefferson 
that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator
qA
with unalienable rights,"
Sidney Davis' philosophical classification of Douglas 
mentioned in Chapter is consistent with the argument 
above that legal philosophies are best understood as the 
basis of judicial rhetoric rather than as lifelong predis­
positions tending to color all of a judge's opinions. How­
ever, the verdict seems nearly unanimous, the academics, the 
jurists, and Douglas himself all put him in the camp of 
legal realism. The evidence for this classification is 
persuasive; his mentors and colleagues founded the movement, 
he admits to being one of the "renegades," and his opinions
Qg
are "flayed in law school classrooms and in the law reviews," 
because he associates rhetorically with the likes of Art 
Buchwald and John Milton. No scholar or jurist has ever 
accused Douglas of being a staunch positivist, but some have 
perceived traces of natural law at work. Nevertheless, if 
the assumptions from which the present study proceeds--that
**ibid., p. 180. ^^See Ch. I, p. 16.
Cohen, p. 701.
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philosophy of law is best apprehended as argument in actual 
decisions— the received wisdom of these classifications may 
be questionable. But before turning to the results of the 
present analysis of his career first amendment opinions, we 
must first examine the presumptions underlying the methods 
by which those results were reached, and we must elaborate 
the procedures employed to reach them.
CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Introduction 
The generation of knowledge is governed both by 
certain epistemological assumptions and by systematic prac­
tical procedures. This chapter's first task is to explain 
the assumptions underlying qualitative content analysis, a 
broad class of methods including such techniques as genre 
criticism. The second function of this chapter is to de­
tail the use of the LEXIS program for computerized legal 
data retrieval in the present study. The final section of 
this chapter details the procedures and criteria governing 
the coding of content units into the hypothesized categories 
of Argument from Ideal, Argument from Rule, and Argument 
from Context.
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Assvunptions of Critical Method: The Role of
Content Analysis in Genre Criticism 
Despite the opinion of Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool that 
there "is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the 
question one wants answered is quantitative,"^ a broader 
understanding of content analysis allows for message-cen­
tered studies of an essentially qualitative nature as well. 
Indeed A. L. George argued that for certain kinds of 
questions "qualitative analysis of a limited number of 
crucial communications may often yield better clues to the
particular intentions of a particular speaker at one moment
2
in time than more standardized techniques." When the re­
searcher is interested in making inferences about the 
intentions of the source, the effects of messages, or other
^Harold D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, and ithiel de Sola 
Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford, CA: Stan­
ford University Press), 1952, p. 45.
2
A. L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in 
Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1959), p. 7.
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message-based conclusions, the qualitative approach often 
surpasses a simple frequency-counting routine. Of course 
qualitative and quantitative research techniques are not 
mutai1y exclusive, nor is one necessarily superior to the 
other. Holsti, in fact, offered a binary definition of 
qualitative content analysis itself when he suggested that 
the approach is best understood as "the drawing of infer­
ences on the basis of appearance or nonappearance of
4attributes in messages." The important point to understand 
in analyzing qualitative content is that vhile one may 
count things, the counting itself is neither sufficient nor 
meaningful. At the same time, critical judgments alone are 
neither final nor infallible. Pool stressed the reciprocal 
relationship between methods when he wrote that "it should 
not be assumed that qualitative methods are insightful and 
quantitative ones merely mechanical methods for checking
3por a discussion of various inferential motives, see 
Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and 
Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1969), especially Chapter 2, "Content Analysis 
Research Designs."
^Holsti, p. 10.
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hypotheses. The relationship is a circular one; each pro­
vides new insights on which the other can feed."^
Message-centered research assumes that the content of 
messages indexes something else. Such inferences may be to 
sources, receivers, or other messages, but they all rest 
upon the same assumption. If the researcher infers from 
content data to the attitudes, values, beliefs, or motives 
of the source, the research relies upon the psycholinguistic 
theory known as the representational model. The essence of 
the theory as well as its relevance to content analysis was 
explained by its primary author, Charles Osgood;
The 'representational model' in content analysis 
assumes (1) that in semantic encoding by the source 
the occurrence of specific lexical items in his 
messages is indicative of the immediate prior 
occurrence in his nervous system of the corres­
ponding representational mediation processes ; and 
(2) that in semantic decoding by the receiver the 
occurrence of specific lexical items in messages 
are predictive of the occurrence in his nervous 
system of those representational mediation pro­
cesses which he has developed in association with 
these signs. This, of course, is merely a more 
formal way of saying that words 'express' the ideas 
of the speaker and 'signify' ideas for the hearer.®
^Pool, ed.. Trends in Content Analysis, p. 192.
®Charles Osgood, "The Representational Model and 
Relevant Research Methods," in Pool, ed., p. 39.
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Thus, when the researcher infers from message events to the 
source of the message, he is relying upon psycholinguistic 
theory which postulates a relationship between those events 
and certain states or events in the source.
Although the message makes up only one part of a 
rhetorical event, the traditional rhetorical critic also 
engages in qualitative content analysis when inferring 
message effects as a function of message content. When a 
rhetorical critic relies predominantly upon the message over 
other aspects of a rhetorical transaction, the assumption 
that the message indexes something else (usually effects) 
underlies the research. A review of meta-criticism over 
the last fifty years is not necessary to support the obser­
vation that conclusions about the effects of messages pre­
dominate the Neo-Aristotelian perspective in rhetorical 
scholarship. Edwin Black, after reviewing most of the signi­
ficant traditional rhetorical criticism of this century, 
argued in 1965 that the only formalistic or judicial con­
clusions Neo-Aristotelian criticism reveals are inextricably 
tied to discovering "the historically facturai effects of
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the discourse on its relatively immediate audience."^ The 
point here is that such scholarship properly belongs in the 
context of qualitative content analysis and to illustrate 
that it proceeds from an assumption that message content 
indexes one or more other aspects of the rhetorical event.
A third kind of inference made by communication re­
searchers based upon message content aims at drawing con­
clusions about other messages. Here the qualitative content 
analyst finds theoretical underpinning in genre theory.
With the elaboration of the assumptions underlying genre 
theory, it surfaces as a fruitful type of qualitative 
content analysis.
A key insight regarding the assumptions of a generic 
approach to message-centered scholarship was offered in 
Frye's influential work, The Anatomy of Criticism, when he 
insisted that the "purpose of criticism by genres is not so
g
much to classify as to clarify." Frye's concern with 
clarifying relationships among literary works rather than
^Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism; A Study in Method 
(New York; The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 48.
^Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four
Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957),
pp. 247-248.
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merely assigning them to categories is analagous to A. L. 
George's concern noted earlier regarding the frequent 
superiority of qualitative judgments over the counting of 
lexical, stylistic, or other message events. The assump­
tion which underlies the generic approach is basically 
essentialistic: by focusing upon the cammonalities of
discourse instead of the pecularities, we move closer to 
grasping its essential nature. This essentialistic con­
ception of discourse provided the assumptive base of Black's 
important work. Rhetorical Criticism; A Study in Method.
He summarized the position by suggesting that,
if one of the major objectives of rhetorical 
criticism is to enrich our understanding of the 
rhetorical uses of language critics can probably 
do their work better by seeing and disclosing 
the elements common to many discourses rather than 
the singularities of a few.9
Black's genre approach to rhetorical scholarship is 
superior to the Neo-Aristotelian perspective precisely 
because its epistemological aim is essentialism rather than 
the more narrow, existentialist aims of the latter. While 
the sensitive and thorough explication of a single rhetorical 
events, such as Nichols' well-known essay on Lincoln's first
9aiack, pp. 176-177.
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10inaugural, certainly daims value in and of itself (an
existentialist view), it makes no claims to illuminate the
nature of presidential inaugurals as a genre.
The essentialistic assumptions of generic criticism
received their most elegant statement to date in the
recent collection of essays edited by Campbell and Jamieson
entitled Form and Genre : Shaping Rhetorical Action.
Clearly consistent with the goals of A. L. George, Frye, and
Black, the editors insisted initially that "the justification
for a generic claim is the understanding it produces rather
13than the ordered universe it creates." The first criterion 
Campbell and Jamieson then set for generic criticism was that 
"classification is justified only by the critical illumination
^^Maire Hochmuth Nichols, "Lincoln's First inaugural," 
in Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, eds.. Methods of 
Rhetorical Criticism, A Twentieth Century Perspective, (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 60-100.
^^For contrast, see Donald Wolfarth, "John F. Kennedy 
in the Tradition of Inaugural Speeches," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 47 (April 1961), pp. 124-143.
^^Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson,
Form and Genre : Shaping Rhetorical Action (Falls Church,
VA: The Speech Communication Association, 1978).
13Campbell and Jamieson, "Form and Genre in Rhetorical 
Criticism: An Introduction," in Campbell and Jamieson, p.
18.
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it produces not by the neatness of a classificatory 
14schema." Northrop Frye's insistence upon clarifying over 
classifying is obviously hospitable to this criterion.
Campbell and Jamieson explained just what the critic 
seeks when pursuing clarification as a goal. The aim is to 
find the "internal dynamic" which binds together constel­
lations of substantive and stylistic forms. Thus, when the 
critic purports to have found a rhetorical genre, the claim 
is being made "that a group of discourses has a synthetic 
core in which certain significant rhetorical elements, e.g., 
a system of belief, lines of argument, stylistic choices, 
and the perception of the situation, are fused into an 
indivisible whole. ^
After noting that genres may be derived either deduc­
tively, as from a model or touchstone, or inductively by 
surveying vast numbers of situationally similar discourses, 
Campbell and Jamieson identified the pitfalls of both 
approaches. More directly relevant to the present study, 
though, is the warning they provided regarding both:
l^ibid., p. 18.
ISibid, p. 21.
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The confusion of deductive and inductive approaches 
to genres can also create difficulties. In a number 
of cases, critics have assumed, a priori, that a genre 
already exists and is known and defined— e.g., the 
sermon, the presidential inaugural, the apology, among 
others--and an inductive procedure, content analysis 
in some cases, is applied to parse its elements. Such 
studies are suspect because the a priori definition of 
a genre and identification of its members generates a 
circular argument: an essential and preliminary pro­
cedure defining the generic characteristics has been 
omitted. Generic critics need to recognize explicitly 
the assumptions they are making and the procedures 
required to establish their claims.16
The present study avoids such difficulties by making 
no assumptions that rhetorical genres exist, a priori, in 
the form of natural law arguments, legal positivist argu­
ments, and legal realist arguments. The assumption is made 
that (a) those philosophies exist, and (b) that philosophy 
is argument.Thus, the operational definitions of such
IGibid., p. 23.
^^Cf., Chaim Perelman, An Historical Introduction to 
Philosophical Thinking (New York: Random House, 1969), p.
201, when he wrote that "the goal of philosophy is to 
influence the mind and win its agreement." Numerous writers 
have highlighted Perelman’s insistence upon the rhetorical 
nature of philosophy; among them are: Max Loreau, trans.
Lloyd I. Watkins and Paul D. Brandes, "Rhetoric as the Logic 
of the Behavioral Sciences, " Quarterly Jouranl of Speech 51 
(December 1965), pp. 455-463; Ray D. Dearin, "The Philosophical 
Basis of Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," Quarterly Jour­
nal of Speech 55 (October 1969), pp. 213-224; Douglas H. 
Parker, "Rhetoric, Ethics, and Manipulation," Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 5 (Spring 1972), pp. 69-82; John R. Anderson,
"The Audience as a Concept in the Philosophic Rhetoric of
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argument posited in the previous chapter serve as hypo­
theses to be tested, not as assumptions from which to pro­
ceed. By surveying jurisprudential literature we have 
synthesized hypothetically argumentative forms by identifying 
fundamental tenets from each school of thought. Then by 
examining a large sample of opinions we can determine whether 
such characteristics are fused together by an "internal 
dynamic." Only upon the basis of such a theoretically guided 
analysis of documents can a rhetorical genre be claimed to 
inhere in legal philosophy.
Attempts to define "genre" have typically followed the
ad hoc route taken by Potter Stewart in defining obscenity
X8when he said, "I know it when I see it." Critics have
gathered together samples of poems or novels or speeches
with certain similarities and have based a generic claim
thereon without first offering any definition, either
19operational or conceptual. A second problem often overlooked
Perelman, Johnstone, and Natanson," Southern Speech Communi­
cation Journal 38 (Fall 1972), pp. 39-50; and Nathan Roten- 
streich, "Argumentation and Philosophical Clarification," 
philosophy and Rhetoric 5 (Winter 1972), pp. 13-23.
^Qjacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. at 197 (1964).
l^A survey of the first several years of the journal 
Genre, for example, revealed numerous essays describing and/or 
analyzing specific literary types asserted to be genres, but 
none devoted exclusively to meta-critical questions like 
definition of the concept itself.
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is that literary genres and rhetorical genres differ from 
one another in a most basic way. The poet or novelist quite 
consciously sets out to write a work which, if well-executed, 
will be called a good poem or a good novel— that is, a good 
example of v^at the genre poetry or the genre novel is
supposed to be. In this sense, the literary author is an
actor— he or she acts upon the reader by manipulating words 
and themes and moods constrained only by the historical 
evolution of the genre itself and his or her own capabili­
ties. There are usually no exigencies involved in writing 
a novel. The rhetorical author, on the other hand, is a
reactor, and the audience forms only one from a number of
influences to which he or she must react. If the rhetor 
speaks for and through an institution, its constraints may 
merge with others to form an institutional rhetoric, perhaps 
even a genre in time.
Herbert Simons' definition of rhetorical genre came 
close to this notion of rhetor as reactor when he suggested 
that it is "a recurring pattern of rhetorical practice which 
includes, among others, the repeated use of images, metaphors, 
arguments, structural arrangements, configurations of language.
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20 • • . or a combination of such elements." But Simons' definition
failed to distinguish rhetorical genre from literary genre
and it is the reactive nature of rhetorical discourse which
separates it from literary discourse, previous definitions
of rhetorical genre have either failed to make clear this
distinction or have seemed to suggest that a genre was
simply the sum of constraints at work in a given situation.
In this study rhetorical genre is defined as a predictable
cluster of recurrent patterns of responses (arguments, types
of support, philosphic orientations) by various rhetors in
various times and places to recurrent patterns of external
or institutional influences (exigencies, constraints,
audiences). The genre is to be sought in the responses, not
the influences. The existence of a conflux of externally
recurring influences is our clue that a genre may be nearby,
but does not, in and of itself, prove it. The pattern of
responses will vary from pope to pope and president to
president and Supreme Court justice to Supreme Court justice
only to the extent allowed by the influences, whether exi-
gential, situational, or institutional. The rhetor who goes
^^Herbert Simons, "'Genre-alizing' About Rhetoric: A
Scientific Approach," in Campbell and Jamieson, eds., pp. 
33-50.
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beyond the constraints (or who ignores them, or is unaware 
of them) is obviously not constrained and thus cannot be 
said to be writing in the genre for his rhetoric is not 
reactive to the constraints.
The methodological literature in content analysis 
stresses two points that Simons urged also upon genre 
critics. One speaks to the issue of theoretic parameters 
being established and the other to the need for specifica­
tion of analytic procedures. He insisted that "the task 
of generic identification should take place within theoreti­
cal frameworks, should be guided by theoretically devised
hypotheses, and should be focused upon theoretically signi-
21ficant similarities." While he may be correct that
categories drawn from aesthetics or literature might not
prove helpful to the rhetorical critic, it is more difficult
to accept his exclusion of philosophy as a source of
22
hypotheses for generic criticism. The historic proximity 
21Simons, p. 41.
22
Cf., Recommendation #31 of the New Orleans Conference 
on Research and Development in Speech Communication, which 
stated in part: "Opportunities exist to advance speech com­
munication theory and research through amplification and re­
finement of formulations originating in other branches of the 
behavioral sciences and humanities." (Robert J. Kibler and 
Larry L . Barker, eds., Conceptual Frontiers in Speech Communi­
cation (New York: Speech Association of America, 1969), p. 36,
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of rhetoric, law, and philosophy, along with the compelling
arguments of Perelman, led this researcher to the position
that a theoretic framework drawn from jurisprudence for the
purpose of attempting to discover rhetorical genres in
judicial opinions is admissible, appropriate, and valuable.
The well-established theoretic framework of jurisprudence
makes it admissible? the inherent intersection of rhetoric,
law, and philosophy makes it appropriate; and because such
a study promises theoretic contributions to both rhetorical
scholarship and jurisprudential scholarship, its value is
evident. In this vein, Simons argued;
The great promise of generic study lies not simply 
in classification but in the identification of 
common purposive and situational constraints that 
lead to generic similarities. While other students 
of persuasion are busy determining the differential 
effects of varied rhetorical choices, [genre] critics 
can be breaking new ground by developing theory and 
conducting research about the factors influencing those 
choices.
LEXIS: The Use of Computerized Legal Data Retrieval
in the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Characteristic of existing scholarship on William 0. 
Douglas are statements describing the sampling procedures
23simons, p. 44.
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such as "a rather arbitrary sample of utterances was 
24chosen," or "a sampling of opinions will provide the main
outlines of the Justice's position while the nuances must
2 5necessarily be neglected." One explanation for the 
qualifiers is that the studies done prior to Mr. Douglas' 
retirement in 1975 were necessarily restricted to certain 
periods or aspects of his judicial career, and thus none 
were comprehensive in scope. A second explanation, though, 
has to do with the nature of traditional legal data retrie­
val systems. Law finding aids are designed to facilitate 
the work of the legal community and to that end they do an 
admirable job. But frequently the social scientist or 
humanist approaches legal archives with non-legal questions 
of foremost importance and his or her research may not be
served as efficiently as that of a colleague from the bench 
26or bar. Legal indices and finding aids are organized
^^Gerhard Casper, "The Liberal Faith: Some Observations
on the Legal Philosophy of Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas," 
Federal Bar Journal 22 (1962), p. 180.
^^Leon D. Epstein, "justice Douglas and Civil Liberties," 
Wisconsin Law Review 12 5 (1951), p. 125.
26gee Morris Cohen, Legal Research in a Nutshell (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1971) for a summary of the
strengths and weaknesses of conventional legal research aids. 
See also, Michael G. Parkinson, "Language Variation and Suc­
cess in the System of Criminal Justice," Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, 1978.
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around topic headings which direct the researcher to points 
of law, and if the question was only tangentially legal, 
the work, until recently, was difficult.
Other than the limitation of the topical system in 
legal archives, the researcher approaching the law library 
faces a profusion of documents virtually unparalleled in 
other areas of inquiry. Morris Cohen, Professor of law and 
law librarian at Harvard, reported that there are currently 
about three million cases on record in Anglo-American jur­
isprudence and the number grows at the rate of around thirty-
27thousand a year. Thousands of these cases emanated from
the United States Supreme Court and William O. Douglas
personally produced over 1200 of them. Describing this
situation, Cohen pointed out that "traditional legal
research techniques are rapidly proving inadequate to permit
accesses to [such] vast, continually expanding reservoirs of 
28information." One response to this large and rapidly 
growing expanse of cases has been computerized legal data
2?Ibid., p. 40.
ZGlbid.
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90retrieval technology and one such system was used to deter­
mine the universe of documents examined in the present study.
The system, developed by the Mead Corporation of Dayton, 
Ohio, is called LEXIS and it improves upon traditional legal 
research tools in two basic ways. The first is the speed 
with which a researcher may discover the range of relevant 
documents. Where traditional law finders would require a 
seasoned researcher to spend days in the law library, the 
LEXIS system searches a body of data and prints out citations 
to the relevant materials in minutes. The second advantage 
of LEXIS over traditional law finders accrues particularly 
to the social scientist or humanist who has legal inquiries 
in mind that are likely not of interest to the juristic 
researcher pursuing strictly legal questions. This advan- 
age is explained in the LEXIS desk book as it discusses the 
central principle of the system, which is "the determination 
by the researcher of words, phrases, and numbers, and com­
binations of these, which are likely to occur in cases or
29por a discussion of various computerized legal data 
retrieval systems, see Francis H. Musselman, "Computers: A
Boon to Legal Research," Legal Economics (Winter 1976), pp. 
7-8, 11-12, 33.
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statutory material which may be useful to the researcher.” ®^ 
This Key Word in Context (KWIC) principle frees the re­
searcher from pre-established legal index headings and 
enables him or her to formulate search requests limited 
only by imagination and resources . The KWIC approach is 
advantageous to traditional research methods, particularly 
for its suitability to the prose style of Supreme Court 
justices. As was illustrated in Chapter II, justices fre­
quently play the role of social or moral philosopher as 
much as that of jurist and their rhetoric thus ranges over 
a broad array to topics, many of which may not directly per­
tain to the issue at hand. Traditional citators and indices 
cannot be relied upon for accurate or complete retrieval of 
such obscure or tangential remarks, even though they may be 
of primary interest to the non-lawyer researcher. But with 
the assistance of the KWIC feature of LEXIS, a researcher 
can specify any word or phrase of interest and the computer 
will retrieve all documents in which it appears, regardless 
of whether it holds central importance to the case.
30l e x i st A Primer (Dayton, Ohio: Mead Data Central,
1975), p. 1.
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The KWIC ability of LEXIS rests on its " full -text"
approach to data storage in which "the full, natural text
of an appropriate set of documents . . .  is stored character
by character, precisely as published, in a computer's memory
bank. " As of May, 1979, the LEXIS system consisted of
32several "libraries" including all United States Supreme 
Court cases dating back to January 1, 1938. This made the 
system particularly suitable for researching Douglas because 
his tenure on the Court began a year and a half after that 
date and thus all of his opinions are stored.
As with traditional research methods, intuitional, 
basic skills, and practice are necessary for successful
^^Legal Research and the Computer (Dayton: Mead Data
Central, inc.), p. 4.
^^The libraries consist of two broad categories:
Federal Materials and State Materials. The Federal libraries 
consist of (1) General Federal which includes Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeals, and District Court materials loaded to 
various dates; (2) Securities Law including materials from 
U.S.C. Title 15, S.B.C. Rules and Regulations, Federal Re­
serve Board Regulations, and Legislative Histories; (3) Tax 
Law, including the I.R.S. Code, Tax Court Decisions, and 
other materials; and (4) Trade Regulation Law, including 
Federal Court Decisions and F.T.C. Decisions. The State 
Libraries (as of May, 1979) included thirty-three states and 
the District of Columbia with plans to include all fifty 
states by July 1, 1979. Typically a state library includes 
the state's statutes, constitution, and supreme court reports, 
with many including other materials as well.
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computer-assisted legal date retrieval. With LEXIS, this 
means carefully phrased search requests. Complete instruc­
tions and options for phrasing search requests are quite 
lengthy and can be found in the LEXIS desk book,^ ^ so the 
present study explains only the request formulated by 
this researcher for the present study of William O.
Douglas.
Like other computerized data retrieval systems (such 
as ERIC), LEXIS functions on a combination of features such 
as various connectors, KWIC, and several search limitors.
The KWIC feature allows the computer to retrieve any case 
in which the specified words or phrases appear; the connectors, 
such as OR, AND, W/N, (Within N words of the specified word), 
AND NOT, and BUT NOT, serve to broaden a search request 
according to the needs of the researcher. The limitors, 
such as DATE and SEG (a specified segment of the opinion 
such as OPINION, DISSENT, HEADNOTES, CITATION, etc.) serve 
to restrict the request to conform to the researcher's needs.
^^LEXIS; A Primer, pp. 3-14. The actual desk book is 
available only to subscribers to the system (fees can run as 
high as $40,000 a year and more), but this shorthand version 
adequately explains the procedures for formulating search 
requests.
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The DATE limiter restricts the request to a period before 
a given date, after a given date, or between two dates.
The W/SEG limiter restricts the search to NAME (the popular 
name of the case, e.g.. Miller v. California), CITE (the 
official citation of the case, e.g., 413 U.S. 15), DISSENT 
(only the dissenting opinions), OPINION (only the majority 
opinions), OPINIONBY (only the opinion of a specified 
member of the majority), DISSENTBY (only the opinion of a 
specified member of the dissent), and so forth.
One goal of the present study was to improve upon 
existing evaluations of Douglas' first amendment opinions 
by examining all of them as opposed to samples selected on 
the basis of sub-classification systems such as time periods 
within his career. The LEXIS search request formulated to 
achieve this goal was thus broadly phrased and included no 
date or segment limitors. The computer was instructed to 
retrieve and print the names and citations for all cases 
conforming to: "OPINIŒTBY (Douglas or DISSENTBY (Douglas)
or CONCURBY (Douglas) and 1st AMENDMENT or FREEDOM W/4 
SPEECH or PRESS or EXPRESSION." This request produced a 
yield of three-hundred and one cases and somewhat surprisingly, 
a substantial number of them proved irrelevant to the
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present research interests. If an opinion was of insuffi­
cient length or development to allow classification by its 
jurisprudential-rhetorical bases, even though the specified
terms appeared in manifest content, the opinion was not
34used in this analysis.
In summary, LEXIS is a highly sensitive research tool 
available to the social scientist or humanist interested 
in legal questions. Although it may suffer from over­
sensitivity to manifest content, to expect computers to 
make decisions of relevance or irrelevance of data when 
critical decisions are to be made misunderstands their place 
in research. On the whole, computer-assisted legal data 
retrieval is a valuable and economically defensible addition 
to the scholar's armamentarium.
34gee Appendix D for the table of cases retrieved by 
LEXIS but judged irrelevant to the present study.
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Analytic Procedures
Three hundred and one opinions were retrieved by LEXIS
under the search request noted above. They were analyzed
according to the following procedures :
(1) Exclusion of Irrelevant Cases
Ninety-four cases retrieved by LEXIS were judged to
be irrelevant to the present study. Four criteria guided
that judgment. First, the case had to conform to the search
request in terms of the specified Key Words in Context
(KWIC). Three cases, for example, were discarded because
they dealt with the twenty-first amendment rather than the
3 5first amendment. In each case the hyphenated words were 
separated from one another from one line of text to the 
next (i.e., "twenty" on one line, and "first" on another) 
and this apparently caused the case to be read by LEXIS as 
conforming to the search request. Second, a number of cases 
were discarded for lack of clear authorship. Frequently 
the sub-headings in U.S. Reports would indicate what appeared
3 5These cases are: Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 401
U.S. 433 (1971), Lenhausen v. Lakeshore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 
354 (1973), and United States v. State Tax Commission of 
Mississippi, 412 U.S. 363 (1973).
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to be joint authorship of a concurring or dissenting opinion. 
Since this study focused exclusively on Douglas, such cases 
were not used. Third, as was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, cases often came to the court on procedural rather 
than substantive grounds. Although a case may have come to 
a court of original jurisdiction on first amendment issues, 
it could terminate in the Supreme Court on fourteenth amend­
ment questions or on claims that a defendant's fourth or 
fifth amendment privileges were denied, in this study, only 
those cases in which the first amendment held central focus 
were retained. Finally, Douglas posted numerous opinions 
of surprising brevity. Most often they were dissents and 
typically they were procedural dissents. Many were one 
terse paragraph. Such cases simply did not provide suffici­
ent data for determining the rhetorical bases of Douglas' 
reasoning. Freeman v. Flake, for example, conforming to all 
other criteria for inclusion in the study, brought to the 
Court the question of whether hair codes in public schools 
violated students' first amendment rights, but the Court 
denied certiorari. Douglas posted a very short dissent^® 
stating simply that he wanted to hear this issued argued.
3^405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
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To attempt to divine the rhetorical bases of such a request 
would be guesswork and consequently all similarly under­
developed opinions were discarded.
(2) coding of Relevant Cases
Two issues predominate coding procedures in content 
analysis; category construction and coding instructions.
The central methodological tenet in category construction 
is the requirement of mutual exclusivity. As Holsti warns,
the criterion "stipulates that no content datum can be
3 7placed in more than a single cell." The review of juris­
prudential literature and the operational definitions of 
rhetorical/jurisprudential categories offered in Chapter II 
of this study satisfy this researcher that the standard of 
mutual exclusivity has been met. At each point in the 
evolution of legal philosophy, when legal positivism asserted 
its uniqueness from natural law and, in this century, when 
American legal realists made the same assertion of their 
independent status vis a vis both previous philosophies, the 
critiques of the various schools of thought have stressed
^^Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social 
Sciences and Humanities. (Reading: Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 99.
-130-
the fundamental paradigmatic differences which marked off 
one territory from the others. This historically consistent 
demarcation, coupled with the clearly operationalized 
definitions of each philosophy, provide sufficient basis for 
a claim of unique and independent categories.
Once clear categories have been devised, criteria must 
be established according to which coding units will be 
assigned to them. This, of course, hinges upon the desig­
nation of the coding unit itself. The nature of the questions 
posed in this study required that the entire opinion be 
adopted as the coding unit. Choice of the complete opinion 
as the unit of analysis was endorsed by Holsti, who advised 
that the individual document of interest may be assigned 
a "single score which most closely characterizes its major 
theme. In this case we make a single qualitative judgment
about the entire document without tabulating the frequency
38with which any content attribute appears [whichin it]."
Having thus designated what the coding unit shall be, the 
content analyst must proceed next to elucidating the content 
attributes which must be present in (or absent from) the 
content unit in order to justify assigning it to one category
SBlbid., pp. 7-8.
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ins tead of another. Typically this takes the form of 
instructions to coders who will perform the task of reading 
the material and making a coding decision. Frequently, the 
primary researcher performs considerable preliminary 
analysis, leaving the coders with little more than clerical 
duty. Their decisions are then statistically compared and 
the researcher points with some pride to high reliability 
coefficients. However, some research problems are such that 
the use of multiple coders is impossible, and even if their 
work is genuinely judgmental rather than clerical, statist­
ical reliability tests are ruled out. The present study is 
such a case.
Osgood Saporta, and Nunnally suggested that in some 
cases (although usually multiple coders are preferable) the 
primary researcher is justified in doing all coding individ­
ually.^^ Two aspects of the present study were felt to be 
sufficient to preclude the use of multiple coders. First, 
the sophistication in jurisprudential literacy was felt to 
be such that it could not be meaningfully reduced to coding 
instructions. Second, the actual coding of the three
oa
Charles Osgood, Sol Saporta, Jum C. Nunnally, 
"Evaluative Assertion Analysis," Litera III (1956), pp. 
47-102.
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hundred and one opinions into Not Relevant, Argument from 
Ideal, Argument from Rule, and Argument from Context re­
quired vast amounts of time. This aspect of the study 
consumed several months of work. The liklihood of obtaining 
even remotely reliable data from hired coders for such a 
long-term task eliminated their use as a consideration.
That, however, does not relieve the researcher from 
attempting to insure the reliability of his own coding 
decisions. The present study attempted to achieve such 
reliability by dividing coding decisions into two stages.
In the first stage, relevant decisions were read and tagged 
according to rhetorical/jurisprudential category on the 
basis of the operational definitions offered in Chapter II. 
This resulted in an initial grouping of the two hundred and 
seven relevant opinions into three lists according to the 
researcher's first impression of the orientation of their 
warrant. In the second stage, each opinion in each group 
was re-read in an attempt to ascertain a recurrent pattern 
of rhetorical practice evident in the category. Once again, 
the hypothetical definition of the three rhetorical genres 
was the researcher's guide in this analysis. Notes were 
taken on a standard form (see Appendix E) recording both the
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rhetorical/jurisprudential bases of the opinion and the 
type of majority or non-majority opinion it represented.
The sources which appeared to predominately provide the 
basis of the opinion (ideals, rules, or contextual factors) 
made up the content attributed of the document which dictated 
the coding decision. The results of these procedures com­
prise the following cahpter.
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction
This chapter reports the results of analyzing tvro 
hundred and seven first amendment opinions by William 0. 
Douglas and offers conclusions about his judicial rhetoric 
in particular and that of the Supreme Court in general.
The organization of the chapter follows the order of re­
search questions posed in Chapter I. This study asked 
first whether judicial opinion could be generically classi­
fied according to the jurisprudential basis of its argu­
ments . The first section of this chapter, therefore, 
discusses the data gathered in pursuit of that question 
and offers conclusions regarding rhetorical genres in 
judicial opinion.
The second question pursued here asked whether generic 
clusters characterized the judicial rhetoric of William 0. 
Douglas, and if so, what they were and how they may be
-134-
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classified. The second section of this chapter offers 
quantitative and critical observations addressing that 
question.
Finally, this study asked whether such generic 
clusters in Douglas' judicial rhetoric differed between 
majority and non-majority opinions. The final section of 
this chapter offers findings yielded by determining whether 
Douglas produced significantly more opinions of some types 
than of others.
The Internal Dynamic of Natural Law;
The Argument from Ideal 
Chapter II hypothesized that if natural law philosophy 
provided the warrant for recurrent rhetorical behavior, 
such arguments would "rely predominantly or exclusively 
upon such self-evident moral-deontic principles as justice, 
unalienable rights, fairness, and the dictates of reason. 
Such ar^uements," so the hypothesis went, "do not rely 
ultimately upon statute, precedent, or extra-judicial evi­
dentiary materials."^ One task of this study was to search 
Justice William O. Douglas' rhetorical defense of the first
^Supra, Chapter II, p. 4.
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amendment for opinions based predominantly upon this "Argu­
ment from Ideal." The purpose of such a definition, drawn 
from legal philosophy and rhetorical theory, was to help 
avoid, in Holsti's term, a "fishing expedition," or "research
unguided by broader theoretical considerations and undisci-
2
plined by a research design." Such a theoretically based 
classification system, though, is only a beginning, for as 
Frye, Campbell, Jamieson, and others admonished in Chapter 
111,3 the genre critic properly seeks clarification of the 
relationships among literary or rhetorical forms rather than 
remaining satisfied with the symmetry of an analytic frame­
work. This section begins the goal of clarification by 
reporting first the results of classification.
Two hundred and seven of the three hundred and one 
cases retrieved by LEXIS were judged relevant to the 
present study under the criteria outlined in Chapter III. 
Table 1 (p. 204) depicts the percentages of opinions 
categorized by argument type.
^01e R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social 
Sciences and Humanities, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 41. Also see generally. 
Chapter II, pp. 24-41.
^Supra, Chapter III, pp. 4-5.
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Analysis of the eighteen (8.7%) opinions coded as 
Argument from Ideal produced two overall observations : 
first, William 0. Douglas did indeed occasionally base an 
opinion upon tenets of natural law philosophy. While 8.7% 
of his career total for first amendment opinions is a small 
percentage, the fact that they are there at all deserves 
careful scrutiny. Natural law has been most typically con­
ceived as the rationale for revolutionaries and religionists, 
not justices of the United States Supreme Court. But before 
concluding that Douglas occasionally indulged in jurispru­
dential excesses, we must note the second overall observa­
tion made about Douglas' use of the Argument from ideal: 
all natural law arguments are not alike. Two sub-species 
of the genre were, in fact, evident. The first is what 
might be called the Thomist version of the argument/* while 
the second will be referred to as a "Natural Rights" version 
of natural law.
4
This term by no means intends to suggest that Thomism 
can be reduced to a shorthand phrase. On the contrary, it 
is a complex and subtle web spun from such diverse strands 
as Stoicism, Aristotelian political theory, Augustinian 
Christian doctrine, and early medieval rationalism. For an 
excellent account of the philosophical influences upon 
Thomas Aquinas' Suma Theoloaica. see A. P. d'Entreves, 
Natural Law, 2nd ed., (London: Hutchinson University
Library, 1970).
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Arguinent from Ideal; The Thomist Sub-Species 
The term "Thomist" is adopted because it best denotes 
an unadorned natural law ontology as its warrant. As 
Oxford's H. L. A. Hart, an eloquent spokesman for legal 
positivism observed, St. Thomas' proposition, "lex iniusta 
non est lex" ("an unjust law is not law"), remains the 
clearest and most coherent statement of the core of natural 
law philosophy, d'Entreves agreed that St. Thomas' system 
of natural law remained unsurpassed in perspicacity and 
eloquence and added an explanation of what is meant by "the 
doctrine of natural law as an 'ontology. . . . The ontologi­
cal approach maintains that the very notion of natural law 
stands or falls on [an] identification [between] ^  and 
ought, between 'fact and values,'"^ Aquinas himself 
articulated the political implication of this proposition 
when he asserted that if secular rulers (or, by implication, 
the laws enacted by them) "command things to be done which
^d'Entreves, "Three Conceptions of Natural Law," in 
M. P. Golding, The Nature of Law, (New York: Random House,
1966) p. 42. The reference to Hume is to his argument that 
the logical relationships between ought and ought not "are 
entirely different from" those between is and is not. 
Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, "Of Morals," quoted in 
Golding, p. 37.
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are unjust, their subjects are not obliged to obey 
them.
The "natural" lawyers were not indulging in ab­
stractions in advocating the notion that unjust law could 
claim no binding obligation upon the people under their 
regime, and this insistence gave rise to their control clash 
with legal positivism. With an understated touch of satire, 
John Austin, the Englishman who fathered modern positivism, 
met the claim head-on:
Now, to say that human laws which conflict with 
the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are 
not law, is to talk stark nonsense. The most 
pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most 
opposed to the will of God, have been and are con­
tinually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals.
Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, 
be prohibited by the sovereign under penalty of 
death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and 
condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that 
it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded 
that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which 
have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will 
demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by 
hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I 
have impugned the validity. An exception, demurrer, 
or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard 
in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the 
world down to the present moment. ^
^Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2a-2ae, 104, 6. Quoted in 
d'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 46.
7John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 
Lecture VI (1832), reprinted in Golding, pp. 96-97.
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It may be stark nonsense in John Austin's view, but William 
O. Douglas, on more than one occasion, based United States 
Supreme Court opinions on just such claims— that the 
citizen possessed the right, even the duty, to disobey un­
just laws. This is the natural law ontology— the Thomist 
version of Argument from Ideal - -the merging of being with 
value. But how does it look when published in United 
States Reports?
Two examples of the ontological, Thomist version of 
the Argument from Ideal should suffice.® The first came in 
the case of Poulos v. New Hampshire in 1953, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness 
for conducting a religious service without first obtaining 
a permit. The specific issue was whether the citizen could 
disobey a law he believed to be unconstitutional. The 
Court said no, and Douglas in a dissent joined by Hugo Black, 
raised the notion of popular sovereignty to the level of 
natural law:
. . .  when a legislature undertakes to proscribe the 
exercise of a citizen's constitutional right to free
®It is most important to understand that these state­
ments are not asides or afterthoughts, they are the basis of 
the entire opinion— the warrant vhich, to this researcher, 
appeared to undergird the total argument.
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speech, it acts lawlessly? and the citizen can 
take matters in his own hands and proceed on the 
basis that such a law is no law at all
When Douglas said that, he echoed verbatim St. Thomas'
edict that "lex iniusta non est lex." The citizen's right
to ignore positive laws stood out even more clearly in his
next paragraph:
No matter what the legislature may say, a man has 
the right to make his speech, print his handbill, 
compose his newspaper, and deliver his sermon with­
out asking anyone's permission. The contrary 
suggestion is abhorrent to our traditions.^®
The underlying epistemological inference Douglas 
implied in such arguments is also pure Thomism: In Aquinas '
scheme, the "law of man . . .  is that he should act in 
accordance with reason," and that "law is nothing else than 
an ordinance of reason," and that "the natural law is 
promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into 
man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. So whence 
cometh the citizen's right to ignore or disobey duly enacted 
positive laws? From his reason— his innate ability to know 
good fiXOTi evil, even though it may take the arcane form of con­
stitutional from unconstitutional, possessing this ability
*345 U.S. 395 (1953) at 423.
^®Ibid. l^Quoted in Golding, p. 15, 12.
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to know, he is thus mandated to follow St. Thomas' "first
precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and
1 2evil is to be avoided." The civil rights struggle of the
1960's provided the backdrop for Douglas' most explicit
statement of this warrant.
Prior to Easter weekend, 1963, a group of black
ministers applied to Birmingham's Public Safety Commissioner,
Eugene "Bull" Connor, for permits to parade on Friday and
Sunday. They were denied the permits and issued an ^  parte
injunction prohibiting them from any sort of demonstrations
or marches. They marched in defiance of the injunction,
were arrested, convicted of contempt, and a 5-4 Supreme
Court upheld the conviction. Justice William O. Douglas'
dissent again conjoined the epistemological and political
implications of Thomism by insisting that:
The right to defy an unconstitutional statute is 
basic in our scheme. Even when an ordinance 
requires a permit to make a speech, to deliver a 
sermon, to picket, to parade, or to assemble, it 
need not be honored when it is invalid on its 
face.13
The full import of such a statement must take into account 
that the case in point involved defendants who were not
l^Ibid, p. 18.
13yfalker v. Birmingham. 388 U.S. 307 (1967) at 336.
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trained jurists confronting not only laws, but court 
injunctions issued in their absence. Still, Douglas argued 
that they could defy the secular power: "An ordinance--
unconstitutional on its face or patently unconstitutional 
as applied--is not made sacred by an unconstitutional 
injunction that enforces it. It can and should be flouted 
in the manner of the ordinance itself.Douglas' use of 
the term "invalid on its face" twice seems to clearly mean 
that it is the citizen who makes that decision. If we 
equate the twentieth-century American manifestation of 
natural law as argued by William O. Douglas with the thir­
teenth-century version as argued by Thomas Aquinas, we see 
"constitutional and unconstitutional," "valid on its face-- 
invalid on its face," as the rhetorical equivalent of "good 
and evil--just and unjust" with the corollary in both cen­
turies being that "evil is to be avoided." indeed, Father 
John C. Murray, S. J., a contemporary American natural law 
proponent, uses the term "justice is to be done and injustice 
avoided," and asserts it to be one of only two self-evident 
principles in natural law, the other being the maxim,
l^ibid., at 338.
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"suum cuique.  ^ The abstract doctrine of Aquinas excused 
subjects from obligation to obey unjust commands of their 
rulers; William O, Douglas' rhetorical stance in this 
dissent excused civil rights leaders from any obligation 
to obey "Bull" Connor's unconstitutional court orders.
Argument from Ideal; The Natural Rights Sub-Species 
A second sub-species of the Argument from Ideal also 
emerged upon close textual analysis of the eighteen opinions 
placed in the category. In a number of opinions Douglas 
seemed to proceed from a "Natural Rights" version of natural 
law philosophy. This sub-species of the argument is very 
similar to the "Thomist" version just discussed, but differs 
in that these arguments identify a specific right as the 
defense for doing or forbearing from certain actions, and 
suggest that such rights are inherent in the human condition. 
They may proceed from man ' s "divine" qualities or his 
"rational" qualities, but they are in either case "unalien­
able" from action from the state. In addition to certain 
rights inhering in the human condition, Douglas argued that
^^John C. Murray, SJ, We Hold These Truths: Catholic
Reflections on the American proposition, (New York: Sheed
and Ward, Inc., 1960), p. 332.
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they reside in the American condition. The jurisprudential 
upshot of this aspect of the argument is of signal impor­
tance .
Hans Kelsen, an influential proponent of legal posi­
tivism, pointed out the connection between metaphysical 
precepts like equal justice under law, popular sovereignty, 
or liberty and positive laws like the first amendment. In 
Kelsen's scheme, all positive laws derive their validity 
from super-ordinate laws. This leads to a regress up the 
"pedigree" until we reach the "basic norm." In the United 
States, the regress would eventually reach the constitution, 
and Kelsen stipulated for any legal order "that the first 
constitution is a binding legal norm is presupposed, and 
the formulation of the presupposition is the basic norm of 
this legal o r d e r . W h a t  Kelsen is implying is that once 
we reach the most basic positive law, we still have one 
step left in our search for the basic norm, and that step 
moves us outside the legal system and, ipso facto, into 
natural law. Kelsen went on to explain how natural law thus 
gains access to the positive legal order:
^^Quoted in Golding, p. 127. (emphasis added)
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The basic norm is not itself a made, but a 
hypothetical presupposed norm; it is not positive 
law, but only its condition. Even this clearly 
shows the limitation of the idea of legal 
'positivity,' The basic norm is not valid 
because it has been created in a certain way, 
but its validity is assumed by virtue of its 
content. It is valid, then, like a norm of 
natural law, apart from its merely hypothetical 
validity. The idea of a pure positive law, like 
that of natural law, has its limitation.17
This binding together of natural rights with positive legal
rights reached rhetorical fruition in a number of Douglas'
first amendment opinions.
The well-known case of Public Utilities Commission v . 
Poliak provided the first example, and one of the clearest, 
of how Douglas opened the positive legal order to natural 
law. In Poliak the Court ruled that city busses in the 
District of Columbia could retain the use of loudspeakers 
playing FM music and commercial announcements without vio­
lating the first or fifth amendments. Douglas felt otherwise, 
and dissented, in doing so he illustrated how natural law 
can provide the warrant for positive law:
The case comes down to the meaning of 'liberty' 
as used in the Fifth Amendment. Liberty in the 
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom 
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must 
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository
^^Ibid., pp. 133-134. (emphasis added)
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of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed 
the beginning of all freedom. . . . The First 
Amendment in its respect for the conscience of 
the individual honors the sanctity of thought 
and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe 
what one wishes are important aspects of the 
constitutional right to be let alone.18
Clearly both the first and fifth amendments rest, in Douglas' 
view, on warrants outside the legal system, if, in the case 
of the fifth amendment, the right to be let alone is "the 
beginning of all freedom," and if, in the case of the first 
amendment, "its respect for the conscience of the individual 
honors the sanctity of thought and belief," we appear to 
have a paradigm case of a fundamental tenet of natural law; 
it is the function of positive law to sanction natural law. 
d'Entreves argued that "human laws must be established to 
draw out all the conclusions of natural law," so that ulti­
mately, "all law, eternal and natural, human and divine, is
19linked together in a complete and coherent system." William 
Douglas' examples of "Natural Rights" rhetoric compose just
I8 3 4 3 U.S. 451 (1952) at 467, 368. 
l^d'Entreves, Natural Law, p. 47.
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such a coherent system with the Bill of Rights as the bridge
20between the "human and divine."
Other cases reveal this rhetoric even more explicitly. 
In McGowan v. Maryland the Court sustained the validity of 
Maryland's "blue laws," and again, Mr. Justice Douglas dis­
sented. Perhaps no clearer statement of positive laws 
functioning to sanction natural laws can be found than in 
this dissent:
The institutions of our society are founded on the 
belief that there is an authority higher than the 
authority of the State; that there is a moral law 
which the State is powerless to alter; that the 
individual possesses rights, conferred by the 
Creator, which government must respect. . . . The
20Two points should be kept in mind regarding Douglas' 
invocation of the Constitution as the probitive base of an 
argument. First, he used the document differently for 
different purposes. When supporting a natural law argument, 
he stressed the ideals upon which the document rests: 
popular sovereignty, individual dignity, natural rights, etc, 
When supporting a positive law argument by reference to the 
Constitution, Douglas stressed the rule manifestly stated 
in the document (e.g., "Congress shall make no law . . ."). 
Second, Douglas sometimes evinced a key tenet of natural 
law philosophy which stipulates that a function of the 
positive law is to give sanction to the natural law. Thus, 
when an article or êimendment of the Constitution is made to 
serve as the bridge from what is to what ought to be, we 
must classify that argument on the basis of how the Consti­
tution is being used rather than on the basis of its mani­
fest content.
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body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
enshrined these principles.21
The two aspects of this argument, that a higher moral law 
exists, and that its existence negates certain powers of 
the state are rhetorically (and philosophically) bridged 
by the Constitution, and especially the Bill of Rights, 
here metaphorically represented as a "shrine." The metaphor 
is not without significance— by building a shrine of positive 
laws rather than theological dogma, we construct the pheno­
menon of secularized natural law and thereby escape religion's
22near monopoly on the philosophy.
The secular precept, in Kelsen's term the "basic norm," 
which provides the warrant for these arguments in numerous 
Douglas opinions is popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty 
(suum cuique?) is asserted to be a higher moral law which by
2I3 6 6 U.S. 420 (1961) at 562.
22Father Murray's book. We Hold These Truths : Catholic
Reflections on the American Proposition, although a lucid and 
valuable source on natural law philosophy, also exemplifies 
what results from the doctrine of separation of church and 
state taking a mental backseat to sectarian doctrine. For 
example: " . . .  the principles of Catholic faith and morality
stand superior to, and in control of, the whole order of 
civil life. The question is sometimes raised, whether 
Catholicism is compatible with American democracy. The 
question is invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner 
of its position inverts the order of values. It must, of 
course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy 
is compatible with Catholicism." (at pp. ix-x.)
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its self-evident validity constrains grovernment from pro­
scribing some specific right. His most unambiguous state­
ment of the argument came in United States v. International 
Union of Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural implement 
Workers of America in 1957. The second paragraph of his 
dissent began with the major premise that "Under our Con­
stitution it is We the People who are sovereign. The people
2 3have the final say." That statement is then linked to a 
specific right flowing from it: "First Amendment rights are
part of the heritage of all persons and groups in this 
country." And, therefore, he concludes, government is 
powerless to alter such rights : "They are not to be dis­
pensed with merely because we [the Court] or the Congress
24thinks the person or group is worthy or unworthy."
The argument had been made five years earlier, but 
popular sovereignty as the basic norm was left at the 
implicit level in Douglas' dissent in Beauharnis v. Illinois, 
a case which upheld the group libel conviction of the 
defendant. Then Douglas said that the term, "shall not be 
abridged,"
. . .  is a negation of power on the part of each and 
every department of government. Free speech, free
23352 U.S. 567 (1957) at 593. ^^Ibid., at 597.
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press, free exercise of religion are placed separate 
and apart; they are above and beyond the police 
power; they are not subject to regulation in the 
manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, 
production of oil, and the like.^S
Not surprisingly, Douglas' use of this argument form 
rarely occurred in majority opinions, but it was equally 
explicit when it did. In Girourard v. united States (1946) 
the Court ruled that an alien claiming conscientious objector 
status could not be denied citizenship for that reason alone. 
With characteristic clarity, Douglas based the Court's 
opinion on the natural rights version of the Argument from 
Ideal :
The struggle for religious liberty has through the 
centuries been an effort to accomodate the demands 
of the State to the conscience of the individual.
The victory for freedom of thought recorded in 
our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain 
of conscience there is a moral power higher than 
the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered 
death rather than sub-ordinate their allegiance to 
God to the authority of the State. Freedom of 
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the 
product of that struggle.
Once again, the norm of popular sovereignty is asserted,
here more clearly than before in the form of "suum cuique"
when Douglas points to "conscience of the individual" and
"freedom of thought." That self-evident metaphysical
2 S3 4 3 U.S. 250 (1952) at 286. ^^328 U.S. 61 (1946) at 69,
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postulate is seen ensconced in the positive legal order 
vÆien he says that "our Bill of Rights recognizes. . . . "  
and we see that the government is thereby restrained;
"Freedom of religion [is] guaranteed by the First Amend­
ment . . . ."
Mr. Douglas' concurring opinion in joint Anti-Facist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, Attorney General also provided 
a clear example of the rhetorical bridging of value postulates 
outside the positive legal order to specific provisions of 
the legal order itself. In this cas#, three organizations 
had sued in federal court for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, claiming that Attorney General McGrath's order plac­
ing their names on lists of subversive organizations had 
caused them irreparable damage. The District court granted 
McGrath a motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the motion, and the Supreme Court reversed, with Douglas 
concurring in that result. Again evident in this opinion 
is the notion of self-evidently valid postulates, by virtue 
of their inherent appeal, placing restraints on governmental 
action. The plaintiffs had objected mainly that the 
Attorney General's order had given them no opportunity to 
reply. This, Douglas argued, was forbidden, for "government
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in this country cannot by edict condemn or place beyond the 
pale. The rudiments of justice as we know it, call for 
notice and hearing--an opportunity to appear and rebut the 
charge."27 The rudiments of justice, natural rights 
possessed by all humans, are sanctioned for Americans, in 
Douglas' argument, again by the Bill of Rights : "Steadfast 
adherance to strict procedural safeguards is our main
28assurance that there will be equal justice under law."
In this case, then, the basic norm takes shape as "the 
rudiments of justice," and as "equal justice under law" 
rather than popular sovereignty, but still central to the 
argument is the rhetorically achieved link between moral 
norms and legal norms, between the "human and the divine."
What has been clarified, in this researcher's view, 
about William O. Douglas in particular is that he manifests 
arguments on occasion which rely ultimately upon "such self- 
evident moral-deontic principles as justice, unalienable 
rights, fairness, the dictates of reason, and so on." But 
further, the classification of 8.7% of his career first 
amendments as Argument from Ideal has yielded the clarifi­
cation of how such eurguments work— it has helped discover
^^341 U.S. 123 (1951) at 178. ^Sj^id., at 179.
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their "internal dynamic." In one sub-species of the argu­
ment, the Thomist as herein called, an ontological bond 
between existence and value— an unjust law is not a law—  
serves as the rhetorical warrant for the political behavior 
pursuant to it. But the argument must include epistemo­
logical elements as well as metaphysical— the citizen must 
be viewed as capable of knowing just from unjust, even 
constitutional from unconstitutional before he can, in 
Douglas' term, "flout" the law. The Thomist version of 
Argument from Ideal thus assumes a syllogistic form: Major
Premise: An unjust law is no law; Minor Premise: individual
citizens possess the ability to know just from unjust; 
Conclusion; individual citizens are not obliged to obey 
laws they perceive as unjust.
The natural rights version of the Argument from ideal 
proceeds from a similar syllogistic internal dynamic : Major
Premise: Individual human beings are sovereign creatures
with certain natural rights ; Minor Premise: The Bill of
Rights sanctions specific natural rights flowing from the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty; Conclusion: government is
powerless to alter the sovereign rights of individuals since 
the rights of individuals were not granted by government.
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All elements of the argument must be present in just this 
dynamic relationship, and in a number of opinions by 
William O. Douglas, it was manifestly there. Such a logical 
foundation is an absolute requirement for an argument des­
tined to become part of the state papers of the country. 
Without each element present, the inferential leaps fall 
short and the argument fails. In Douglas' hands, though, 
it works. But a Supreme Court Justice of even Douglas' 
philosophical acumen and rhetorical skill is still a 
lawyer, still the propounder of a written Constitution and 
a body of common law, still the oracle of rules. Such rule- 
based arguments dominated Douglas' first amendment opinions 
on all measures, and it is to their classification and 
clarification that we now turn.
The Internal Dynamic of Legal Positivism:
The Argument from Rule 
The particular strain of American legal realism urged 
in the work of Columbia University's Underhill Moore came 
to be called "Institutional Behaviorism," a term implying 
that "a legal institution is the happening over and over
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again of the same kind of behavior"^^ of human beings. In 
the present study, the concept of genre has been similarly 
defined, looking to recurrent rhetorical behavior for its 
bases. On such an accounting, the occurring over and over 
of the same rhetorical behavior, we arrive at the result 
that William O. Douglas has turned most often for his 
jurisprudential topoi not to the tenets of legal realism, 
but to legal positivism. Arguments conforming to the hypo­
thesized Argument from Rule made up 56.6% of Douglas' first 
amendment opinions and were present to some degree in all 
but four years of Douglas' career, (see Table 2, p. 205). 
Having made this classification, we now turn to textual 
analysis of those one hundred and seventeen opinions and to 
the task of clarifying the relationships among them.
Argument from Rule; The Deductive Sub-Species 
As with the Argument from Ideal, the Argument from 
Rule divided into two non-discrete sub-species. The first 
is best characterized as "deductive;" the second is analogic." 
In the "deductive" the argument proceeds from some explicitly
Underhill Moore, "Rational Basis of Legal Institu­
tions," Columbia Law Review 23 (1923), p. 609
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stated rule (constitutional, statutory, or case law), to the 
particulars of the instant case, and hence, to the result. 
Ronald Dworkin described the process of reasoning under­
lying the deductive mode :
'textbook' rules are often given by courst as 
reasons for deciding a case or part of a case one 
way or another. It is possible, in some cases, 
to cast the entire argument of the court's opinion 
in the form of one or more syllogisms, in each of 
which the major premise is such a rule, the minor 
premise a statement of fact either agreed upon by 
the parties or determined in the proceedings, and 
the conclusion a statement of the final or an 
interim decision in the case.30
An early example of such argument from Douglas came 
in the landmark case of Murdock v. Pennsvlvania in 1943.
Here the Court, through Douglas' majority opinion, struck 
down a Pennsylvania statute requiring a license tax on 
colporteur evangelism, in this case as applied to Jehovah's 
Witnesses. One covering syllogism characterized the entire 
opinion: Major Premise : the first amendment prohibits
taxes of expression; Minor Premise: the state law is a tax
on expression; Conclusion : the state law is invalid. This
result, of course, hinged upon the applicability of the 
first amendment to the states via the fourteenth amendment,
^^Ronald Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion," The Journal 
of Philosophy 60 (October 10, 1963), pp. 625-626.
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a rule established twelve years earlier in Stroinberg v, 
California and which Douglas frequently invoked. Here 
he simply said that the rights "in question exist apart 
from state authority. [They are] guaranteed to the people 
by the Federal Constitution."^^
Note how this argument differs from the Argument from 
Ideal: he based this opinion upon explicitly identified
human, i.e., positive laws without reference to either 
natural laws or natural rights . under the coding procedures 
adopted herein the absence of reference to transcendent 
ideals leaves such an opinion resting on a positive law 
warrant.
This case also illustrated an aspect of legal posi­
tivism discussed in Chapter II, the practice of distinguish­
ing or over-ruling cases as actually constituting Argument 
from Rule. Simpson explained that,
distinguishing [or overruling] cases, which consists in 
giving reasons why a rule in a case ought not to be 
following or applied in a later case, is often con­
ceived to be an indication that courts are not 'really' 
bound: in truth, earlier cases are distinguished, and
have to be distinguished, just because they are 
binding, so that they ought to be followed unless a 
reason can be given for not following them; in much
31283 U.S. 359 (1931). 22319 u.S. 105 (1943) at 115.
-159-
the same way courts have to interpret statutes 
just because statutes are b i n d i n g . 33
Douglas demonstrated how such rule-based rhetoric works
when he announced in Murdock that,
The judgment in Jones v. Opelika has this day been 
vacated. Freed from that controlling precedent, we 
can restore to their high, constitutional position 
the liberties of itinerant evangelists who disseminate 
their religious beliefs and the tents of their faith 
through the distribution of literature
Only after demonstrating that the rules established in Jones 
V. Opelika^S were no longer tenable could Douglas assert 
that the judges were "freed from that controlling precedent." 
He thus disposed of one rule while laying down the one that 
replaced it, and by doing so relied ultimately upon a rule- 
based rhetoric.
In Murdock, Douglas ' argument became law by virtue of 
its being couched in a majority opinion. To the disappoint­
ment of most civil libertarians, the bulk of Douglas'
W. B. Simpson, "The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and 
the Doctrine of Binding Precedent." in A. G. Guest, ed., 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. (London: Oxford University
Press. 1961), p. 159.
3*319 U.S. at 117.
3^The original Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) 
is the case Douglas had reference to. The re-appeal, Jones 
V. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) was a companion case with 
Murdock.
—160 -
rule-based reasoning has yet to find its way into precedent.
His dissent in the Roth v. United States obscenity case in
1957 provided an instructive example of how a justice may
reject the Court's rules while simultaneously arguing from
his own. This case, of course, initiated a series of
attempts by the Court to deal with obscenity in a rule-
governed way. To that end, they established, through
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, the "Roth Test;" "The
standard for judging obscenity . . .  is whether, to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole,
appeals to prurient interest.Justice Douglas rejected
this legal rule, arguing that.
By these standards punishment is inflicted for 
thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor anti­
social conduct. This test cannot be squared 
with out decisions under the First Amendment.
Even the ill-starred Dennis case conceded that 
speech to be punishable must have some relation 
to action which could be penalized by government.
Thüs it was not rules per se that Douglas objected to in
the Roth argument, for he invoked both the first amendment
and precedent cases under it in attacking the rule in
point. But he went further, and offered his own rule, one
36354 U.S. 476 (1957). 3?354 U.S. at 509.
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which he would posit in numerous opinions, and one which 
Yale's Thomas I. Emerson developed in his monograph.
Op
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment; "Freedom
of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that,
it is so closely brigaded with action as to be an insepar-
39able part of it." It is noteworthy that Douglas went far 
beyond what Simpson asserted was "the minimum required 
before a judge may be said to act upon a legal rule." 
Simpson's requirements were that:
(a) He should have a rule in mind when he decides 
to act. This does not mean that he should have 
in mind a precise formulation of a rule; a person 
may act upon a rule without thinking our a draft 
of a rule.
(b) He should decide that the rule is applicable—  
that is to say he should decide that some fact or 
set of facts should be subsumed under the rule, 
and this will involve a task of classification.
(c) He should deliberately so conduct himself that 
his conduct conforms to the conduct prescribed
by the rule
^®Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the 
First Amendment. (New York: Random House, 1966).
3^354 U.S. at 514. One should note that Douglas' 
"speech brigaded with action" test is actually a highly 
evolved and much more subtle "clear and present danger" 
test, the standard which Justice Holmes first articulated 
in his dissent in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919).
Simpson, p. 162
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In his Roth dissent Douglas had in mind both established 
and hypothetical rules, he argued the inapplicability of 
those he rejected and the applicability of those he 
supported (two sides of the same logical process), and his 
rhetorical behavior comported with the rule itself.
One rhetorical impact of a rule-based argument coming 
in a dissent is that it cannot be lightly dismissed as, in 
Hughes' term, "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law. 
It is, rather, an appeal to the past wisdom of the law and 
in a system based on stare decisis causes something of a 
taller barrier for the majority to breach. Such was the 
case with Douglas' twenty-page dissent in Communist Party 
of the Unites States v. Subversive Activities Control Board 
in 1961, It took the Court's most adept practitioner of 
judicial restraint, Felix Frankfurter, one hundred eleven 
pages of majority opinion to state the other side. One 
reason may be that Douglas couched his dissent in a staunch 
Argument from Rule rhetoric and marshalled case after case 
to his cause. In his summation, Douglas wrote:
41charles Evan Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United 
States, (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing company.
Inc., 1928), p. 68.
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From these precedents I would hopefully deduce two 
principles. First, no individual may be required 
to register before he makes a speech, for the First 
Amendment rights are not subject to any prior re­
straint. Second, a group engaged in lawful conduct 
may not be required to file with the Government a 
list of its members, no matter how unpopular it may
be.42
He concluded by chiding the majority for distinguishing two 
cases he felt were relevant, NAACP v. Alabama and joint 
Anti-Facist Committee v. McGrath, and inplied that one of 
the most basic tenets of jurisprudence underlying legal 
positivism, that legal rules must be general rules, had 
thereby been violated: "When we reject those precedents,
we create a special rule for this day o n l y . "43 Rules are 
thus acceptable, indeed necessary and desirable, but not 
if they apply "for this day only."
One of Douglas' clearest uses of Argument from Rule 
in its Deductive form came a year later in his concurring 
opinion in Russell v. United States (there were six 
separate cases joined under this citation), a case which 
established the rule that congressional investigations 
must bear direct relation to some legitimate legislative 
function. While agreeing with that rule, Douglas went on
42367 U.S. 1 (1961) at 172. U.S. 1 (1961) at 188,
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to urge what John Austin called the "conimand theory" of 
law:
When a subjective standard is introduced, the line 
between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct 
becomes vague, uncertain and unpredictable. . . .
My idea is and has been that those who put the words 
of the First Amendment in the form of a command knew 
best. That is the political theory of government we 
must sustain until a constitutional amendment is 
adopted that puts the Congress astride the 'press.'
Thus, Douglas based this opinion upon the desirability of 
deducing legal results and political behavior from super­
ordinate general rules, a process impossible under "sub­
jective standards:" An important insight regarding the 
epistemological justification for citizens disregarding 
positive laws discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter also emerged in this opinion. Given the objective 
standards Douglas insisted upon, not only jurists, but 
citizens as well, are better able to know where they stand 
vis-a-vis the law, are better able to recognize an "unjust" 
law, and can thus better know whether the particular rule 
is to be followed or flouted.
44369 U.S. 749 (1962) at 779. Douglas often suggested 
such a constitutional amendment as a means of curtailing 
expression, as if to dare someone to try it.
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A final example of this deductive sub-species of 
Argument from Rule dually illustrated Douglas' proclivity 
to this sort of reasoning. The Court denied certiorari in 
President's Council, District 25 v. Community School Board 
#25 (1972), a case involving the banning of a book entitled 
Down these Mean Streets from the public schools of Queens, 
New York. Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari, 
arraying an impressive number of similar cases which had 
been given their day in the Supreme Court, and argued that 
the case should be heard. From his brief, he deduced four 
rules for granting the petition : (1) "Actions of school
boards are not immune from constitutional scrutiny." (2) 
"Academic freedom has been upheld against attack on various 
fronts." (3) "The First Amendment involves not only the 
right to speak and publish, but also the right to hear, to 
leam, to know." and (4) "And this Court has recognized 
that this right to know is 'nowhere more vital than in our 
schools and universities."^5 on the one hand Douglas cited 
previously established legal rules so that the Court could, 
on the other hand, establish another legal rule--he deduced
^^409 U.S. 998 (1972) at 998-999.
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from precedent the need for a deductive base from which to 
settle cases.
Argument from Rule; The Analogic Sub-Species 
A second sub-species of the Argument from Rule, the 
analogic, at times surfaced in Douglas' first amendment 
opinions. As previously mentioned, a claim of mutual ex­
clusivity between these types could probably not be sustained; 
they are better differentiated by a criterion of emphasis 
rather than identity. In this case, the sub-species of 
analogic Argument from Rule differs from the deductive 
Argument from Rule in that it proceeds from a less general 
rule, that is to say, a precedent case, rather than a 
generalized common law rule or a statute. However, such 
general rules remain an essential feature of the "internal 
dynamic" of the argument, but they are not its starting 
point. In Douglas' first amendment opinions, the analogic 
Argument from Rule (1) established a correspondence between 
the instant case and at least one precedent case, and (2) 
linked them both to a general rule, either statutory, con­
stitutional, or case law. Lawrence Becker stipulated just 
such a progression as the criterion of validity for 
analogical reasoning in law:
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Clearly, what one looks for in a good dynamic analogy 
. . .  is simply an object which has a property which 
can be 'yoked' to a property in its analog for the 
purposes at hand. Relevance, or validity (i.e., 
whether A and B are appropriately thought of as 
analogs for a given purpose) is decided here in just 
the way one decides the worth of a theoretical model : 
in terms of its consequences for predictive, explan­
atory, heuristic, or other tasks. . . . [Such argu­
ments work] by yoking the supposed analogs together 
at the points at which their properties, given certain 
circumstances, yield intertranslatable results, useful 
predictions, or explanations.^6
In this light, the notion of precedent--stare decisis--
suggests that one case controls another not because it
preceeds it, but because it predicts it— the two cases are
"intertranslatable"— they could serve as precedents for
each other. Thus, two cases are determined to possess
relevant similarities which cause them both to be governed
by a more general rule.
An early example of this argument form arose in 
Follett V. McCormick in 1944. Douglas based his opinion for 
the Court almost exclusively upon the Murdock opinion he had 
written for the Court the year before. In Follett the 
ruling invalidated a tax on book agents as applied to 
Jehovah's Witnesses. After noting the similarities with
^^Lawrence C. Becker, "Analogy in Legal Reasoning," 
Ethics 83 (April 1973), p. 252.
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Murdock, Douglas first observed that "freedom of religion
is not merely reserved for those with a long purse,
and then that such a tax "as a condition to the exercise
of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment
is as obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship or a
48previous restraint." Thus, factual situations character­
ized by license taxes, previous restraints, censorships, 
and the like, are (a) relevantly similar, and (b) pro­
hibited by the general rule of the first amendment. Again, 
this argument emphasizes the rule function of a part of the
Constitution rather than the ideals implicit in it.
A paradigm instance of the analogic Argument from 
Rule came in Douglas ' opinion for a unanimous court in 
Fowler V. Rhode Island in 1953. The fact pattern in Fowler
was virtually identical with the previous case of Niemotko 
49
V .  Maryland two years earlier: groups of Jehovah’s
Witnesses in both cases applied for permission to hold 
religious services in city parks, were refused, held their 
services in defiance of city officials, were arrested, con­
victed, and finally exonerated by the Supreme Court. Douglas
*^321 U.S. 573 (1944) at 576.
^®321 U.S. 573 (1944) at 577. '^ 3^40 U.S. 268 (1951).
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disposed of Fowler with the pronouncement that "in Niemotko 
V. Maryland . . .  we had a case on all fours with this 
one. " Implied in this shorthand phrase is the notion of 
translatable results, either case could predict the result 
of the other, for both come under a more general rule.
Perhaps the clearest statement of such analogic 
reasoning came in Douglas' dissenting opinion in uphaus v . 
Wyman in 1960. The case originally came to the court the 
year before,was remanded to the New Hampshire courts, 
and was back on re-appeal. Dr. Willard Uphaus, Executive 
Director of World Fellowship, Inc., had been convicted of 
contempt for refusing to reveal the names of members of his 
group who had attended summer camps in New Hampshire. The 
Court ruled that New Hampshire's Attorney General Wyman 
could constitutionally demand membership lists from Uphaus. 
He refused and ultimately spent a year in jail. Douglas, 
whose opinion Black joined, vigorously dissented from the 
Court's ruling and linked the case to several others he 
saw as relevantly similar:
^^Fowler V. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) at 69.
51360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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World Fellowship, so far as this record shows, is as 
law-abiding as N.A.A.C.P. The members of one are 
entitled to the same freedom of speech, of press, of 
assembly, and of association as the members of the 
other. These rights extend even to Communists, as a 
unanimous Court held in Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937).
What is an unconstitutional invasion of freedom of 
association in Alabama or in Arkansas should be uncon­
stitutional in New Hampshire. 52
Once again, the argument proceeds from the establishment of
relevant similarity between two cases (either one of which
could serve as precedent for the other), to a general
statutory, constitutional, or case law rule which covers
both situations.
Argument from Rule, as operationalized in this study, 
is thus seen to assume two forms, the deductive internal 
dynamic and the analogic internal dynamic. Both incorporate 
appeals to rules in their logic, but the former begins with 
rules and the latter ends there. The rule invoked or in­
duced may be the U.S. Constitution, but it is used only as 
a source of legal rules, not of moral mandates, nor as a 
touchstone for transcendent ideals.
52364 U.S. 388 (1960) at 407-408. The reference to 
NAACP is to the case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel, Patterson, 
Attorney General, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) in which the Court 
ruled that Alabama's attorney general did not possess the 
power to compel membership lists from that group in that 
state.
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But what appeals may a judge opt for if not for 
ideals or rules? The legal realists, who claim Douglas as 
one of their own and who are embraced by him as colleagues, 
would answer: social goals, social situations which dictate
decisions, or perhaps the inability to state rules or agree 
upon facts. Such rhetorical bases of judicial opinion are 
herein called the Argument from Context and it is to the 
classification and clarification of these arguments that 
this chapter now proceeds.
The Internal Dynamic of Legal Realism:
The Argument from Context 
Chapter II of this study hypothesized that if the 
tenets of legal realism formed the warrant for a recurrent 
pattern of judicial argument, such a rhetorical genre, "while 
possibly referring to statutory or case-law rules, [would] 
in fact rely upon reference to social goals for support and 
[would] typically stress the exigencies of the instant case 
or extra-judicial evidentiary materials." To test this 
hypothesis, as with the two previously hypothesized genres, 
two hundred and seven of Douglas' first amendment opinions 
were analyzed, with the result that seventy-two, or 34.8% 
(see Table 1, p. 204 ) were judged to rely upon such warrants.
-172-
But once again, a potential rhetorical genre will not reveal 
its internal dynamic on the basis of classification alone, 
and we therefore turn to the task of clarification.
Argument from Context; The Sociocentric Sub-Species 
Three sub-species of the Argument from Context emerged 
upon textual analysis of the seventy-two opinions classified 
as flowing from legal realism, each typifying a particular 
aspect of that legal philosophy, but again, none of which 
could sustain a claim of mutual exclusivity from the others. 
The first is what may be called the "sociocentric" Argument 
from Context, the second is characterized as the "relativis- 
tic," and the third will be referred to as the "exigential. " 
Sociocentric Arguments from Context were decided pre­
dominantly by reference to social goals and/or social effects 
These arguments case closest to typifying a sociological 
jurisprudence— the view that legal institutions are best 
understood as being socially embedded, reacting to and 
impacting upon the society around them. This court-centered 
view features judges as its focal point and expects them to 
argue from a desire to achieve social goals or an intent to 
produce or prevent social effects, Douglas' first eunendment 
opinions provide a rich inventory of such rhetoric.
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The cold war mentality of the 1950's gave rise to a
plethora of governmental committees charged with insuring
the loyalty of public employees. Tenney v. Bandhove came
to the Court in 1951 from California, testing the question
of whether the privileges and immunities afforded state
legislators extended to the investigative function of
committees. The majority held that the first amendment
granted immunity for such functions, and Douglas dissented.
He did not entirely reject the need for immunity, but was
clearly motivated in this argument by concern with the social
pressures which spawned such committees and by dismay with
the social effects they were capable of producing;
. . .  we are apparently holding today that the action 
of those committees have no limits in the eyes of 
the law. May they depart with impunity from their 
legislative functions, sit as kangaroo courts, and 
try men for their loyalty and their political be­
liefs? May they substitute trial before committees 
for trial before juries? May they sit as a board 
of censors over industry, prepare their blacklists 
of citizens and issue pronouncements as devastating 
as any bill of attainder?
What emerged rather clearly in Douglas' Tenney dissent was
the sociological view of legal institutions, in this case
both of legislatures and of courts. He recognized the
53341 U.S. 367 (1951) at 382.
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social impact of the investigative arm of the state 
legislature, and sought to curb its undesirable effects 
with the judiciary's power of review.
Schools and teachers were a popular target in the 
1950's for those wanting to safeguard Americanism. To this 
end, New York passed the "Peinberg Law," aimed at purging 
"subversive persons from the public school system." The 
Supreme Court sustained the law and again, Douglas dissented, 
this time producing one of the more stirring opinions of his 
career :
What happens under this law is typical of what 
happens in a police state. Teachers are under 
constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for 
signs of disloyalty; their utterances are watched 
for clues to dangerous thoughts. A pall is cast 
over the classrooms. There can be no real academic 
freedom in that environment. Where suspicion fills 
the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their 
jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect.
A 'party line'— as dangerous as the 'party line' of 
the Communists lays hold. It is the 'party line' of 
the orthodox view, of the conventional thought, of 
the accepted approach. A problem can no longer be 
pursued with impunity to its edges. Fear stalks the 
classroom. The teacher is no longer a stimulant, to 
safe and sound information; she becomes instead a 
pipeline for safe and sound information. A deadening 
dogma takes the place of free inquiry. Instruction tends 
to become servile; pursuit of knowledge is discouraged; 
discussion often leaves off where it should begin.
S^Adler V. Board of Education of the City of New York, 
342 U.S. 485 (1952) at 510.
-175-
When deTocqueville suggested in the nineteenth cen­
tury that virtually every problem in American life 
eventually found its way to the Supreme Court, even he 
probably would not have guessed that his observation would 
hold true for the most intimate problems of the bedroom.
Yet that is precisely what Poe v. Ullman brought to the 
Court in 1961, the right of a husband and wife to receive 
from their doctor information regarding birth control. In 
this case, the Court sustained lower court rulings which 
Douglas' dissent argued would have the effect of "sealing 
the lips of a doctor because he desires to observe the law,
obnoxious as the law may be."^^ Such a result, he argued,
culminated in social effects which were unacceptable:
The regime of a free society needs room for vast 
experimentation. Crises, emergencies, experience 
at the individual and community levels produce new 
insights; problems never imagined, appear. To stop 
experimentation and the testing of new decrees and 
controls is to deprive society of a needed versatil­
ity. 56
^^367 U.S. 497 (1961) at 514-515.
5 6 3 5 7 U.S. 497 (1961) at 518. This case was over­
ruled by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196 5), a case 
in Which Douglas wrote the Court's opinion and cited this 
dissent for support.
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What is evident in these two cases is Douglas' reliance 
upon the sociocentric Argument from Context in order to 
alleviate or produce certain social effects; in one case 
in the area of state government, in the other in the area 
of medicine. Six years later his own profession was drawn 
in by this argument.
The emergence of poverty law centers in the 1960's
was among the more pragmatic results of the civil rights
struggle. But when Hackin v. Arizona came before the Supreme
Court in 1967 testing the extent to which the indigent were
entitled to counsel, the Court, per curiam, dismissed the
appeal for want of a federal question. Douglas dissented.
In two ways his opinion in Hackin illustrated how a judicial
argument may find its warrant in the philosophy of legal
realism. First, he stressed the interplay between the legal
profession and the society it serves:
. . .  to millions of Americans who are indigent and 
ignorant— these rights [that lawsuits are protected 
speech under the first amendment, see N.A.A.C.P. v . 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)] are meaningless. They 
are helpless to assert their rights under the law 
without assistance. They suffer discrimination in 
housing and employment, are victimized by shady 
consumer sales practices, evicted from their homes 
at the whim of the landlord, denied welfare payments 
and endure domestic strife without hope of the legal
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remedies of divorce, maintenance, or child custody 
decrees. ^ 7
Second, in the style of the "Brandeis Brief"named for 
his philosophical and chronological progenitor, Douglas 
footnoted the above passage with citations, not to legal 
precedents, but to ten major sociolgoical studies of poverty 
and the law. Such reliance upon extra-judicial sources is 
a product of the twentieth century almost exclusively, and 
of legal realists typically. The sociocentric Argument from 
Context may have reached its zenith in Chief Justice Earl 
Warren's majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 9^
5?389 U.S. 143 (1967) at 145.
S^The "Brandeis Brief" is a term of describing an 
approach to legal argumentation first introduced by Attorney 
Louis D. Brandeis when he argued Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412 (1908) before the Supreme Court. Johnson wrote that the 
"Brandeis Brief" introduced a "new technique in the weighing 
of constitutional issues. This occurred when Mr. Louis D. 
Brandeis handed the Court . . . his famous brief, three pages 
of which were devoted to a statement of the constitutional 
principles involved and 113 pages of which were devoted to 
the presentation of facts and statistics, backed by scien­
tific authorities, to show the evil effects of too long hours 
on women, 'the mothers of the race.'" Johnson, Social 
Planning Under the Constitution, 2 Selected Essays (1938)
131, 145. Quoted in Edward L. Barrett, Jr., and Paul W. 
Bruton, eds., Constitutional Law; Cases and Materials, 
(Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, inc., 1973) p. 700,
59347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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an opinion which relied heavily upon studies by the prominent 
b ok social psychologist. Dr. Kenneth Clark.®® Douglas, 
however, was never more forceful than when making such 
arguments, and diverse areas of American society came under 
his scrutiny as he relied upon them. Two final examples 
should suffice.
In 1972 Healey v. James brought to the Court the 
question of whether a state college president could consti­
tutionally deny recognition to a proposed chapter of Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS) on his campus. Justice 
Powell's majority opinion ruled that he could not, and 
Douglas concurred. But the warrant from which Douglas 
argued was not ruled-based, but sociocentric, stressing 
goals to which the good society should aspire:
The present case is miniscule in the events of the 
'60's and '70's. But the fact that it has come here 
for ultimate resolution indicates the sickness of our 
academic world, measured by First Amendment standards. 
Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials 
in their search for truth. If we are to become an
60See generally: Archibald Cox, The Warren Court:
Constitutional Decisions as an Instrument of Social Reform 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968): Abraham
Davis, The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social 
Science Data (New York: l^ SS Information Service, 1973); and
Paul L. Rosen, The Supreme Court and Socieil Science (Urbana; 
University of Illinois Press, 1972).
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integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn 
status quo opposed to change, students and faculties 
should have communal interests in which each age learns 
from the other. Without ferment of one kind or 
another, a college or university (like a federal agency 
or other human institution) becomes a useless appendage 
to a society which traditionally has reflected the 
spirit of rebellion.61
No doubt the single most important Supreme Court case 
affecting mass media in America was Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. V. FCC, 345 U.S. 367 (1969), which gave constitutional 
sanction to the Fairness Doctrine.6^  Much to the dismay 
of many students of the Court, Douglas' health prevented 
him from taking part in the Red Lion dicision. However, 
four years later he had his opportunity to speak to the 
wisdom of the Fairness Doctrine and in doing so he authored 
what was his last great first amendment opinion. The case 
was Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National 
Committee, and in it the Court ruled that the Fairness 
Doctrine did not require individual licensees to sell 
ccxnmercial time for the purpose of editorial announcements. 
Two groups, the DNC and the Business Executives Move for
61408 U.S. 169 (1972) at 107.
G2por copious background information on the Red Lion 
case and other significant legal developments in broadcast 
regulation, see Fred W. Friendly's excellent work. The Good 
Guys, The Bad Guys and the First Amendment (New York: Random
House, 1975).
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Peace had taken a Washington radio station, WTOP, to court 
in their attempt to broadcast anti-war editorials. The 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the two groups, invoking 
the Fairness Doctrine. But the Supreme Court, on a 7-2 
vote, reversed. Chief Justice Burger's opinion saying, in 
part, "editing is what editors are for." Douglas took this 
opportunity to say what he had been unable to say in Red 
Lion. Concurring with the majority, he argued from the 
sociocentric Argument from context that governmental intru­
sion into the television industry would provoke undesirable 
effects ;
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, . . . in a carefully 
written opinion that was built upon predecessor cases, 
put TV and radio under a different regime [from news­
papers]. I did not participate in that decision, and, 
with all respect, would not support it. The Fairness 
Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime.
It puts the head of the camel inside the tent and en­
ables administration after administration to toy with 
TV and radio in order to serve its sordid or benevolent 
ends. In 1973--as in other years— there is clamoring 
to make TV and radio emit messages that console certain 
groups
The prospect of government compelled speech--forcing broad­
casters to "emit messages"— was one Douglas feared and one
63412 U.S. 94 (1973) at 154-155.
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which remains at the center of debate on the social utility 
of the Fairness Doctrine.
Argument from Context; The Relativistic Sub-Species
A second sub-species of the Argument from Context finds 
its roots in the rule and fact skepticism of Jerome Frank. 
Recognizing the inescapable variability of human judgment, 
the skeptics argued that the law "consists of decisions, 
not of rules," with the upshot being that there are some 
areas of conduct in which courts should not be making 
decisions. Thus, the sub-species of argument based upon this 
aspect of legal realism may be called the "Relativistic" 
Argument from Context. Douglas' opinions in the area of 
obscenity and pornography relied heavily upon this type of 
argument, one which basically denies the possibility of 
making aesthetic judgments capable of winning universal 
support, and therefore concludes that such decisions are no 
business of courts and judges and juries.
An early statement of this position came in Douglas' 
opinion for the Court in Hannegan v. Esquire in 1946.
Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1963), originally published by Bretano's, 1930.
GSibid., p. 138.
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Postmaster General Hannegan had revoked the second class 
mailing privileges of Esquire magazine upon a finding that 
the periodical failed to meet one condition of Section 14 
of the Classification Act of 1879, stipulating that publi­
cations entitled to the lower rate must contain "information 
of a public character" and thus contribute to the public 
good. The Court vacated Postmaster General Hannegan's 
order, and Douglas argued from the relativistic Argument 
from Context that in passing the legislation Congress 
never intended,
. . .  that each applicant for the second class rate 
must convince the Postmaster General that his publi­
cation positively contributes to the public good or 
public welfare. Under our system of government 
there is an accomodation for the widest variety of tastes 
and ideas. What is good literature, what has educational 
value, what is refined public information, what is good 
art, varies with individuals as it does from one gene­
ration to another. There would doubtless be a con­
trariety of views concerning Cervantes' Don Quixote, 
Shakespeare's Venus‘ and Adonis, or Zola's Nana. But 
a requirement that literature or art conform to some 
norm prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology 
foreign to our system. The basic [idea] implicit in 
the requirements of the fourth condition can be served 
only by uncensored distribution of literature. From 
the multitude of competing offerings the public will 
pick and choose. What seems to me to be trash may have 
for others fleeting or even enduring v a l u e s . 6 6
GG327 U.S. 146 (1946) at 157-158.
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The 1957 term of the Supreme Court saw a number of
obscenity cases from various parts of the country. In
Kingsley Books v. Brown Douglas posted a dissent which
foreshadowed his dissent sixteen years later in Miller v.
California. The epistemological and aesthetic relativism
characteristic of legal realism was clearly stated here as
Douglas observed that.
Juries or judges may differ in their opinions, com­
munity by community, case by case. . . . Free speech 
is not to be regulated like diseased cattle or impure 
butter. The audience (in this case the judge or jury 
that hissed yesterday) may applaud today, even for the 
same performance.^7
In Ginzburg v. United States in 1966 the Court con­
tinued the process begun nine years earlier in Roth of 
attempting to formulate objective tests for the judicial 
determination of obscenity. Here Ralph Ginzburg was charged 
with obscenity as manifested in three of his publications: 
Eros and Liason magazines, and a monograph entitled The 
Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. The final 
aspect of the "Roth Test Revised" was added in this case, 
the so-called "pandering" element. The Court reached its 
finding of obscenity, in part at least, because Ginzburg,
67354 U.S. 436 (1957) at 443.
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who had attempted to obtain mailing privileges in the towns 
of Blue Ball and intercourse, Pennsylvania and Middlesex,
New Jersey, was found guilty of possessing "the leer of 
the sensualist." As Professor Emerson pointed out, Douglas' 
dissent "stressed the elusiveness of all the standards which 
have been proposed."®® The opinion, perhaps the clearest 
example of the Relativistic Argument from Context, began 
with a citation from Jerome Frank's circuit court opinion 
in the Roth case and then proceeded to posit a number of un­
answerable questions typical of rule and fact skepticism;
How can we know enough to probe the mysteries of the 
subconscious of our people and say that this is good 
for them and that is not? Catering to the most eccen­
tric taste may have some 'social importance' in giving 
that minority an opportunity to express itself rather 
than to repress its inner desires. . . . How can we 
know that this expression may not prevent antisocial 
conduct?®^
Argument from Context: The Exigential Sub-Species
A third sub-species of the Argument from Context emerged 
in Douglas' first amendment opinions. This type might be 
called the "exigential," for it allows the decision to be
®®Thomas i. Emerson, David Haber, and Norman Dorsen. 
Political and Civil Rights in the United States, Student 
Edition, Vol. I (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967),
p. 656.
®®383 U.S. 463 (1966) at 491.
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dictated primarily by the pecularities of the instant case.
Karl Llewellyn's article, "Some Realism About Realism" in
the 1922 Harvard Law Review provided insight into this type
of argument when he wrote that the realists,
. . . want law to deal . . . with things, with people, 
with tangibles, with definite tangibles, and with 
observable relations between tangibles— not with words 
alone; when law deals with words, they want words to 
represent tangibles which can be got at beneath words, 
and observable relations between those tangibles.
This, of course, was not to suggest that the legal realists 
wanted law to become a disconnected sequence of ad hoc 
decisions, with no memory of precedent cases and no reference 
to generalized legal rules. It simply meant that on occa­
sion, the "tangibles" would provide the point of departure 
from whence the judge reasons to the rule, instead of vice 
versa, and as Douglas pointed out in E.P.A. v. Mink, "the
71Starting point of a decision usually indicates the result." 
Again, this argument type is differentiated from rule-based 
arguments in terms of rhetorical emphasis, not on the basis 
of the absolute absence of reference to cases or statutes. 
Such reliance upon the predominant theme as the basis of the
^®Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism About Realism,"
Harvard Law Review 44 (1922), p. 1223.
7I4IO U.S. 73 (1973) at 105.
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coding decision is usually necessary when (as in this study)
the entire document is used as the coding unit.
Douglas invoked this argument form in 1947 in the case
of Craig v. Harney when he pointed out that often the Supreme
Court is required to make "an independent examination of the 
72facts." The facts requiring such an independent examina­
tion in this case related to a series of editorials rather 
vigorously attacking a judge in a local trial. The papers 
were charged with contempt, convicted, and appealed to the 
Supreme Court where through Douglas' majority opinion, their 
convictions were reversed. Looking to the editorials and 
their probable impact upon the judge's impartiality, Douglas 
wrote :
. . .  it takes more imagination than we possess to find 
in this sketchy and one-sided report of a case any im­
minent or serious threat to a judge of reasonable 
fortitude. . . .  We agree with the court below that 
the editorial must be appraised in the setting of the 
news articles which both preceded and followed it.
It must also be appraised in light of the community 
environment which prevailed at that time
The rule to which this analysis of the "tangibles " was
intended to infer was the "clear and present danger test,"
but this argument was distinct from the Argument from Rule
72331 U.S. 367 (1947) at 373. ?3lbid., at 375-376,
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for it clearly emphasized the facts of the case and not the 
rule itself.
A similar result was reached in Douglas' oft-quoted 
dissent in Dennis y. united States, one of the leading 
Communist conspiracy cases of the 1950's. In Dennis, the 
Court sustained the convictions of twelve members of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United 
States for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act. 
Addressing himself to the notion of advocacy of abstract 
doctrine, Douglas asserted that "how it can be said that 
there is a clear and present danger that this advocacy will 
succeed is, therefore, a mystery. . . .  in America they 
[Communists] are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; 
their wares remain u n s o l d . I n  the absence of evidence 
on the record that such advocacy would in fact result in 
the overthrow of our system of government, Douglas argued, 
the first amendment afforded protection to the defendants. 
Thus, the Exigential Argument from Context may be seen to 
reply upon factual evidence, or the lack of it, when such 
evidence is deemed relevant to the decision. Reference to
74341 U.S. 494 (1951) at 588-589.
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a legal rule is often the result of such an argument, but 
is not the basis of it.
A final example of how Douglas argued from the
exigencies of the instant case to a rule, with emphasis
upon the former, also arose in the context of what Emerson
7 Rcalled "the post-war hysteria known as McCarthyism." The 
Court denied certiorari in Black v. Cutter Labs, a case 
involving the dismissal of an employee on the grounds that 
she was a security risk. Douglas argued that the case should 
be heard, and his opinion relied predominantly upon the 
Exigential Argument from Context:
Cutter Laboratories is an important pharmaceutical 
factory. It may need special protection. It may need 
to establish safeguards against sabotage and adulte­
ration. It may need special screening of its employees. 
But there is not a word in the present record indicating 
that it needs protection against Doris Walker. She has 
no criminal record, she is guilty of no adulteration, 
no act of sabotage. The factory in question has not 
been plagued with any such problem. It is only the 
fear that Doris Walker might at a future time engage 
in sabotage that is made the excuse for her discharge.
I do not think that we can hold consistently with our 
Bill of Rights that Communists can be proscribed from 
making a living on the assumption that wherever they 
work the incidence of sabotage rises or that the danger 
from Communist employees is too great for critical 
industry to bear.
75Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres­
sion (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 112.
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The blunt truth is that Doris Walker is not dis­
charged for misconduct but either because of her 
legitimate labor activities or because of her 
political ideology or belief. Belief cannot be 
penalized consistently with the First Amendment.^®
The dominant theme of this opinion was thus an analysis of
the factual situation— the tangibles— which then led to a
generalized rule, in this case the first amendment.
An inductive internal dynamic thus differentiates the 
Argument from Context from the deductive internal dynamic of 
the Argument from Rule and the Argument from Ideal. In the 
first sub-species, the sociocentric, the same inductive 
progression underlies the argument— specific social situations, 
social contexts, social goals as manisfested in specific 
cases, lead to but do not rely upon, generalizations taking 
the form of common law, statutory, or constitutional rules.
The relativistic sub-species of the Argument from Context 
uses inductive processes, but with a different result. Here 
the judge-rhetor reads the contrariety of situations, the 
aesthetic and/or epistemological variability inherent in 
value judgments, and reasons to the rule that there can be 
no rule to accomodate such disparate situations. Finally, 
the exigential Argument from Context is based upon factual
"^ 3^ 51 U.S. 292 (1956) at 302-303.
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phenomena and views them as controlling. The judge pro­
ceeds from such facts ^  a rule, and that sequence of the 
argument distinguished it from positivistic (i.e., syllo- 
gis tic) arguments.
The Case for Rhetorical Genres in Judicial Opinion
The foregoing discussion of William O. Douglas' first
amendment opinions has attempted to answer the first question
posed in this dissertation; Can judicial opinion be generi-
cally classified according to the jurisprudential basis of
its argument? On the Basis of analyzing two hundred and
seven of William O. Douglas' first amendment opinions, there
appears to be sufficient evidence for a qualified affirmative
7 7answer to that question. The hypothetical definitions of 
the genres were drawn both from legal philosophy and 
rhetorical theory, and Douglas' actual rhetorical behavior 
was observed to be consistent with the hypothesized argu­
ment forms. But it is most important to note that rhetorical 
genres are also determined as much by rhetorical elements 
that are not present as by those that are. By avoiding or 
subordinating certain rhetorical responses to certain
^^The qualifications of this affirmative answer will 
be taken up in Chapter V of this study.
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situations, the remaining array of options is correspond­
ingly limited, thereby contributing to a recurring pattern 
of rhetorical practice— a "cluster" in Edwin Black's term. 
The import of this observation for the present study is 
that the asserted exhaustiveness of the categories was 
demonstrated to be correct. No opinions were encountered 
that could not be coded as being predominantly founded in 
one of the hypothesized genres, it is fairly typical of 
content analytic studies to have a "miscellaneous" category 
to accomodate the "left overs"--the coding units that failed 
to fit any of the hypothesized classes. Of course, many of 
the opinions contained aspects of more than one genre, but 
first, none were encountered which were not predominantly 
warranted in one of the genres, and second, none were 
encountered which argued from warrants unrecognizable as 
one of the three hypothesized herein— there were no "left 
overs." The refusal to abandon a hypothesized category 
system when nature refuses to be tortured into it is a 
pitfall of social science encountered all too often; no 
reason for giving up on this category system was found.
The institutional constraints discussed at length in 
Chapter II were seen to cut across all three jurisprudential- 
rhetorical genres. Regardless of whether a justice argues
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from Ideal, from Rule, or from Context, he remains con­
strained by the stylistic and mechanical conventions of the 
Court for which he speaks. He cannot disregard either 
statute, precedent, or Constitution; he cannot disregard 
the variety of audiences his opinion will have; and he 
rarely can disregard the opinions posted by his colleagues.
Thus all Supreme Court opinions may be said to belong 
to an "institutional" genre, but that alone does not con­
stitute a rhetorical genre. For that, the mechanical and 
stylistic constraints inhering in the institution must merge 
with substantive philosophical and argumentative elements 
into an internal dynamic that pulls all the factors together 
into a coherent whole, a recognizable cluster formed along 
a rhetorical continuum. Three such clusters formed in 
Douglas' first amendment opinions. Whether we may, on this 
evidence, classify Douglas himself--whether in Richard 
Weaver's term we have a "characteristic major premise"
recurring frequently enough to justify a claim that it
7R"characterizes the u s e r " — was the second major question
^®Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: 
Henry Regenery Company, 1970), p. 56.
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raised in this study, and we turn now to the evidence pro­
duced here for answering it.
Rule-Based Rhetoric and the First Amendment:
The Douglas Dynamic 
The second major question raised in this study asked: 
"are there generic clusters in William O. Douglas' first 
amendment opinions, and if so, what are they and how can 
they be characterized?" It was necessary to first establish 
whether there was reason to believe rhetorical genres existed 
at all in judicial opinion before moving to this question.
The previous section of this chapter reported the results 
of analyzing his first amendment opinions and argued on the 
basis of that analysis that such genres probably do typify 
rhetorical responses to judicial exigencies. Assuming the 
validity of the category system which guided that analysis, 
the finding emerged that when addressing first amendment 
issues, Douglas adopted the Argument from Rule— the legal 
positivist warrant--in 56.5% of his opinions (see Table 1, 
p. 204).
To conclude from the quantitative domination of the 
Argument from Rule that Douglas was not the "supreme 
expositor from the bench of the philosophy of legal
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realism,"79 as Dean Severn claimed, is a tempting, but not 
entirely warranted, conclusion. First, Severn may only 
have meant that Douglas did it better than anyone else, a 
claim this researcher is not prepared to dispute. Second, 
until such time as comparison studies on other justices 
could be made to determine the extent to which they relied 
upon the Argument from Context— Justices like Holmes, 
Hughes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Black, for example— we can­
not say who couched his rhetoric in realist philosophy most 
often. Douglas may indeed have done so both better than 
anyone else and more often than anyone else as well, but 
presently we cannot say either with certainty. Third, to 
place disproportionate faith in quantitative evidence would 
be to assume incorrectly that frequency of occurrence is 
the most valid indicator of salience or significance of a 
content datum to the encoder. This study found, for 
example, that Douglas relied upon natural law arguments in 
only 8.7% of his first amendment opinions. The finding of 
a comparison study that Justice Rehnquist, for example, 
never relied upon such arguments, would cast a somewhat
^^Michael I. govern, "Mr. Justice Douglas," Columbia 
Law Review 74 (1974), p. 345.
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different light upon such a small figure. Similarly, if we 
discovered that Douglas' 8.7% figure represented a signifi­
cantly greater reliance on natural law rhetoric than say 
Holmes or Hughes, then the importance of the mere presence 
of such arguments would transcend their relative frequency 
or infrequency, and much different critical responses would 
be in order. Finally, and most importantly, two points 
made earlier must be reiterated. First, reliance upon 
precedents, laws, and constitutional provisions is a way of 
arguing in an opinion which is largely expected by all 
audiences related to the Supreme Court as an institution, 
an expectancy forming perhaps the most powerful constraint 
on a justice's rhetorical options. Second, and following 
from the point just noted, rhetoric is not religion, a judge 
is not baptized into a jurisprudential faith from which he 
never wavers. Different exigencies produce different re­
sponses --when such responses cluster consistently over long 
periods of time and in many cases, they may form a genre, 
but not a denomination.
But despite all these cautions, the fact remains that 
arguments typical of legal positivism and not legal realism 
dominated the first amendment opinions of Justice Douglas
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throughout his tenure on the Court, and that is a finding 
at odds with the overwhelming body of critical comment 
regarding his philosophical orientation, if we adopt the 
skeptical attitude of the realists themselves, and insist 
that behavior alone counts above all else in the study of 
legal institutions, then the rhetorical behavior of William 
O. Douglas in his first amendment opinions must surely create 
some doubt about the extent to which he utilized legal 
realism.
The Rhetoric of Majority and Dissent;
Measuring the Received Wisdom 
The final question this study sought to answer was 
whether William 0. Douglas argued from different rhetorical- 
jurisprudential bases in majority opinions than in non­
majority opinions. Within the methodological framework 
employed in this study, the answer to that question is an 
emphatic no. The obvious disclaimer in order is that just
as there are "as many ways of finding the ratio of a case
80as there are ways of finding a lost cat," there are as
many ways of slicing a rhetorical cheese as there are
®®Simpson, p. 159
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critical mice to nibble at it. Replicability is not a prime 
objective of the critical method. But genre criticism, 
properly conceived and clearly operationalized, may hold more 
promise of getting critical responses to rhetorical artifacts 
somewhat more consistent with one another and thereby move 
us somewhat closer to the goal of theory building in rhetor­
ical criticism and rhetorical practice. Another critic 
examining Douglas' first amendment opinions from a non­
generic perspective might find differences between the 
rhetoric of majority and non-majority opinions, especially 
if that is what he was looking for. But by combining the 
genre approach derived from legal philosophy and rhetorical 
theory with the systematic and quantitative approach of 
content analysis, no such differences were found, despite 
the substantial and persuasive body of scholarship claiming 
that they should be there. The logic of this argument per­
haps should be made explicit. If the category system adopted 
herein is valid (i.e., exhaustive of rhetorical options as 
manifested in jurisprudential orientation), and it were 
followed uniformly in assigning coding units to categories, 
and if the statistical analysis of differences between 
categories were properly performed, then based on the present
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analysis of Douglas' first amendment opinions, the received
wisdom that the rhetoric of majority and non-majority
opinions is vastly different is due for closer scrutiny.
Such procedures might even prove to be replicable,
Tables 3, p. 207 and 4, p. 208 display the frequencies
and percentages of majority and non-majority opinions
81respectively by genre. The chi square test indicated 
that these frequencies represent differences significant 
at the p <  0.001 level, meaning that regardless of whether 
he was in the majority or dissent, Douglas displayed a 
dominant preference for rule-based arguments. Table 5, p. 
209 however, displays what may be the most important 
finding of the present study. When the frequencies of 
majority opinions occurring in each genre are compared with 
the non-majority frequencies for each genre, differences in 
statistical significance at the p ^  0.05 level were not 
found, meaning that whether he argued from Ideal, Rule, or 
Context, the opinion type was not a factor sufficiently 
strong to predict Douglas' generic choices.
Q1
The chi square formula adopted in this study was 
taken from Frederick Williams, Reasoning With Statistics, 
2nd ed,, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1979), pp.
106-110.
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When his opinions were broken down into the four sub- 
types (see Table 6, p. 210), both of these findings held 
true, there was no significant difference between majority 
and non-majority rhetorical options— a uniform preference 
for the Argument from Rule across opinion types recurred. 
This genre accounted for no less than 50.5% of any opinion 
sub-type and reached a high of 73.3% in the case of pro­
cedural dissents. And finally, when the majority and non­
majority groups were independently analyzed, the same 
result recurred, no statistically significant differences 
between the sub-types of either group were found (see Tables 
7, p.211 and 8, p. 212).
Two inferences seem warranted from these data. First, 
even further reason to doubt the characterization of Douglas 
as a legal realist is now on the record. The four opinion 
types identified are exhaustive and the generic classifi­
cations are exhaustive and no differences of statistical 
significance emerged upon analyzing any combination of them. 
If, as assumed from the beginning of this study, a judge's 
opinions are the appropriate place to look for his legal 
philosophy and rhetorical proclivities, then these findings 
must be taken into account in any evaluation of Justice
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Douglas. Second, these data raise serious questions about
the often asserted differences between the rhetoric of
majority and non-majority opinions. If replicability is
not a goal of rhetorical criticism, accuracy certainly is
and perhaps only through analyzing large numbers of
objectively selected opinions--majority and dissent--can we
get an accurate picture of their nature. This is clearly
a case of bringing to fruition Edwin Black's summation of
his case for genre criticism when he wrote that,
. . .  if one of the major objectives of rhetorical 
criticism is to enrich our understanding of the 
rhetorical uses of language critics can probably 
do their work better by seeing and disclosing the 
elements common to many discourses rather than the 
singularities of a few.®^
The critic armed with a more narrow perspective may very
well be unduly influenced by the grand language of a
Cardozo or a Hughes and thus go out and "find" that dissents
83which "appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, " are 
vastly different from majority opinions. But such research 
would tell us nothing of what was not found by not looking 
at large numbers of both majority and non-majority opinions. 
The genre approach, coupled with content analytic techniques
82Black, pp. 176-177. ®®Hughes, p. 68.
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forces the critic to look at the dull as well as the stirring 
opinions and a more accurate critical appraisal emerges as 
a result.
A fairly common occurrence in studies of the scope of 
this one is to find more than one set out to find. Some­
times such findings are significant, sometimes trivial, most 
times interesting. It is not unheard of for the researcher 
to, post hoc, alter the intent of the study in order to 
accomodate the findings. That, however, was no temptation 
presently for the "extra" findings here came as no particular 
surprise. They do, though, provide some quantitative support, 
although qualified, for existing assertions that Douglas was 
a judicial "loner," meaning that he had a disproportionate 
incidence of dissents. Over his entire career, first amend­
ment dissents outnumbered majority opinions by 120 to 87, 
a margin of 58% to 42%. The ultimate significance of that 
figure, of course, must await comparison studies reporting 
the frequency with which other justices dissented in first 
amendment cases. Furthermore, as Douglas aged on the job, 
the liklihood of his opinions being dissents grew, a finding 
probably more attributable to the changed make-up of the 
Court in his later years than to recaltricance on Douglas'
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part. That William 0. Douglas dissented from the majority 
of the Nixon Court more frequently than from the majorities 
of the Roosevelt or Warren Courts should be small wonder 
to most observers. Finally, Douglas recorded a marked 
increase in the occurrence of procedural dissents in the 
latter part of his career. The inference suggested by that 
datum clearly points to Justice Douglas' brethren rather 
than to some alleged obstinancy on his part: they no longer
granted Supreme Court review to the kinds of first amend­
ment cases he feld needed resolution. Interestingly, he 
marshalled some of his most precedent-laden opinions in 
these procedural dissents in the attempt to place on the 
record rule-based arguments for admitting as many free 
speech controversies as possible for judicial review.
Summary
This chapter has reported the results of analyzing two 
hundred and seven of William 0. Douglas' first amendment 
opinions in the attempt to answer the three questions pursued 
in this study. On the basis of the analysis herein performed, 
a tentative affirmative answer to the first question of 
whether judicial opinion may be generically classified on 
the basis of jurisprudential-rhetorical orientation was
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offered. Regarding the second question, of what generic 
clusters, if any, characterized Douglas' first amendment 
opinions, rather clear evidence emerged to support a claim 
that his rhetorical tendencies ran to legal positivism more 
frequently than to legal realism or natural law. And 
finally, the comparison of Douglas' majority and non­
majority rhetoric yielded the unexpected result that no 
statistically significant differences in generic frequencies 
occurred.
As with any major study, doubts arise, disclaimers 
clamor for a hearing, and new questions, both substantive 
and methodological, come to mind. Those concerns make up 
Chapter V, and we now turn to them.
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Table 1
Frequency of All Opinions by Genre 
(N = 207)
Genre Frequency
Argument from Ideal: The 
Natural Law Warrant 18 ( 8.7%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 117 ( 56.5%)
Argument from Context: The 
Legal Realist Warrant 72 (34.8%)
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Table 2
Yearly Distribution of Genres
Year* Argument 
from Ideal
Argument 
from Rule
Argument 
from Context
Total for 
the Year
1943 0 2 0 2
1944 0 2 0 2
194 5 0 2 1 3
1946 1 1 2 4
1947 0 0 2 2
1948 0 1 0 1
1949 1 0 1 2
1951 1 1 4 6
1952 3 1 3 7
1953 1 3 0 4
1954 0 1 1 2
1955 1 0 0 1
1956 0 0 2 2
1957 1 2 1 4
1958 0 4 0 4
1959 1 3 0 4
1960 0 1 0 1
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Table 2 (Continued)
Year* Argument 
from Ideal
Argument 
from Rule
Argument 
from Context
Total for 
the Year
1961 2 8 3 13
1962 2 1 0 3
1963 0 1 4 5
1964 0 1 0 1
196 5 0 4 2 6
1966 0 3 7 10
1967 1 3 5 9
1968 0 7 6 13
1969 0 3 2 5
1970 0 2 2 4
1971 2 6 5 13
1972 0 19 7 26
1973 1 14 4 19
1974 0 17 6 23
1975 0 4 2 6
Grand
Totals 18 (8.7% 117 (56.5% 72 (34.8%) 207
*LEXIS retrieved no cases for the years : 1939, 1940, 1941,
1942, or 1950.
-207-
Table 3
(N = 87)
Genre Frequency*
Argument from Ideal : The 
Natural Law Warrant 6 ( 7.0%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 53 (61.0%)
Argument from Context: The 
Legal Realist Warrant 28 (32.0%)
*(These frequencies represent differences between genres
significant at the p<, 0.001 level.)
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Table 4
Frequency of Non-Majority Opinions by Genre
(N = 120)
Genre Frequency*
Argument from Ideal : The 
Natural Law Warrant 12 (10.0%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 64 (53.3%)
Argument from Context: The 
Legal Realist Warrant 44 (36.7%)
*(These frequencies represent differences between genres
significant at the p <  0.001 level.)
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Table 5
Distribution of Genres by Opinion Type
Genre Majority Non-Majority
Argument from Ideal: The 
Natural Law Warrant 6 ( 7.0%) 12 (10.0%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 53 (61.0%) 64 (53.3%)
Argument from Context: The 
Legal Realist Warrant 28 (32.0%) 44 (36.7%)
Total in Opinion Type 87 (100%) 120 (100%)
These frequencies represent differences between opinion
types that are not significant at the p <  0.05 level.
Table 6
Distribution of Genres by Opinion Sub-Type
Genre WOD for WOD Concur­ WOD Dissent­ WOD Dissent­
the ring with ing From ing Prom
Majority Majority Majority Denial of
Cert., etc.
Argument from Ideal:
The Natural Law Warrant 2( 7.7%) 4( 6.6%) 11(10.5%) 1 ( 6.7%)
Argument from Rules The
Positive Law Warrant 17(65.4%) 36 ( 59.0%) 53(50.5%) 11(73.3%) i
H
Argument from Context: °
The Legal Realist Warrant 7(26.9%) 21(34.4%) 41(39.0%) 3(20.0%)
Total in Opinion Type 26(12.6% 61(29.5% 105(50 . 7%) 15( 7.2%)
These frequencies represent differences between opinion types that are not
significant at the p <  0.05 level.
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Table 7
Distribution of Majority Opinion Sub-Type by Genre
Genre WOD for the WOD Concurring
Majority With Majority
Argument from Ideal : The 
Natural Law Warrant 2 ( 7.7%) 4 ( 6.6%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 17 (65.4%) 36 (59.0%)
Argument from Context: The 
Legal Realist Warrant 7 (26.9%) 21 (34.4%)
These frequencies represent differences between sub-types of
majority opinions that are not significant at the p <, 0.05
level.
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Table 8
Distribution of Non-Majority Opinion Sub-Type by Genre
Genre WOD Dissenting 
From Majority
WOD Dissenting 
from Denial of 
Cert., etc.
Argument from Ideal;
The Natural Law Warrant 11 (10.5%) 1 ( 6.7%)
Argument from Rule: The 
Positive Law Warrant 53 (50.5%) 11 (73.3%)
Argument from Context:
The Legal Realist Warrant 41 (39.0%) 3 (20.0%)
These frequencies represent differences between subtypes of 
non-majority opinions that are not significant at the 
p <0.05 level.
CHAPTER V 
IN RETROSPECT 
Introduction
For each of the three questions pursued in this study, 
this chapter identifies qualifications and implications of 
the findings reported, suggests further substantive questions 
to be pursued in each area, and offers methodological refine­
ments that would enhance scholarly efforts to cope with 
related future questions. This study closes with an Epilogue 
which addresses the nature of doing a study of a person like 
William O. Douglas.
Rhetorical Genres in judicial Opinion 
That rhetorical genres exist in judicial opinion in the 
form of Argument from Ideal, Argument from Rule, and Argument 
from Context seems evident. The first qualification of this 
claim, of course, flows from the limitations of case study.
To infer from one justice, particularly one like Douglas, 
to all others is questionable. But two central issues must
-213-
-214-
be kept in mind. First, case studies are not designed to 
provide final answers, only initial clues. The clues here 
are strong. Legal philosophy offers no schools of thought 
other than the three developed in this study and the legal 
philosopher best equipped to draw out the rhetorical impli­
cations of his discipline, Chaim perelman, has argued that 
the essential nature of philosophy is its attempt to urge, 
by argument, a certain view of the world upon its con­
sumers Second, although Douglas is probably an unrepre­
sentative case, the same can be said of any justice who 
ever served— there is no "typical" Supreme Court justice.
But they do all serve the same Supreme Court— they all serve 
an institution and a legal system with certain endemic 
characteristics and to that extent any justice, no matter 
how atypical he may appear, can provide some insight into 
the nature of the system he serves.
A second general qualification of the generic claim 
made here has to do with the nature of the exigencies to 
which Douglas was responding. All the evidence offered 
herein is based upon rhetorical responses to first amendment 
exigencies. One aspect of this disclaimer is that these
^See footnote 54. Chapter II,
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issues were perhaps more personally salient to Douglas than 
to other justices, a consideration which could color the 
results of an analysis such as this. Another aspect of 
this disclaimer is that despite the fact that an analysis 
of only first amendment opinions achieves more precision 
than other studies have, it is still quite a broad brush 
with which to paint. First amendment law divides into 
speech, press, assembly, establishment, exercise, and peti­
tion clauses, each of which may possibly inspire different 
responses because of the vastly different exigencies which 
may typify them. The present study made no distinction on 
the basis of these different areas of law for to do so 
would have rendered the project virtually impossible of 
completion by a single scholar working with such a large 
number of opinions. However, there is a thread running 
through these diverse elanents of the first amendment which 
justifies treating them together. The "personal fulfill-
2
ment" dimension of the first amendment, as Emerson put it, 
cuts across all these areas of law in Douglas' approach. 
Whether the instant case arose from controversies involving
^Thomas I. Emerson, "justice Douglas' Contribution to 
the Lav: The First Amendment, " Columbia Law Review 74
(1974), p. 3 56.
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sidewalk oratory, religious pamphleteering, or labor union 
organizing, Douglas saw the situations as kin: They all
represented individual citizens striving through expression 
to gain a measure of dignity, to improve their lives, to 
spread the truth as they saw it. Thus, although the first 
amendment's penumbra covers a variety of rights, we are 
warranted in treating them as a sufficiently similar class 
of exigencies for purposes of genre criticism.
One central implication of the existence of rhetorical 
genres based upon legal philosophy inhering in judicial 
opinion seems apparent: Jurisprudence should not be a means
of labeling a justice, but rather a means of classifying 
his arguments ; Because Douglas relied predominantly upon 
the Argument frcxn Rule, it does not follow, ipso facto, that 
he is a legal positivist. Because he relied occasionally 
upon natural law rhetoric does not automatically support a 
claim that he subscribed to that jurisprudence in any life­
long way. And because he issued opinions aimed at engineering 
social goals, that alone does not place him in the camp of 
the legal realists. These philosophical variations are best 
understood as variant rhetorical responses to variant legal 
situations— a jurisprudential set of topoi— to which the
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judge-rhetor may refer. They are "the available means of 
persuasion in emy given case," not a mold from which the 
judge may never escape. By understanding jurisprudence in 
a rhetorical light, we probably can better evaluate the 
judge, his arguments, and the legal philosophy as well.
Two general areas of new substantive questions seem 
ripe for study. The first is to explore other Supreme 
Court justices' generic tendencies in order to further dis­
cover the extent to which rhetorical genres typify judicial 
opinion. This study has provided sufficient reason to 
believe that such genres exist; comparison studies on other 
justices offer the only way of determining whether the 
present case study typifies behavior or captures an atypical 
one. A second way of enhancing the validity of the present 
generic claim would be to perform the same euialysis on a 
substantial body of Douglas' opinions from a different area 
of law. Would he argue differently upon complex monetary 
or fiscal issues; would the areas of substantive and proced­
ural due process give rise to rhetorical responses similar 
to those of first amendment cases; would environmental law, 
because of its relatively recent emergence upon the consti­
tutional scene, by typified by a greater reliance upon
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Argvunent from Context or would Douglas ' intense feelings in 
the area engender stirring natural law arguments? These are 
questions of equal significance to the present study that 
must await a future day, but their answers alone can confirm 
or dispute the ones offered here.
For each of the three questions pursued in this study, 
one primary methodological refinement seems desirable: the
size of the coding unit needs to be reduced. By reducing 
the size of the coding unit from the entire opinion to some 
smaller lexical or syntactic structure, such as the "assertion" 
as devised by Osgood, Sapor ta, and Nunnally,^ two advantages 
would accrue. First, multiple coders could be employed 
because they would not be required to read hundreds of pages 
of text in order to make coding decisions. Further, with 
explicit and clear coding instructions, little or no 
knowledge of legal philosophy or rhetorical theory would be 
required. This expertise would dictate the composition of 
the coding instructions, of course, but the coders them­
selves would not need it. The use of multiple coders would 
allow for inter-coder reliability measures to be performed,
^Charles Osgood, Sol Saporta, Jum C. Nunnally, "Evalu­
ative Assertion Analysis," Litera III (1956), pp. 47-102.
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a check obviously not possible with a single coder. A 
second major advantage of reducing the size of the coding 
unit would be to allow for sampling from large and diverse 
bodies of documents. Once the primary researcher reduced 
the coding units to assertion-sized statements, comparison 
studies could be made upon various areas of law within the 
work of one justice, or between the opinions of two or 
more different justices. Such comparisons would not only 
be extremely interesting and valuable in and of themselves, 
but would provide further data for determining the validity 
of the classificatory scheme itself.
Qualifying the Douglas Dynamic 
The second question this study sought to answer asked 
what generic clusters, if any, characterized the judicial 
rhetoric of William O. Douglas. Based on the analytic 
system adopted herein, the conclusion was reached that 
arguments typical of legal positivism dominated Douglas' 
opinions in all stages of his career and in all types of 
opinions. Two disclaimers similar to those above are in 
order. First, the validity of the category system is only 
assumed at this stage of its development. This researcher 
believes it possesses face validity, but until other analyses
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of other justices reveal similar clusters of arguments, 
the system's validity must remain assumptive. Second, 
again this analysis was limited to first amendment cases, 
a factor which could conceivably influence the rhetorical 
responses of a judge. The finding, for example, that 
Douglas relied heavily upon rule-based arguments in many 
diverse areas of law would obviously lend strength to the 
claim that he is a positivist. But for now, the point 
made above must be recalled: legal philosophy best describes
rhetoric, not rhetors. Even this claim, though, needs tem­
pering .
The single most important implication of the finding 
that Douglas relied predominantly upon the Argument from 
Rule is the apparent necessity to reevaluate the widespread 
belief that he was best classified as a legal realist. The 
question must first be put: what is required to sustain a
claim that a justice ^  a realist or a positivist or a 
natural lawyer? This study suggests that those who have 
placed Douglas with the legal realists have ignored that 
question and have either taken him at his word or have 
believed previous commentators placing him there. The best 
answer seems to be that both the students of Douglas and
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and the students of Richard Weaver should amend their 
position to read; "a characteristic major premise char­
acterizes its user for today only." Judicial philosophy 
is best understood as argument and it therefore is the best 
way to characterize a judge; but a judge may make diverse 
rhetorical choices over a long career, obviously Douglas 
did, and therefore the only meaningful descriptive-critical 
statements are those which say: "at this time and to this
extent a particular justice relied upon a particular genre 
predominantly." Thus the minimal requirement for character­
izing a judge as a devotee of a particular jurisprudence is 
that he argued from its tenets in some substantial, long­
term, or quantitatively significant fashion. Until such 
data are on the record, critics must temper the sweep of 
their conclusions.
The primary question remaining unanswered in this study 
is: do these findings hold true in areas of law other than
the first amendment? The quantitative distribution of 
generic choices Douglas made in arguing freedom of expression 
cases was fascinating; whether it was representative is 
another (question. The rights of criminal defendants was an 
area of law Douglas held to be vitally important. How
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would he argue cases focusing upon fundamental constitutional 
issues such as habeas corpus, right to counsel, or search 
and seizure? These ideals, along with freedom of speech and 
press, are deeply embedded in our Anglo-American heritage: 
would he see them as ontologically wedded to the Constitution 
and its subordinate positive laws— the Thomist version of 
natural law--or would he also marshall the statutes and 
precedents in their cause he did for the first amendment?
In sierra Club v. Morton,^  Douglas argued that, like the 
corporation, "valleys, alphine meadows, rivers, lakes, 
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or 
even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern 
technology and modern life," should have standing to sue 
in their own behalf. Is this novel approach to the sociology 
of law the sine qua non of Douglas ' rhetoric in environmental 
law, or was that famous dissent only a flight of rhetorical 
fancy? These and many other questions can and now should 
be asked in diverse substantive areas of law covered in the 
long career of Justice Douglas.
The same methodological refinement— reducing the unit 
of analysis from the complete opinion to a more manageable 
size— would yield desirable results in further research on
4405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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questions of this sort also. For example, a randomly 
arranged set of assertion-sized statements representing 
several diverse areas of law could be presented to coders 
for judging. A finding of similarity or difference of 
generic responses to different legal exigencies could thus 
be determined with increased expediency and reliability. 
Validity of the measure could be enhanced because of the 
smaller the size of the coding unit, more units may be
t
presented to coders at one session, and as the data base 
grows in size and scope, so grows the validity of the find­
ings based upon it.
The Rhetoric of Majority and Dissent; Qualifications, 
Implications, and Further Research 
The final question this study pursued asked whether 
William O. Douglas argued from variant generic bases in 
majority and non-majority opinions. Rather compelling 
statistical evidence emerged supporting an affirmative 
answer to that question. But again, disclaimers are 
necessary.
First, as pointed out in Chapter IV, critics may 
approach rhetorical artifacts from many diverse perspectives, 
and if they do, diverse critical insights would ensue. The
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analytic method adopted herein was a hybrid of critical and 
content analytic techniques and it found no differences 
between majority and non-majority rhetoric. A critic view­
ing judicial rhetoric through the lens of neo-Aristotelian 
methods might see differences. A Burkeian critic, especially 
if he or she defined the "agency" as opinion type (majority 
or non-majority), would almost certainly find differences.
But on the one hand, the traditional critic must find effects 
and a dissent is by definition a sort of defeat. On the 
other hand, Kenneth Burke only gave his followers five 
dimensions of rhetorical acts to analyze and his category 
system may well prejudice results, particularly if it is 
used as a set of critical cookie cutters. This researcher 
remains satisfied that genre criticism coupled with quanti­
tative measures offers an approach superior to others for 
certain tasks. Its qualitative dimensions are capable of 
apprehending intrinsic aspects of many discourses, placing 
them side by side, and moving toward an appreciation of the 
essential nature— the internal dynamic— of a class of 
documents. Its quantitative dimension adds a measure of 
objectivity to criticism that is lacking in most approaches. 
Only by quantifying rhetorical constituents of a class of
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documents may we even approach validity measures other than 
intuitive ones. Only by quantifying certain characteristics 
in a sub-population can we make objective comparisons with 
other sub-populations, in short, this hybrid holds promise 
of bearing critical fruit of a much more useful variety 
than some of its ancestors, namely progress toward estab­
lishing the essential nature of various kinds of discourse.
A second disclaimer due here speaks again to the in­
herent limitations of case study. This study established 
that Douglas manifested no differences between majority and 
non-majority opinions, but that provides little grounds for 
inferring the same conclusion to other justices. Should 
future studies find the generalization that no differences 
in fact exist to be true, then we must discard the received 
wisdom of the opposite generalization that different rhetor­
ical elements inhere in majority than non-majority opinions. 
What the present study has done is offer good reason for 
performing such studies. Douglas is without doubt one of 
the more significant justices in the Court's history and his 
opinions have been and will continue to be the object of 
critical scrutiny for many years. If his opinions contra­
dict the received wisdom, then it requires réévaluation.
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Two areas of further research are suggested by the 
finding that no significant differences exist between 
majority and non-majority opinions. One is to test this 
finding in areas of Douglas* judicial career other than 
first amendment law. Exigencies arising in different con­
stitutional settings may produce characteristically differ­
ent rhetorical responses from majority rhetors than from 
dissenters. That possibility should be explored. Second, 
the career opinions of other justices should be analyzed 
to determine whether they resort to different generic 
options when with the majority than the dissent. Only if 
major studies of large samples of opinions produced by many 
justices in many areas of l&w are performed can we truly 
know what generalizations are in order about judicial 
rhetoric.
Such studies would be facilitated by the same method­
ological refinement suggested previously— reducing the size 
of the coding unit. Particularly when multivariate research 
designs are called for, such as simultaneously comparing 
several justices' opinions in several areas of law, several 
opinion types, and several time freimes, large numbers of 
coding units would be required and small coding units would 
facilitate the analysis.
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Epilogue
Somewhere in my graduate career a professor remarked 
in class that an exciting and rewarding mode of study was 
to "get inside the head of a great man or woman and stay 
there for a time." Examples like Karl Wallace's extended 
study of Francis Bacon were given. Doing so, it seems, is 
rather like the practice of the ancient sophists and the 
modem Jesuits of having their students memorize the speeches 
of great orators until something of the greatness "rubs 
off." Longtitudinal studies force one over the gray patches 
as well as the purple, the perfunctory as well as the 
inspired, but only through long and intensive "inside the 
head" studies of great figures can one stand a chance of 
genuine insight, or perhaps obtain a glimpse of the internal 
dynamic of the person as well as the work.
With William O. Douglas, one first sees a master lawyer 
and an inspiring intellect. But one soon also sees some­
thing of a humorist, a satirist. One imagines him occasion­
ally peering from between the lines of stare decisis with a 
wink in his eye. Often one sees a Jonathan Edwards exhorting 
his flock with messianic zeal that they hang by a thread over 
the pit of repression and totalitarianism. At times one sees
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a social engineer carefully measuring the stress points in 
the structures of the culture and prescribing remedies.
But what one realizes only after being inside the head of 
Douglas for a yeeur or two is that you are also inside his 
heart. One comes to understand that whether he refers to 
eternal law, to last year's precedent, or to next year's 
society, he never loses sight of the individual human beings 
living and working under a regime of law and he strives 
always to keep as much of that regime off their backs as 
possible. Insights like that can make a dissertation 
personally as well as professionally worthwhile.
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